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Rishabh Das

An Embedded Defense-in-Depth Module for Detecting
Cyberattacks on Interdependent SCADA Controllers
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) is a process control archi-

tecture with interconnected computers monitoring and controlling physical processes
using sensors and actuators. SCADA manages large cyber-physical systems like water treatment, gas pipelines, oil terminals, and power systems. These processes use
a decentralized computing architecture. Small ruggedized digital computers (programmable logic controllers or PLCs) adapted for the control of industrial processes
perform the distributed control. These computers do not have security built into
them and rely on external nodes for the detection of cyber-attacks. This dissertation
introduces an embedded intrusion detection system (IDS) inside the PLCs.
The embedded intrusion detection system detects anomalies related to the
PLC’s network traffic and abnormalities of the sensors and actuators in the physical
process. Additionally, the embedded IDS has a peer-to-peer network to share system state among PLCs. The shared states allow the embedded IDS to detect the
legitimacy of sensors connected to neighboring nodes.
The evaluation of the intrusion detection framework needs a modular highfidelity SCADA testbed capable of reproducing large scale cascading events. Moreiv

over, the framework should support the examination of the interdependencies between
subsystems. Because such testbeds are lacking in the SCADA research community,
this dissertation introduces a novel modeling and simulation approach by segmenting
SCADA components into five segments. This technology is employed to replicate a
virtual midstream oil terminal adhering to the American Petroleum Institute (API)
standards. The virtual midstream oil terminal acts as a foundation for testing the
intrusion detection framework and is one of the major contributions of this research.
Hence, the contributions of this research are towards two primary domains
related to SCADA cyber-security: a modular SCADA virtualization framework and
an embedded intrusion detection system.

10/26/2020

Abstract Approval: Committee Chair
Dr. Thomas Morris

Ravi Gorur
Department Chair

Digitally signed by Ravi Gorur
Date: 2020.11.10 10:47:12
-06'00'
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Cyber-security isn’t perfect, but you can cut
the risks by doing the basics
—Andy Rees
1.1

Overview

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are physical processes connected to sensors and actuators with a tightly coupled industrial controller
that runs a program to monitor and control the physical process. SCADA systems
include a networked connection from the industrial controller to a separate computer
with a Human Machine Interface (HMI) [2]. Operators use the HMI to monitor and
control the physical system. Some industrial sectors using SCADA are: energy, water, transport and shipping, communications, banking and finance, and defense [10].
SCADA systems are vulnerable to a variety of cyber-attacks. Attackers can compromise an HMI and issue illicit control actions [1]. Compromising a computer with
network access to the industrial controllers can permit network injection attacks [1].
The attacker can also spoof control information and sensor data traffic [1,4]. Another
kind of cyber-attack is a logic bomb, hidden inside the ladder logic [5-7], firmware,
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or hardware of the peripheral devices [1]. Disruption of the SCADA processes caused
by equipment failure or a cyber-attack can disrupt and damage critical infrastructure
operations, cause major economic losses, contaminate the ecological environment and
even more dangerously may claim human lives. [8,10].
The extreme consequences of cyber-attacks on industrial control systems (ICS)
managed by SCADA has motivated a large amount of research [35-45]. Wenjuan et
al. implemented a distributed active anomaly detection module for identifying false
alarms in medical cyber-physical systems [35]. The medical devices use a supervised
version of the fuzzy if-then rule and can reduce false alarms. Mitchell et al. used a
behavior-rule based anomaly detection system (BRIDS) for identifying attacks from
data aggregation points (DAP) in power systems [36]. A rule-based approach is used
to detect temporal anomalies in power system substation multi-cast messages [37].
A range of whitelisting strategies is used to identify access control anomalies [38].
These research use a purview of techniques to counter several security issues related
to cyber-physical systems. Chapter 2 will provide a comprehensive insight into the
current state of the active intrusion detection research.
The defensive countermeasures provided in research [35-48] do not provide
an absolute answer to all cyber-threats; rather the defenses are directed to address
specific cyber-security challenges. Table 1.1 lists a few popular articles from current
literature aimed at addressing specific cyber-security issues. These popular research
articles are solutions to a specific problem in the cyber-security of ICS.
“Cyber-security isn’t perfect,” [11] and a more “holistic approach is one that
uses specific countermeasures implemented in layers to create an aggregated, risk2

Table 1.1: List of popular active intrusion detection methodology research on
IEEE Xplore and Science Direct selected on basis of number of citations
Title
A Multidimensional Critical State
Analysis for Detecting Intrusions in
SCADA Systems
Cyber Security of Water SCADA
Systems—Part I: Analysis and
Experimentation of Stealthy
Deception Attacks
Neural Network Based Intrusion
Detection system for Critical
Infrastructures
Multiattribute SCADA-Specific
Intrusion Detection System for Power
Networks
Highly Available Intrusion-Tolerant
Services with Proactive-Reactive
Recovery
Cyber Security of Water SCADA
Systems—Part II: Attack Detection
Using Enhanced Hydrodynamic
Models
Modbus/DNP3 State-Based Intrusion
Detection System
Idaho National Laboratory
Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition Intrusion Detection
System (SCADA IDS)
A Cybersecurity Detection Framework
for Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition Systems
Accurate modeling of Modbus/TCP
for intrusion detection in SCADA
systems

Citations

Year

Addressed Cyber-security Issues

133

2011

Detection of critical state in SCADA
systems [39]

129

2013

Detection of remote water pilfering
from automated canal systems [40]

78

2009

Illegal or anomalous activity within
the computer network [41]

73

2014

Whitelisting for detecting
Man-in-the-middle attack [42]

64

2010

Denial-of-Service attack on SCADA
networks [43]

58

2013

Sensor-actuator faults and
communication network-induced
deception attacks [44]

58

2010

SCADA-DoS, MiTM, Replay and
unauthorized command execution [45]

45

2008

Network protocol overflow using traffic
monitoring [46]

43

2016

Attack on transport layer of the
network and SCADA protocol [47]

141

2013

Anomaly detection in TCP MODBUS
using deterministic finite automaton
(DFA) [48]

based security posture—helps to defend against cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities that could affect these systems” [NCCIC ICS-CERT Defense-in-Depth 2016] [12].
This layered approach is called Defense-in-Depth and provides a scalable framework
that incorporates a conglomerate of security principles and frameworks for securing
an ICS.
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The end goal of defense-in-depth is to limit and contain the impact of any
security incident. The adversary is forced to pass through multiple layers which improves security by raising the “cost” of an intrusion while improving the probability
of detection and capability to defend against a malicious attacker. Multiple numbers of layers increase the difficulty of reconnaissance activities on ICS networks and
systems. [NCCIC ICS-CERT Defense-in-Depth 2016] [12].
Most of the security modules integrated into the defense-in-depth layers are
active monitoring software (intrusion detection system) capable of detecting anomalous behaviors [41-48]. An intrusion detection system (IDS) monitors system state
by monitoring network traffic, system logs, memory content and behavior, file system
content, and behavior, and with SCADA systems some IDS monitor the physical system state [39]. IDS classify this behavior to show the state of the system. Two class
IDS separate activity into normal and attack classes. Multi-class IDS attempt to
define activities into specific categories such as identifying specific attacks. Intrusion
Prevention System (IPS) responds to IDS outcomes and can carry out a set of predefined actions to steer the physical system towards a safe state. This might reduce the
severity of the cyber attack or might safeguard the SCADA system against certain
cyber attacks altogether.
IDS are installed onto a trusted node; these are computing systems that are
inherently secure, available, and reliable. In a SCADA framework, HMIs and central
servers that can connect to industrial controllers are designated as trusted nodes.
These computers host the IDS software or hardware module and scan all inbound and
outbound traffic to the SCADA controller and other peripheral devices connected to
4

the industrial network. The SCADA controller cannot recognize the legitimacy of
network commands.
Any commands from the trusted nodes are considered authentic. This means
if an attacker compromises a trusted node the IDS protecting the industrial controller
can be disabled or the attacker can send malicious commands to sabotage the physical process being controlled by the controller. This research advances the current
IDS/IPS state-of-the-art by developing a method to embed IDS and IPS capabilities
inside industrial controllers. The concept of embedded IDS for ICS is unique and is
not pursued in the range of cyber countermeasures in current literature. Once deployed inside SCADA controllers this technology has the following novel capabilities:

1. The ability to identify and block injection attacks on SCADA controllers.
2. The ability to identify and block Denial of Service (DoS) attack on SCADA
controllers.
3. Ability to identify Man-in-the-Middle (MiTM) attacks between PLCs and trusted
nodes.
4. Embedded IDS has a private peer-to-peer network to share the state of SCADA
controllers on the same network.
5. Multiple controllers manage large physical processes in industries. In such interdependent processes, readings from one controller might influence the control
logic or even influence the commands provided by human interaction through
the HMI. If an attacker compromises one controller, they can disrupt the func-
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tionalities of other controllers. A pre-trained long short term memory (LSTM)
neural network predicts the integrity of the neighboring controllers based on
the received states through the peer-to-peer network. This allows end nodes to
monitor each other; these nodes are referred to as watchdogs [23].

The intrusion detection framework needs a modular high-fidelity SCADA testbed
to understand the vulnerability associated with each segment of a SCADA system.
Because such testbeds are lacking in the SCADA research community, this research
introduces a novel modeling and simulation approach by segmenting SCADA components into five sections. The smaller components can be virtualized independently
which results in a portable, low-cost, and high-fidelity testbed for SCADA cybersecurity research. The proposed modular framework is used to replicate a virtual
midstream oil terminal which adheres to American Petroleum Institute (API) standards. Users can simulate cyber-attacks and examine the effects on the physical
system components. The scale of the virtual midstream oil terminal testbed allows
researchers to model cyber-attacks that exploit multiple components at once or in
sequence. This flexibility allows the reproduction of larger scale and cascading events
and supports examination of the interdependencies between systems. The method of
making modular testbeds and the construction of a full-scale midstream oil terminal is
of great importance to SCADA researchers. This technology will act as a foundation
for testing the intrusion detection framework and is one of the major contributions
of this research.
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Hence, the contributions of this research are towards two primary domains
related to SCADA cyber-security. First, the portable modeling framework is a contribution to the domain of SCADA testbed architecture. Second, the embedded
intrusion detection system is a unique improvement that adds a new defense-in-depth
layer and improves upon existing security modules. Upcoming sections in this chapter will discuss the motivation behind the current research and will enumerate the
research method and the contributions made in the domain of cyber-physical system
testbed development and embedded intrusion detection systems.

1.2

Defense-in-Depth in ICS

The Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT)
divides the information technology and operational technology network architectures
of modern industrial control systems into a combination of five functional levels and
two demilitarized zones (DMZ) as shown in the figure below [12,13].
Information Technology Zone:
• Level 5 (Enterprise Network) : Level five is the perimeter layer of the
ICS network framework. The enterprise network includes connectivity to the
internet, peer locations and backup architecture that can be local or on the
cloud.
• Level 4 (Site Business Planning and Logistic Network) : The corporate
communications, email servers, Domain Name System (DNS) servers, and IT
business systems make up level 4.
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Figure 1.1: Level segmentation of IT and OT networks in ICS architecture [12]

Due to the connectivity of level 4 and 5 to the internet, a wide number of attacks
can affect the components in these zones. Hence, researchers consider level 4
and 5 untrusted and DMZs are used to isolate these levels from the operational
network [12].
Operational Technology Zone:
• Level 3 (Site Manufacturing Operations and Control) : Centralized
monitoring systems, historians and data acquisition servers are used to monitor
and record field data from distributed controllers and intelligent field devices.
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The risks associated with this level come from direct connectivity to any external
systems or networks.
• Level 2 (Area Control) : Level 2 contains nodes capable of monitoring
and controlling field devices using a Human-Machine Interface (HMI). These
devices filter the machine-to-machine level data to the human-to-machine level.
Monitoring devices at level 2 are called trusted nodes, and the signals and
commands from this level to a device at a lower level are considered legitimate.
• Level 1 (Basic Control) : The field controllers like Programmable Logic
Controllers (PLCs) reside in this level. The controllers sample and process the
analog and digital data recorded by the sensors and use this data for internal
decision making. Pre-programmed user-defined logic is used to make control
decisions. The operator can query or send commands to the controller from
level 3 using an HMI to gain visibility or to change process settings across the
field sensors and actuators.
• Level 0 (Process) : Sensors, actuators and basic input/output devices constitute this zone. These are edge devices that communicate the state of the
physical processes to the controller and change the state of the process using
the actuators.
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) : A demilitarized zone also known as a perimeter
network is a physical sub-network that acts as a mediatory network architecture for
connecting devices to prevent exposure from a larger and untrusted network. Creating
a DMZ requires a firewall to have three or more interfaces, rather than the typical
9

public and private interface. One interface connects to the operational network, the
second to the corporate network and the remaining interfaces are used to connect the
shared or insecure devices like data historian, wireless access points, etc. [13].

1.2.1

A brief discussion of attacks and security modules associated with
each defense-in-depth layer:
The layered architecture of the defense-in-depth allows layered strategies that

secure each core zone and which offer more opportunities for information and resource
control to the administrators. Administrators cascade several security modules to
counter a wide variety of cyber-attacks without affecting the core functionalities of
the control system.
An intruder trying to disrupt a critical infrastructure will seek to compromise
the core control domains in level 3 and below. The primary aim of the attacker is to
determine a path through the layers to gain limited or complete control over the core
services and operational capability of the control system [8,12]. In an attack scenario,
the intrusion begins outside the control zone (at level 5 or level 4) and the intruder
pries deeper and deeper into the architecture. While having access to the outer levels
(level 5 and level 4) the attacker can steal information from the database servers
or can disrupt the functionality of the computers. A historical instance of such an
attack is the Shamoon malware attack on an oil and gas company called RasGas [52].
The Shamoon malware used spear-phishing techniques to infect computers at levels
4 and 5. “Wiper” module of the Shamoon virus deleted databases involving public
information which resulted in a huge financial loss for the company.
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Table 1.2: Security module used on each layer of the defense in depth for ICS
Levels
Level 5 (Enterprise
Network)

Information
Technology Zone

Principal
Components
Web servers, back-up
server, database
managers

Security Modules

Known attacks

Anti-virus,
anti-malware,
firewalls, IDS [12]
Distributed data
monitoring systems
like SPLUNK, rule
based anomaly
flagging system to
monitor corporate
communications

SQL injection,. Cross
site scripting, web
server vulnerabilities

Level 4 (Site Business
Planning and Logistic
Network)

DNS server, corporate
communication
server, email server,
IT management
servers

Level 3 (Site
Manufacturing
Operations and
Control)

Centralized
monitoring systems,
historians, data
acquisition servers
and remote HMIs

SCADA/aware
firewall [50],IDS

Malwares, Worms,
Trojan, OS based
vulnerabilities

Level 2 (Area
Control)

Monitoring and
controlling nodes
(HMI)

Rule based data
monitoring system,
IDS, access control
using whitelisting
strategies [51]

Malwares, worms,
trojan, OS based
vulnerabilities

Level 1 (Basic
Control)

Controllers like PLC

Encryption is
sometimes employed
[49]

Level 0 (Physical
Process)

Sensors, actuator,
basic I/O

No known security

Operational
Technology Zone

Phishing, social
engineering based
attacks, password
attacks [55]

Denial of Service,
Buffer overflow, logic
bombs, network based
attacks from level 2
Physical tampering,
hardware trojan

To damage the operational components of the system, the intruder can gain
access directly into level 3 computers (like STUXNET [53]) or might find security
holes in each level and wrest its way from level 5 to level 3 (like Black Energy[54]).
Table 1.2 shows some common attack vectors and security modules relevant to each
layer of the defense-in-depth architecture.

1.3

Motivation

The SCADA architecture has gone through several changes over the years
which has increased the exploitable attack vectors [4]. Threat actors like hackers,
activists, terrorist organizations and even nations are leveraging any unprotected
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attack vectors available for malicious intent. This has resulted in an alarming increase
in cyber-attack scenarios over the past decade [10]. This section discusses all the
factors motivating this research.

1.3.1

Increasing number of attack vectors/surface over the SCADA generations
SCADA systems have been used in industries since the 1980s [2]. Over the

years, sections of the older architectures were updated to incorporate the superior
networking capabilities. Updating sections permitted the SCADA systems to have
scalability and enhanced interoperability at a lower cost and downtime. But the
increasing interconnectivity of SCADA networks exposed them to a wide range of
network security problems [7]. This is well documented in the existing literature:
Bangemann et al. provide a comprehensive analysis of how integrating newer technologies into older SCADA architecture have opened unforeseen vulnerabilities in the
system [3]. The authors attribute the vulnerabilities to the increase in data-flow.
This claim is further supported by other literature [1] and [4-8].
Urjarosi et al. categorizes the SCADA frameworks into four major generations
based on technological and market evolution: monolithic, distributed, networked and
web-based [4].
• Monolithic (Before-1980s): This is the earliest known SCADA framework
used to control cyber-physical processes. Networks were non-existent and the
computing operations were surrounded around centralized mainframe systems.
Each mainframe was a standalone controller for a certain process and had no
12

connectivity to other systems. The standby controllers monitored the state of
the primary mainframe and in case of failure, the standby mainframe took over
the process control system.
• Distributed (1980-2000): The introduction of Local Area Networking (LAN)
allowed the specific process control tasks to be distributed among several stations. The stations shared information in real-time using inter-connectivity offered by the LAN. Distribution of system functionality across multiple stations
increased the processing power of the control system and improved redundancy
and reliability of the system [4].
• Networked (2000-2011): The networked generation closely follows the hierarchical design of the distributed generation. Multiple stations networked
together controlled specific functionality of the process control system. The
only major improvement over the second generation was the introduction of
the Wide Area Network (WAN). Using the WAN protocols such as the Internet
Protocol (IP), a portion of the master station responsible for communication
with the field devices (like the HMI) was segmented from the distributed field
controllers.
• Web-Based(2011-present): The current generation of SCADA architecture
is driven by the advancement in cloud computing and Internet-of-Things (IoT).
Using the cloud computing technologies the current generation of SCADA can
monitor and report the status of remote sites spread across vast distances.
The decentralized cloud computing architecture also provides the flexibility of
13

Figure 1.2: ICS vulnerabilities by year [15]

implementing more advanced control algorithms and more resource-intensive
tasks like data modeling, real-time data analysis, etc.

The evolution of the SCADA architecture over the generations provided modern networking and computing capabilities which improved the reliability and efficiency of SCADA operations. Advanced networking capabilities introduced over the
generations facilitated the use of complicated data modeling and monitoring algorithms that leveraged the distributed computing power of a cluster of computers.
The increasing features came at the cost of adding new vulnerabilities and attack
vectors to the system.
The increase in the number of attack vectors has resulted in more disclosed
vulnerabilities in energy, transportation, aerospace, oil and gas, chemicals, automotive
and manufacturing, food and drink, governmental, financial, and medical institutions.
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Figure 1.2 shows a growing list of vulnerabilities between the year 1997 to 2015
based on a study conducted by Kaspersky Lab, OSINT (Open Source Intelligence),
and information from public sources like ICS-CERT [15]. An embedded intrusion
detection system based at level 1 of the Defense-in-Depth security architecture will
add monitoring capability to the field controllers.

1.3.2

Global increase of attacks on cyber-physical systems
The evolution of networked technologies and the internet has made vulnera-

bilities accessible to the threat actors such as terrorists, activists, criminals, insiders,
patriotic hackers, illicit entrepreneurs, botnet herders, and other malware writers [17].
Cyber-incidents related to ICS are on the rise. The report by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) published in 2016 shows a 1303 percent rise
in reported cyber incidents from 5,503 in the fiscal year 2005 to 77,183 in the fiscal
year 2015. Figure 1.3 shows the increase in reported cyber incidents [17]. Malicious
activity in cyberspace has increased in sophistication, breadth of impact, and scale
of damage [14].
Table 1.3 summarizes high impact cyber-attacks between the years 1980 to
2017. The very interesting piece of information from the table is the attack vector
used by the threat actor to gain access to the lower levels (level 0, level 1, level 2) of
the ICS architecture. Access to the lower levels allows the attacker to interact with
the physical operational components of the ICS and can cause significant damage to
the system and society. The information about the attack vector used is decisive, and
it reveals the weakness in the practiced security measures.

15

Figure 1.3: Increasing incidents of cyber attack reported by US-ICS

In cyber-attack scenarios like STUXNET, HAVEX, Black energy, and New
York dam attack, the attacker gained access into the trusted nodes (level 2) by using
an attack vector on the same or higher level. Security modules like the intrusion
detection systems, firewalls are located in level 2 and above. These security measures
were not effective in blocking the cyber-attacks.
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Table 1.3: Comprehensive list of cyber attacks between 1980 to 2020
Year

Name of the attack

Affected Country

Attack vector

1982

Siberian gas pipeline

Russia

Compromised pressure sensor

1992
1994

Ignalia nuclear power
plant
Hacking of Arizona
salt river project

Elicit commands from the
trusted nodes
Attacker compromised HMI from
an external network
Direct unauthorized wireless
access to the actuators
Buffer overflow bug in SQL
servers
MS-SQL vulnerability was used
to compromise a node inside the
network

Lithuania
USA

2000

Maroochy

Australia

2003

SQL Slammer

USA

2003

Nuclear plant
slammer attack

USA

2003

Nachi worm on
control servers

France

2004

Sassor worm

Buffer overflow vulnerability on
Windows XP

USA

Buffer overflow vulnerability in
Local Security Authority
Subsystem Service of microsoft
windows

UK

Employee’s laptop computer was
compromised via the Internet
and then used as an entry point
to install a computer virus and
spyware on the plant’s computer
system
Former employee used system
knowledge and credential to
break into the power system
Infected storage devices were
used to compromise inside
computer nodes

2006

Water company hack
in Pennsylvania

USA

2009

Power company hack
in Texas

USA

2010

STUXNET

Iran

2010

Night Dragon

USA

Spear phishing and SQl injection
of public facing website

2011

Duqu/Flame/Gauss

Iran

Zero day vulnerability in
Microsoft Word

2012

Gas Pipeline
Campaign

USA

Spear-phishing emails were used
to infiltrate the corporate
network

17

Impact
Damage to pipeline
and financial loss
Damage to nuclear
reactor
No damage to life or
property
Environmental
damage
Denial of service on
database servers
Network slowdown,
financial loss and
system crash
The worm launched a
SYN flood attack
once inside the
system. This caused
Denial-of-Service and
financial loss.
System damage to
chemical plant
Interruption of
service in
transportation system
Attacker generated
spam emails to
employees and stole
electronic information
Financial loss and
compromised system
data
Physical damage to
centrifuges used for
Uranium enrichment
Stolen intellectual
property and financial
loss
Monitored
cyber-physical
systems and reported
them back to the
attacker
20 natural gas
pipeline companies
reported intrusion to
DHS

Table 1.3(contd.): Comprehensive list of cyber attacks between 1980 to 2020
Year

Name of the attack

Affected Country

Attack vector

2012

Shamoon

Saudi Arabia

Vulnerabilities in the microsoft
NT kernel

2013

Target Stores

USA

Spear phishing emails were used
to steal credential of the HVAC
vendors

2013

New York Dam

USA

Cyber-physical system connected
directly to internet

2014

German Steel Mill

Germany

Spear-phishing using email

2014

Havex Malware

USA and Europe

Spear-phishing emails and water
hole attacks

2014

Black Energy
Malware

Ukraine and Poland

Spam emails and phishing email

2014

Dragonfly/ Energetic
Bear Campaign

United States, Spain,
France, Italy,
Germany, Turkey,
and Poland

Phishing emails

2015

Ukraine Power Grid
Attack

Ukraine

Spear-phishing emails

2016

Shamoon-Attack 2

Saudi Arabia

Default login credentials in
peripheral devices

2016

Ukraine Power GridAttack 2 /
CRASHOVERRIDE

Ukraine

Compromised ICS hardware

2017

APT33

United States and
Saudi Arabia

Spear-phishing emails

2017

NotPetya

Ukraine

Vulnerability called EternalBlue
in microsoft operating system

2017

TRITON/Trisis/
HatMan

Saudi Arabia

Vulnerability in microsoft
windows operating system

18

Impact
The virus wiped and
destroyed the
harddrives of 35,000
Aramco computers
Massive financial loss
and data breach
No financial loss or
damage to the
physical system
A blast furnace at the
German steel mill
suffered massive
damage
Stolen credentials and
data from the
victim’s computer
Financial loss due to
DDoS attack
Aviation, defense and
energy industry was
compromised. The
ICS software got
infected with trojans
30 substations were
switched off
temporarily
disrupting electricity
supply to the end
consumers
Critical data was
deleted at General
Authority of Civil
Aviation
The compromised
HMIs were used to
open circuit breakers.
This resulted in
power outages and
blackouts
Reconnaissance
attack on aviation,
energy, and
petrochemical sectors
Ukraine’s Chernobyl
Nuclear Power Plant
went offline
Disabled safety
instruments in a
petrochemical plant

1.3.3

Limitations of security paradigms in the defense-in-depth architecture
DMZs and other security components in the defense in depth layers fail if the

intruder compromises a trusted node at level 3 or lower and uses it to launch an
exploit against the operational network. This is because the field controllers at level
1 of the defense in depth architecture expect the commands from the trusted nodes
(level 2) to be legitimate [13].
This research adds to the current state-of-the-art defense-in-depth by providing a framework for embedding an intrusion detection/prevention system at level 1
(inside the controller). Having an embedded intrusion detection framework inside the
SCADA controller can block malicious commands and attacks, even if the attacker
compromises the trusted node (level 2).

1.4

Threat-model and choice of cyber-physical system

This section states the reasoning behind choosing a mid-stream oil terminal
for evaluating the developed security module and explores the threat model relevant
to the set intrusion scenarios in this study.

1.4.1

Choice of cyber-physical system for risk evaluation
The SCADA controller manages crucial systems and assets, which are often

the key resource of a nation. These are vital to the nation’s economy and their failure
will sabotage the security, economic foundation, public health, and safety of a com-
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munity. The Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) in December 2003
designated fourteen industrial sectors as critical infrastructures [1]. As of today, the
Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21) superseded the HSPD-7 and has increased
the number of recognized critical infrastructure to sixteen [17]. This list includes the
following sectors:
• Chemical sector
• Commercial facilities sector
• Communications sectors
• Critical manufacturing sector
• Dams sector
• Defense industrial base sector
• Emergency services sector
• Energy sector
• Financial services sector
• Food agriculture sector
• Government facilities sector
• Healthcare and public health sector
• Information technology sector
• Nuclear reactor, materials and waste sector
• Transport systems sector
• Water wastewater systems sector

This research validates the embedded security module using a full-scale simulated model of a mid-stream oil terminal. The testbed involves the storage and
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distribution of liquid cargo and falls under the energy sector infrastructure. Operational areas like tank farms, tanker trucks gantry, marine tanker jetty, and crosscountry pipelines can handle processes such as receipt (using cross-country pipeline
and marine tankers), storage (in tank farms) and dispatch (using tanker trucks and
marine tankers) per the guidelines set by the American Petroleum Institute (API)
standards. The terminal handles liquid cargo like gasoline, high-speed diesel (HSD),
and aviation turbine fuel (ATF). A mid-stream oil terminal is an important aspect of
the oil and gas energy sector and cyber-attacks can cause disruptions that span across
multiple critical infrastructures sectors like transport systems, critical manufacturing,
and defense industrial base sector.
The significance behind choosing a cyber-physical system from the energy
sector domain is summarized below:
• Most attacked critical infrastructure: The US ICS-CERT performs an
annual industrial control systems assessment every financial year. According to
the assessment summaries of the financial year 2014, 2015, and 2016, the energy
sector reported 32%, 16%, and 21% of the total cyber incidents respectively.
This makes the energy sector as one of the most targeted critical assets.
• Most losses incurred because of cyber attacks: The energy sector suffered
the highest average annual losses from cyber-attacks between the years 2009 to
2015 (USD 21.73 million per year) [22].
• Dependence of other critical infrastructure on the energy sector: The
functionalities of other critical infrastructure depend on the energy sectors.
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Cyber-attack on the energy sector will have an immediate crippling influence
on a nation’s security. And the impact of such an attack will affect processes
in sectors like transport systems, critical manufacturing, and defense industrial
base sectors.

1.4.2

Threat model
This research focuses on cyber-attacks on a midstream oil terminal from a

compromised Trusted Node (TN). The threat model presumes that the malicious
attacker has established a path through the defensive strategies positioned in level 5,
level 4, and level 3. And gained limited or complete control over the trusted node at
level 2 of the defense-in-depth architecture. Level 1 and 0 have no security module
built into them and trust any commands from the trusted node. In such a scenario,
the attacker from the compromised trusted node can monitor and control the core
services and operational control system at level 2 or below.
To gauge the threats exploitable from the compromised nodes, chapter 5 uses
an asset-centric threat modeling technique introduced by Microsoft called STRIDE
[57]. STRIDE represents a mnemonic for six types of security threats: Spoofing,
Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of
privilege. Additionally, this research uses attack trees [140] to analyze possible attack
paths for exploiting malicious goals during various liquid cargo operations.
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1.5

Summary of research methodology and contributions

The end goal of this study is to develop a level 1 embedded security layer inside
the controller that is capable of detecting cyber-attacks performed on a mid-stream
oil terminal from a trusted node (level 2). To accomplish this study, the research
was performed in several steps. The completed steps along their contribution to the
current cyber-security research of ICS is enumerated below:
Step 1- Developing a simulation framework for virtualizing ICS
To reinforce the security features in industrial control systems, researchers and
engineers are implementing novel techniques. But testing newer approaches on industrial SCADA systems in operation often poses a challenge. This is because the
industrial control system (ICS) oversees critical processes, and testing newer technologies might disrupt the physical systems causing loss of life and property. Hence,
researchers prefer to build replicas to study the impact of cyber-attacks on ICS. While
there are several testbeds mentioned in literature [27-37] none of them can simulate
each layer of the ICS. Hence, this research introduces a novel simulation framework
capable of replicating each ICS layer mentioned in defense-in-depth architecture with
high fidelity to an actual industrial system. The developed framework has the following features:
• Modular: Each segment of a SCADA system are modeled using the modeling
framework
• Portability: The virtualized framework is portable and can be shared with
researchers
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• Cost: The cost of replicating a physical process using the virtual framework is
low
• High-Fidelity: The characteristics of the virtualized testbed during normal
and cyber-attack scenarios are similar to the physical process.
• Scalable: The modeling framework can make to-scale virtual models of physical
processes.
Contribution- A modular SCADA virtualization framework
Step 2- Validating developed framework with a physical laboratory scale
gas pipeline testbed
The physical characteristics and the behavior of the virtual system are compared to a laboratory-scale gas pipeline model during the normal and cyber-attack
conditions. The comparison showed a high fidelity response from the virtual testbed.
Contribution- The gas pipeline model can be used for SCADA training, for prototyping and testing cybersecurity controls, for finding cyber threats and attack surfaces
and for SCADA education.

Step 3- Virtualizing a laboratory scale water tank
The virtual model of a laboratory-scale water tank is developed. Similar to
the gas pipeline testbed, the characteristics of the physical system during normal and
attack scenarios are compared to the virtual model.
Contribution- The testbed can be shared among SCADA researchers thereby enabling SCADA research and education.
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Step 4- Scaling up the laboratory scale models to a full scale mid-stream
oil terminal
The modeling technology is used to simulate a to-scale midstream oil terminal adhering to the American Petroleum Institute standards (API). The testbed
has twelve SCADA controllers and a total of 217 sensors and actuators controlling
the physical processes. This model can perform operations identical to an industrial mid-stream oil terminal like transferring liquid cargo from one tank to another,
transferring cargo between a tank and tanker truck, transferring cargo between a ship
and tank, and receiving cargo from a cross-country pipeline. Some of these loading
and unloading operations are often spread across multiple controllers and attacking
one such controller during an operation is visible across the entire system. The capability of simulating cyber attacks against inter-dependent SCADA controllers is
very valuable to the research community. These attacks can be studied and suitable
countermeasures can be devised.
Contribution- A to-scale midstream oil terminal testbed for SCADA research. This
testbed is capable of simulating the effects of cyber-attacks on controllers controlling
inter-dependent processes.

Step 5- Study the impact of cyber-attacks form the trusted nodes on the
midstream oil terminal onto the level 1 controllers
The mid-stream oil terminal testbed is used to develop an intrusion scenario
where an attacker has compromised a trusted node at level 2 of the defense-in-depth
architecture. From the compromised node at level 2, the accessible threats discussed
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in the threat model are exploited. The change in metrics like latency, inter-packet
arrival time, protocol efficiency, throughput, Shannon entropy, and KL divergence
are analyzed. The values of the actuator and sensors were studied to understand the
physical impact of cyber-attacks on the mid-stream oil terminal.
Contribution- An analysis of the impact of cyber-attack on mid-stream oil terminals
is performed.
Step 6- Create a dataset showcasing normal and cyber-attack scenarios in
a mid-stream oil terminal
A heterogeneous dataset was created that represents various operations of a
mid-stream oil terminal: like inter-tank liquid cargo transfer, marine tanker loading/unloading, pipeline transfer, etc. Data during cyber-attack scenarios from the
trusted nodes (level 2) to controllers (level 1), actuators (level 0), and sensors(level
0) are also documented.
Contribution- A cyber-security dataset for understanding intrusion scenarios in a
mid-stream oil terminal.
Step 7- Embedded architecture for placing a level 1 security module inside
the controller
In default a MODBUS configuration, the controller (level 1) monitors network
port 502 for incoming traffic from the trusted nodes (level 2). In the developed
architecture the security module monitors the 502 port and all incoming traffic is
relayed to the controller process using an internal loopback network. This allows the
security modules to monitor any incoming or outgoing traffic from the controller.
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Contribution- The architecture relaying the network traffic can embed security modules inside a level 1 controller.
Step 8- Embedded security module for detecting network based cyber
attacks on ICS
The network-based attacks are detected by monitoring network telemetry features like latency, inter-packet arrival time, protocol efficiency, throughput, Shannon
entropy,and KL divergence. A semi-supervised algorithm called the Local Outlier
Factor (LOF) compares the network telemetry information to a normal baseline. If
the data is an outlier, the LOF marks the packet as anomalous and forwards it to a supervised algorithm called Random Forest. The Random Forest algorithm categorizes
the anomalous packet into three classes: MiTM attacks, velocity-based command
injection and Denial-of-Service attacks. This lets the IDS choose a preprogrammed
response path to address the detected threat.
The combination of LOF and Random Forest can detect anomalous network
behaviors and identify if the anomaly is because of a MiTM or DoS attack.
Contribution- A network security module capable of detecting network-based attacks
Step 9- Developing a peer-to-peer network between the PLC to communicate system states
A python-based peer-to-peer network is developed for inter-PLC communication. The PLCs can share the state of the sensors and actuators with neighboring
PLCs.
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Contribution- Neighboring PLCs can use the peer-to-peer network to monitor each
other’s state. Distributed lightweight security modules can use this framework for
adding more security features [23].
Step 10-Develop a intrusion detection layer that is capable of detecting
the state of a level 1 controller
An LSTM based neural network is trained to estimate the actuator and the
sensor readings of neighboring controllers managing inter-dependent industrial processes. A correlation value of 0.9 is necessary to model such an interdependent industrial process. Using the peer-to-peer communication framework, each PLCs involved
in the interdependent process can score the legitimacy of the sensors and actuator
states of the neighboring PLCs. If the score for any PLC or the physical operation
falls below a threshold, the system detects an anomaly. This helps the system detect
spoofed sensors and actuator readings. The system also oversees if the readings of all
sensors in the interdependent process comply with each other.
Contribution- A novel framework capable of detecting cyber-attacks on controllers
managing inter-dependent processes.

1.6

Dissertation Organization
• Chapter 1: This chapter provides an overview of the proposed research. It introduces the problem statement and demonstrates the approach taken to tackle
the problem.
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• Chapter 2: This chapter provides a detailed literature review of existing technologies that can be used to develop high fidelity test-beds of industrial control
systems. Existing intrusion detection systems are also discussed in this chapter.
• Chapter 3: This chapter provides a detailed overview of the developed virtualization framework. A Laboratory scaled gas pipeline and a water tank are
virtualized and their characteristics are compared to the actual physical model
to test the fidelity of the developed framework. Applications and importance of
the virtualization framework are discussed in detail at the end of the chapter.
• Chapter 4: This chapter documents the architecture of a virtual midstream
oil terminal testbed. This testbed is modeled in accordance with the American
Petroleum Institute (API) standards. The components and the operations in
such an oil terminal are discussed in detail in this chapter.
• Chapter 5: This chapter identifies the cyber threats to the mid-stream oil
terminal using techniques like STRIDE and attack trees. After the enumeration
of threats, this chapter documents the physical impact of such threats on the
operations of the mid-stream oil terminal.
• Chapter 6: This chapter illustrates a novel embedded intrusion detection system for detecting network attacks. Several experiments are performed to validate the performance of the IDS.
• Chapter 7: LSTM based intrusion detection system for identifying attacks
on PLCs controlling inter-dependent processes is demonstrated in this chapter.
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These embedded security modules add to the network layer demonstrated in
chapter 6 and can detect anomalous behavior of interconnected neighboring
edge controllers.
• Chapter 8: This chapter concludes the discussions made in the dissertation.
A summary of completed work and the remaining future work is discussed in
this chapter
• Chapter 9: Provides a list of all the references cited in this dissertation
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The upcoming sections in this chapter explore the current state-of-the-art in
the domain of cyber-physical testbed development. This study considers ten prominent cyber-physical testbeds. Each testbed is reviewed against a common set of design
requirements necessary for evaluating an embedded intrusion detection system. The
study shows the shortcoming of the presented testbeds and justifies the need for the
virtual testbed methodology presented in this dissertation.
The second section reviews existing IDS frameworks as a combination of three
sub-systems: data sensors, an analysis engine, and a reporting system. The comparison highlights the caveats of each IDS and justifies the necessity of the distributed
IDS framework presented in this research.

2.1

SCADA Testbed for Cyber-Security Risk Evaluation

Several design constraints are used to quantify the credibility of ICS testbeds
for studying the impact of cyber-attacks. The most important characteristic is fidelity; which indicates the correlation of the response of the testbed to the real world
observations from an actual physical process [59]. Scalability (extensibility), flexibility
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(adaptability or controllability), repeatability (reproducibility), modularity, measurement accuracy, cost-effectiveness, safe execution and isolation, diversity, and usability
[25, 26] are all important ICS testbed features.
Scalability and modularity are closely related. A scalable testbed allows the
addition or modification of functionalities without significant reorganization and redesign. An excellent example of a scalable framework is one where the researchers
can add or remove system components like sensors, actuators, and controllers to accommodate newer functionalities. A modular framework facilitates scalability; this
is because a modular framework breaks the system down into elementary pieces. Researchers can expand the simulated physical process by introducing newer nodes or
technologies related to the cyber-physical system.
While developing a testbed for the evaluation of the embedded security module, significant importance is given to design constraints like scalability, flexibility,
repeatability, safety, fidelity, and modularity. This helps to create a scalable and
modular testbed to evaluate the embedded security features. The created cyberphysical testbed can reproduce the characteristics of each defense-in-depth level with
high-fidelity. This section reviews the available cyber-physical testbed frameworks
and gauges their effectiveness from the viewpoint of the aforementioned design constraints.
V-SCADA [27] is among the first research articles to implement a virtual
SCADA system for testing and training purposes. The physical process is a small
section of a power system that has five distribution substations. These substations
step down the voltage from 33 kilovolts to 11 kilovolts and output it to a local utility.
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The authors investigate six normal power system operations and five fault scenarios
but the implications of cyber-attacks are not studied in this research. Components of
the physical process are simulated as a single system and the authors give the highest
priority to fidelity, measurement accuracy, and cost-effectiveness. Vulnerability analysis or implications of cyber-attacks against physical components requires a modular
modeling approach. The simulation does not include independent implementation of
each component and hence cannot be used to analyze cyber-attacks against individual
system components.
Salazar et al. [29] documents a method for replicating the functionality of
a laboratory-scale conveyor belt into a virtual testbed. DELMIA V5 Automation
Platform from Dessault Systems is used to simulate the physical process. A virtual
version of the PLC is simulated inside Siemens Simantic manager software which
interfaces with the DELMIA simulator to exchange control system information. The
HMI is developed using LABVIEW and Solidworks. This testbed has three distinct
components: Physical system simulation, PLC, and HMI but the communication links
between the PLC and HMI and between PLC and the physical process are abstract.
Because there is no network communication, attacks against SCADA protocols cannot
be studied using this testbed. Furthermore, this framework supports only Siemens
PLCs.
VPST [31] combines large-scale simulation/emulation of networks of SCADA
power devices with real power system hardware and software, and a commercial electric flow generation and distribution simulator. The architecture is like DETER [61]
and NSTB [62] and can generate high-fidelity physical system response and SCADA
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network response to operational events. The real-time network performance of the
power system testbed is simulated using the real-time immersive network simulation
environment (RINSE). Components like relays and data aggregators are simulated
as independent elements that make this architecture scalable and flexible. Realtime simulators like RINSE combine the response of individual SCADA components
(like relays and data aggregators). This results in high fidelity and low modularity.
Although high fidelity is valuable, the validation of an embedded distributed IDS
requires a modular testbed. Moreover, the shortcoming of this testbed is regarding
diversity and safety. VPST combines Electricity Management Software (EMS) and
RINSE, and cannot simulate other cyber-physical systems.
Choi et al. [33] documented a testbed framework for modeling the ITER
power coil. ITER coils provide controlled DC current to charge and stabilize the
current in a toroidal field (TF). This testbed combines software, Field Programmable
Gate Array (FPGA), and a physical Siemens S7-300 PLC to make a replica of the
actual physical system. The hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) approach used in the testbed provides a high-fidelity response to the actual system. But certain limitations
like low modularity, no implementation of SCADA communication between the HMI
and the controller, and the use of single-purpose simulators like CODAC make it
non-scalable.
The Testbed for Analyzing Security of SCADA Control Systems (TASSCS)
is a sophisticated test bed developed to simulate the effects of eight different types
of cyber-attacks. TASSCS provides high fidelity simulation of the SCADA network
using MODBUS and DNP3 protocols. TASSCS does not simulate Programmable
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Logic Controllers (PLCs), instead, a MODBUS server is hosted on a control server
[70]. Because of this, vulnerabilities associated with the PLCs and their accompanying
programs cannot be tested using TASSCS.
Deterlab is another power system test bed used by over 2600 researchers. It
consists of 400 general purpose computing nodes and can support simulation of various
cyber-attacks such as SQL injection, TCP SYN flooding, worm modeling and more
[61]. Deterlab provides high fidelity simulations but the architecture of the test bed
is not modular. The security of the system can be analyzed as a whole; researchers
interested in analyzing specific components of the ICS such as PLC functionality,
SCADA network communications, or physical system vulnerabilities cannot use this
test bed. Secondly, the computing power necessary for the test bed is significant and
a number of networked servers are necessary to reproduce the results.
WAMS-RTDS is a cyber-physical testbed that can produce a high-fidelity
response to power system events. A Real-time Digital Simulator (RTDS) with a
hardware-in-the-loop architecture incorporates commercial control and monitoring
devices with custom MATLAB and Python scripts. AutoIt is used to automate
the simulation and control engine to model realistic power system contingencies and
cyber-attacks. The testbed is scalable but the use of hardware-in-the-loop components results in a system that is not flexible and diverse. WAMS-RTDS follows an
architecture similar to V-SCADA [27] and VPST [31]. It can produce high fidelity
response but cannot independently simulate each component of the SCADA defensein-depth architecture. Hence this framework cannot be used to validate the embedded
security modules in this study.
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Testbed Category :• Hardware testbed - Hardware components are used to develop the testbed
• Hybrid testbed- A combination of hardware and software is used to develop the
testbed
• Software-based testbed- Only software is used to develop the testbed
Reviewing the existing SCADA virtualization techniques reveals none of the
testbeds satisfies the design constraints necessary for evaluating a distributed embedded intrusion detection system. Hence, this research introduces a novel simulation
framework capable of reproducing the characteristics of each defense-in-depth level
with high-fidelity. The developed testbed considers the following design constraints:

• Scalability: The framework allows the addition and removal of system components like sensors, actuators, and controllers to accommodate newer functionalities.
• Flexibility: The testbed works with a variety of control algorithms.
• Modularity: Each component of the SCADA system operates independently.
• Fidelity: The response of each simulation component during normal and cyberattack scenarios accurately represents its physical counterpart.
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• Safety: The components of the simulation framework are virtual. Hence, the
developed framework can study the response of the physical system during a
cyber-attack without causing safety concerns.
• Diversity: This framework can simulate a wide variety of cyber-physical systems.
• Cost-effectiveness: The use of virtual components in the framework reduces the
cost of the testbed.

2.2

Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) for Cyber-physical systems

IDS is one of the primary tools for safeguarding IT and OT systems. An IDS
is composed of data sensors, an analysis engine, and a reporting system [24]. The
data sensor is a program that monitors the network or host data. Examples of sensor
data include but are not limited to traffic statistics, packet headers, service requests,
operating system calls, and file-system changes. The analysis engine aggregates the
data from the distributed sensors. A pre-installed algorithm inside the analysis engine
examines the aggregated data and detects any security violations. The reporting
system notifies the user about the security violations and can execute a predefined
response path to counteract the effect of the cyber-attack. An IDS with an analysis
engine placed at area control level (level 2 of defense-in-depth paradigm) or higher is
a centralized IDS [24].
The pre-installed algorithm inside the analysis engine of a centralized IDS
detects cyber-attack conditions using two approaches. The first mode looks for specific
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patterns or signatures. IDS using this technique is called signature-based IDS. These
IDS can detect all known attacks but cannot identify unknown attacks for which
no pattern is available. The second mode detects unknown attacks. This approach
known as anomaly-based detection uses a machine-learning algorithm to generalize
the normal behavior of the system. The algorithm compares the current state of
the system to the learned baseline and predicts if the system is anomalous. An IDS
can use an analytical engine that is signature-based, anomaly-based or it can be a
combination of both approaches.
Chapter 1 discusses the shortcomings of the centralized intrusion detection
approach. In this research, we take a decentralized approach to detect security violations from trusted nodes. The literature review in this section explores existing
intrusion detection systems which are decentralized or have similarity with the threat
model of the current dissertation. A thorough analysis of previous work identifies
five embedded IDS frameworks and one centralized IDS addressing the threat model
related to this work.
INTI (Intrusion detection of SiNkhole attacks on 6LoWPAN for the Internet
of Things) identifies sinkhole attacks on the routing services in IoT [23]. INTI is a
signature-based IDS and can detect, prevent, and self-heal the network in case of a
sinkhole attack. The edge nodes monitor and grade the integrity of their neighbors
mathematically. These edge nodes monitoring each other are referred to as watchdogs. The INTI system architecture has the data sensors and the analysis engine
embedded inside the edge node. The data sensors aggregate the number of incoming
and outgoing transmissions and forwards it to the analysis engine. Mathematical
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evaluations in the analysis engine assign reputation scores to the neighboring nodes.
If the reputation score falls below a predefined threshold, the reporting system isolates
the sinkhole node. Simulation results show that INTI achieves a detection rate of at
least 90% with fixed devices and 70% with malicious mobile nodes. The framework
uses a mathematical formulation to validate the proposed method. To address the
threat vectors discussed in this dissertation, the data sensors need to monitor more
features and the data analysis engine requires a different algorithm. Furthermore,
the INTI framework needs a communication paradigm through which edge nodes can
contact the neighboring nodes to share their existing states. The current implementation of INTI cannot detect attacks against the physical components of a system
such as tampering with a physical sensor or actuator and unsafe physical conditions
caused by illicit operations.
Oh et al. proposes a signature-based IDS that has low computational complexity and requires a small amount of memory to protect IoT devices. The authors use a
technique called auxiliary shifting to decrease the number of comparisons by skipping
target data. This approach is an improvement over the state-of-the-art Boyer-Moore
algorithm and achieves a 10% performance boost [63]. The Boyer-Moore algorithm is
a single-string matching algorithm [144]. The algorithm compares characters in the
malicious pattern from the rightmost character. When a mismatch occurs, the algorithm determines the maximum distance to shift the scan window. The algorithm has
O(mn) execution time in the worst case, where m is the length of the pattern, and n
is the length of the text string. The authors exploit the Snort v2.9 rule set to obtain
a pattern set containing 13,896 kinds of intrusions, including SMTP, DDoS, and DNS
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rules. The embedded data sensor receives the patterns and forwards it to the analysis
engine. The analysis engine uses the proposed pattern matching algorithm to detect
malicious activity. On detection, the embedded reporting system notifies the centralized nodes. This system can only detect attacks with known patterns. Moreover, this
system cannot detect the integrity of peer nodes.
Lee et al. put forth an embedded anomaly detection system that can monitor
the power usage of an end node and can categorize the state of the edge controller as
normal or abnormal [64]. The data sensor monitors the power usage of the processing
unit and sends the aggregated data to an anomaly detection algorithm (analysis
engine) for spotting any irregularity. This approach is effective in detecting cyberattacks that consume the computational resources of the end nodes like volumetric
denial-of-service. This dissertation includes threats that do not affect the power
consumption of end nodes; examples of such attacks are changing packet payload
(MiTM attack), disrupting interdependent processes being controlled by multiple
controllers, spoofing sensor readings. Moreover, the current implementation of the
anomaly detection system put forth by Lee et al. cannot evaluate the integrity of
peer nodes.
Le et al. describe a theoretical concept of a state-based embedded intrusion
detection system for edge controllers [65]. Similar to INTI [23], this IDS can monitor
the state of its neighbors. A collection of edge nodes forms a cluster and can communicate their states to a designated cluster head to cross-check the information reported
by different neighbors. This approach focuses on five network topology attacks: rank
attack, sinkhole attack, local repair, neighbor attack, DODAG Information Solicita41

tion (DIS) attack. The IDS data sensors do not monitor the physical characteristics of
the system. Hence the proposed concept cannot detect threats vectors like tampering
of sensors or compromised end nodes disrupting an interdependent process.
Adhikari et al. proposes a signature-based IDS framework that can detect
traditional cyber contingencies and cyber-attacks. The framework has a cascade of
three approaches: Hoeffding Adaptive Trees (HAT), drift detection method (DDM),
and adaptive windowing (ADWIN), and achieves an accuracy of over 94% while detecting 45 different cyber contingencies. The analysis engine uses labeled data for
training supervised classification algorithms [66]. Data sensors monitor the nodes
from a centralized location and create labeled data for validating the analysis engine. The centrally located data sensors cannot monitor the physical state of the
sensors and actuators of each node. Furthermore, the use of supervised algorithms
makes the framework domain-specific and the training of the analysis engine for a
multitude of physical processes becomes a challenge. These cases make the IDS proposed by Adhikari et al. unsuitable for addressing the threat vectors presented in this
dissertation.
Mowla et al. present a framework combining artificial neural networks and
decision trees to detect intrusions in medical devices. The data sensors are distributed
inside different acquisition layers and forwards the information to a centrally located
analysis engine in a cloud-based architecture. The analysis engine uses a supervised
approach to detect false data from the data sensors. This approach exhibits an
optimistic accuracy of 95% but the authors noticed significant latency as the detection
decisions come from the central analysis engine [67]. IDS with high latency cannot be
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To address the threat vectors relevant to the mid-stream oil terminal, the
design of the IDS should have the following characteristics:
• The IDS design should embed the data sensor, analysis engine and the reporting
system inside the edge controller.
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• The IDS should detect network and physical anomalies.
• In interdependent processes, the edge controllers should evaluate the integrity
of the neighboring nodes.
The analysis of existing embedded IDS reveals none of the frameworks satisfy the design constraints necessary for addressing the threat model. Hence, this
dissertation presents a novel modular embedded IDS framework, capable of detecting network and physical system anomalies. The IDS monitors fourteen protocolindependent features from network telemetry information and combines Local outlier
factor (semi-supervised) and Random Forest (supervised) to detect MiTM, repeated
command injection, and volumetric DoS attacks. A peer-to-peer network inside the
IDS allows an LSTM algorithm to evaluate the integrity of the neighboring nodes.
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CHAPTER 3

MODULAR FRAMEWORK FOR VIRTUALIZING
CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS

This chapter illustrates a modeling framework for replicating the characteristics of an industrial control system. The framework considers design constraints like
fidelity, modularity, flexibility, diversity, cost, and safety, and can create complete
virtual replicas. Later in this chapter, two case studies compare the characteristics of
a physical laboratory-scale water tank and a physical laboratory-scale gas pipeline to
their virtual counterpart developed using the proposed framework. The comparison
showed high-fidelity to normal operations and to cyber-events.
The high modularity and flexibility of the system allows to expand the framework to accommodate large industrial processes with more sensors, actuators, and
controllers. In chapter 4, this capability is used to develop a to-scale model of a midstream oil terminal adhering to the American Petroleum Institute (API) standards.
This model is essential for intrusion detection research as it provides data on system
operations and cyber-attacks involving multiple controllers.
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Figure 3.1: SCADA components in a generic industrial control system

3.1

SCADA Component Overview

Any SCADA system can be strategically and logically divided into five major
components as seen in Fig. 3.1 : (1) Physical System, (2) Cyber Physical Link,
(3) Distributed Control System (DCS), (4) Network, (5) and Remote Monitoring
and Control. This section will provide an explanation about each component while
demonstrating its relevance in the overall system.

3.1.1

Physical System
The physical system is the first component of the SCADA architecture, and

is composed of a physical process such as power generation, oil gas production,
water/waste-water treatments, wind farms, large communication systems, building
management systems and transportation systems.
The physical process on a SCADA system has sensors and actuators to monitor
and control the process variables. A sensor is a device that measures a physical
quantity such as pressure, temperature, flow, or density, and converts it into an
electric signal which can be read by an observer or by an instrument. An actuator is
a component of a machine that is responsible for moving or controlling a mechanism
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in the physical system, given an input signal. The actuator is the mechanism by
which a control system can act upon the environment.

3.1.2

Cyber-Physical Link
The cyber-physical link provides a transport medium for the signals from sen-

sors and actuators to reach the Distributed Control System (DCS). Fieldbus, Highway
Addressable Remote Transducer (HART), WirelessHART and Zigbee are examples
of the different technologies used to transport sensor and actuator information to the
DCS. Fieldbus is an industrial network system used to connect instruments in a manufacturing plant to industrial controllers. HART is a hybrid analog-digital industrial
automation protocol that can send digital messages overlaid on the legacy 4-20 mA
analog instrumentation current loops. WirelessHART is a time synchronized, selforganizing, and self-healing mesh network architecture, developed as a multi-vendor
interoperable wireless standard for sensor networks. Zigbee is a low-power wireless
mesh network standard targeting long battery life devices in wireless control and
monitoring applications [71]. Although these are common technologies for the cyberphysical link, where sophistication is not required the link is made of plain electrical
wires that directly transport voltage or current signals to the DCS.

3.1.3

Distributed Control System
The third component of the SCADA architecture is the DCS. The DCS is

composed of one or more edge controllers that directly interface with sensors and
actuators through the cyber-physical link.
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Edge controllers are field devices which often have embedded control capabilities in order to accomplish some logic operations. In the vast majority of cases,
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) are used as edge controllers in SCADA systems. According to IEC 61131-1, the PLC is “a digitally operating electronic system,
designed for use in an industrial environment” [72]. It is responsible for collecting
signals from sensors through the wire bridge, processing them according to a predefined programming, and then send response signals to actuators, also through the
wire bridge.
Typically, there are only two types of signals that a PLC can work with:
discrete and analog. Discrete signals are those that can only assume two states:
either on or off. Analog signals can take on a range of values, and can represent a time
varying quantity such as temperature, pressure or density. Discrete signals require
only one bit to be stored in the PLC memory, are fast to read and write, and require
relatively simple hardware. Analog signals require more bits to be stored, where the
number of bits will depend on the hardware used to read the signal. Additionally, the
hardware required is more complex and it is slower to read and write when compared
to discrete signals.
To convert analog signals into something the PLC can understand, two types
of hardware are used: Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) for signal reading and the
Digital-to-Analog Converter (DAC) for signal writing. The ADC converts the analog
quantity into an integer number, while the DAC converts an integer number into
an analog quantity. Both conversions use an integer which has a finite resolution.
Resolutions of ADCs and DACs for industrial applications typically range from 10
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bits to 16 bits, with 0.1% accuracy. The settling-time requirements for DACs vary
from 10 us to 100 ms, depending on the PLC architecture and price. The sample rate
for ADCs also can vary from 10 samples per second to hundreds of kilo samples per
second.

3.1.4

Network
The network is the fourth component of the SCADA architecture. The net-

work component is used to interconnect the DCS and the supervisory control, along
with other subsystems related to the SCADA system, such as Human Machine Interfaces (HMI), historians, data loggers and user management systems (active directory,
Radius, etc). The DCS communicates with the supervisory control over the network,
following a set of rules called a protocol. One of the first SCADA protocols was
introduced by Modicon in 1979 and was called Modbus. It quickly became a defacto industry standard, and remains popular for SCADA since its standard is openly
available and the implementation does not require licensing fees [73]. Additionally,
Modbus works over many communication mediums such as telephone, ethernet, radio
and satellite, which makes it ideal for large SCADA systems.
Although Modbus is one of the most used protocols for data acquisition, several
vendors created their own custom protocols, which are proprietary for the most part.
Examples of other popular industrial protocols are PROFIBUS [74] (DP, PA and
PROFInet), WorldFIP [75], ControlNet [75], EtherNet/IP [76,77], DNP3 [78], and
A-B DF1 [79].
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A large SCADA system may consist of multiple protocols over different types
of medium. A SCADA protocol converter, usually called Protocol Gateway, provides
a mechanism that enables devices communicating on different protocols to talk to
each other. Additionally, a complex SCADA network may also have supplementary
devices such as bridges, routers and switches, to control the network traffic, and be
physically separated (air gap) or logically separated (virtual LAN, data diodes) from
other networks in the SCADA system.

3.1.5

Remote Monitoring and Control
The remote monitoring and control is composed of historians and data loggers

that manage the physical process data and provide a mechanism for user interaction
and control. This mechanism is often called an HMI, which is the front-end interface
by which operators interact with the monitored variables of the SCADA system. At
a higher level, HMIs are screens that consist of buttons, alarms, reports and trends
for monitoring, analyzing and controlling the automation process.
The HMI can be a physical screen that presents a graphical interface to the user
and is assembled in the process panel with the other automation devices, or it can also
be software that is executed on computers in a control room located miles away from
the actual process panel. In either case, the HMI must use a SCADA network protocol
to communicate with the DCS, gather information about the process variables and
display them on the screen.
Additionally, the HMI can also send control actions and other types of messages to the field devices depending on the SCADA Protocol used. For the Modbus
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protocol, the communication is defined in a master-slave scheme and the protocol
provides four different object types:
• Coils: single-bit physical output
• Discrete Inputs: single-bit physical input
• Input Register: analog input readings
• Holding Register: analog output values or memory
The protocol also provides special functions to read or write these object types in
large chunks, which is useful for more complex SCADA systems.

3.2

Virtualization of SCADA Components

The segmentation of the SCADA system into smaller components makes the
virtualization easier and more portable. Each component can be virtualized independently, in a way that the SCADA system can still operate with only some of its
components replaced by its virtual counterpart. Once all components are virtualized,
the whole SCADA system is virtualized. The perception of virtualization used to
create SCADA testbeds comes with its own set of advantages and disadvantages.
Advantages:
• Reproducibility- Reproducibility is the main principle of scientific method.
Most SCADA physical systems are complex and very expensive and hence cannot be reproduced by the entire spectrum of SCADA researcher. Hence the
proposed architecture using opensource tools can bolster the capability of researchers to share and reproduce developed testbeds.
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• Cost- SCADA testbeds are very expensive. Due to the unavailability of physical
testbeds; high fidelity virtualization of the SCADA systems using opensource
tools provides researchers the capability to analyze novel threats and defenses.
Virtualized testbeds are often inexpensive and often have higher impact in the
research community.
• Portability- Physical process being controlled by the industrial system are
often huge in size. These large scale physical systems cannot be shared by researchers and hence development of completely virtualized high-fidelity testbeds
is encouraged.
• Maintenance- Full scale physical testbeds must go through the same maintenance process as the real physical system hence it requires a fair amount of
vigilance and man power to keep it running. Virtualized testbeds never require
similar amount of operational vigilance. Secondly, the upkeep cost of a real
scale physical testbed is substantially more than a virtual testbed.
• Physical risk- Novel technologies and threats if tested on a physical system
may cause undesired behavior in the physical process which might cause malfunction and failure of real components; there is always a chance of property
damage and potential threat to environment. Virtual systems are safe and the
virtual system can be pushed to the operational limits without causing any
harm.
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Disadvantages:
• Hardware Requirement- Virtualization of complex physical process involves
a lot of computation and might require powerful computers.
• Simplification and assumptions- Although the physical processes are mimicked, often it is observed that the real system is abstracted and simplified. This
might affect the fidelity of the virtualized testbed.

Detail discussion about how each module of the SCADA system is virtualized is
provided in the sections below.

3.2.1

Virtualizing the Physical System
When a physical system is virtualized, the virtual counterpart should behave

similarly to the actual physics of the system and have an accurate response for the
inputs provided. Typically, there are two ways to virtualize a physical plant: by using
(1) transfer functions or mathematical equations that represent the physical behavior
of the system, or by (2) using sophisticated modelling software like Matlab/Simulink,
HyperSIM, or EMegaSIM.
A transfer function is the ratio of output to the input of a system in Laplace
domain. The time domain equation of a physical system represented by a nth order differential equation can be transformed into a usable transfer function by using
Laplace transform. A modeler can either formulate a transfer function for the entire
system, or modularize the physical process and formulate different transfer functions
for the different modularized parts, and then combine all of them together. Once the
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transfer function is obtained, the response of the physical system can be calculated
when all the input variables governing the equation are specified. Hence, the transfer
function once obtained can act as the physical system. However, this approach is
typically useful for simple systems with linear responses. Calculating the transfer
function for complex physical systems can be very challenging. For this reason, modelers make use of sophisticated software to create realistic models of complex physical
systems.
On the modelling software approach, the physical characteristics of the system
are provided by the modelling software. The user should diligently use the blocks or
equations provided with accurate configurations to model the desired response. The
accuracy of the model created using this approach largely depends on the software
being used and the proper configuration of the software parameters.
To model a physical system, the first step is to enumerate the response of the
system for a wide array of inputs. Once the analysis of the response is complete, it
is possible to determine the peripheral components composing the physical system.
Sophisticated modelling software like Simulink, HyperSIM etc. offers a wide variety
of already modeled peripheral components from multiple domains. If any component
is missing, then the modeler should devise custom virtual components that would
mimic the exact response of the missing piece using the transfer function method.
Once all the virtualized peripheral devices are at hand, they are connected to mimic
the actual response of the system, thereby virtualizing the entire industrial process.
The next step is to provide virtual sensors and actuators for the system. The
virtualized system should take in the same number of sensors and actuators as the
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Figure 3.2: Overview of virtual sensors and actuators in the Virtualized Physical
Model

actual physical system. Virtual sensors are created in the model by simply exposing
variables pertinent to the virtualization, like pressure, temperature or speed. Virtual
actuators are designed as controlling parameters that can influence the model, such
as the speed of a pump, the temperature of a heat source or the state of a valve. The
DCS must communicate with these sensors and actuators to complete the control
loop. This is achieved by exchanging UDP (User Datagram Protocol) messages over
a virtual network.
Modelling software, like Simulink/Matlab for instance, provides Simulink Instrument Control Toolbox for sending and receiving data over TCP/IP and UDP
networks. The UDP Send block transmits an input vector as a UDP message over
an IP network port. Therefore, it is possible to transmit the temperature, pressure,
speed or any other measurable quantity in the model just by connecting a UDP Send
block to it. The UDP Send block serves as a virtual sensor for the virtualized system.
The UDP Receive block configures and opens an interface to a specified remote address using the UDP protocol. During the model’s run time, the block acquires data
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Figure 3.3: SimLink script for two DCS stations.

from an external source and inputs that to the model. The UDP Receive block serves
as a virtual actuator for the virtualized system. By using this approach, each sensor
or actuator in the system must have its own UDP Block configured for an individual
IP port (Shown in figure 3.2).

3.2.2

Virtualizing the Cyber-Physical Link
On a physical SCADA system, the cyber-physical link is the transport medium

for the signals from sensors and actuators to reach the DCS. On the virtual counterpart of the cyber-physical link, instead of using actual wires or wireless technologies,
the virtualization is done by using UDP and TCP/IP connections on a virtual network, that can transport the signals from the virtual sensors and actuators.
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The virtualization of the cyber-physical link happens in two steps. Since each
virtual sensor and actuator communicates using UDP connections, the first step is to
capture all sensor and actuator data into software for pre-processing. The software
developed for this task is called SimLink. The SimLink software has a script file that
provides information about the UDP connections it needs to receive and the DCS
stations it needs to send the data to. Figure 3.3 shows the format of the configuration
file used by the SimLink interface program.
After exchanging all sensor and actuator data through the UDP connections,
the next step is to pack all that information into TCP/IP packets that can be sent
to each DCS station mentioned in the configuration script. Therefore, the SimLink
program makes a bridge between the DCS and the virtual sensors and actuators,
the same way the electrical wires make a bridge between the DCS and the physical
sensors and actuators in the plant.

3.2.3

Virtualizing the Distributed Control System
As mentioned earlier, it is very common to use a PLC as a DCS in SCADA

systems, since it already provides the input and output modules and the processing
power to execute the control logic. There are many PLC vendors available. AllenBradley, Siemens, Schneider (formerly Modicon), and Omron are some of the most
popular ones. However, these are all commercial devices with a closed-source implementation. This means that the vendor does not make information available about
the hardware and firmware to allow them to be virtualized. Therefore, most of the
work published in the field of virtual SCADA testbeds are either based on real PLCs
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as hardware-in-the-loop [80], have network-level emulators that can only emulate the
SCADA protocols used by the PLCs [82] [25], or have simple programs, usually written in scripting languages like Python, to replace the logic performed by the PLC
[71], without offering the same programming functionality.
Therefore, the only way to virtualize an entire PLC, including its programming
capabilities and network protocols, was to use an open source PLC that could be virtualized and even adjusted to be compatible with the virtual environment developed.
OpenPLC [81] is a fully functional PLC, and currently the only open source PLC
capable of running PLC-grade programs in all five IEC61131-3 defined languages:
Structured Text, Instruction List, Sequential Function Chart, Function Block Diagram and Ladder Logic. Additionally, OpenPLC supports Modbus/TCP, DNP3,
and has an ongoing project to add a few more SCADA protocols to the list, namely
Ethernet/IP and S7-Comm.
OpenPLC can also run on a variety of hardware, from a simple Arduino to
robust industrial boards, and also as a soft-PLC on Windows and Linux-based machines. This makes OpenPLC very suitable for SCADA DCS virtualization, mainly
because the same code that runs on the physical OpenPLC device can run on its
virtual counterpart. To be easily ported to different platforms, OpenPLC has a very
modular architecture. Therefore, when there is a need to port OpenPLC to a different platform, usually only the I/O driver (also called hardware layer) that deals with
the physical inputs and outputs needs to be changed. The OpenPLC project already
provides drivers for Raspberry Pi, Arduino, UniPi Industrial Platform, Modbus Slave
Devices, ESP8266, and PiXtend Industrial Boards. Additionally, OpenPLC also pro58

Figure 3.4: Virtualizing multiple DCS with OpenPLC on a hypervisor.

vides a blank driver that basically does not do any I/O operation, which allows it to
run on Windows and Linux machines as a soft-PLC.
The virtualized cyber-physical link provides sensor and actuator data as TCP/IP
packets that must be received by the DCS. Therefore, a new driver was written for
the OpenPLC that can exchange those TCP/IP packets with the SimLink software
at a regular sample rate, providing virtual input and output support to OpenPLC.
Since only the hardware driver was changed, OpenPLC operates with high fidelity to
its physical counterpart. Discrepancies were found only when using physical boards
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with high ADC and DAC sample rates. Although the sample rate for the virtual
OpenPLC driver can be adjusted to match the exact sample rate of the physical device, experimental tests demonstrated that increasing the sample rate of the virtual
OpenPLC driver to anything more than 1000 samples per second is susceptible to
packet loss with the current architecture. Nevertheless, a sample rate of 1 KHz is
faster than the ADC built in most commercial PLCs, and should be enough for all
SCADA processes, except for those that need fast response with specialized hardware
on the edge.
For a large SCADA system, it is common to have multiple DCS stations at
different sites, controlling different portions of the process. Therefore, a hardwareefficient way to virtualize multiple DCS is to run OpenPLC on top of a Hypervisor,
as shown on Figure 3.4. A hypervisor is a software capable of creating and running
virtual machines. The hypervisor presents a virtual operating platform to the virtual
machines and manages the execution of their operating systems. Therefore, it is
possible to run multiple instances of a variety of operating systems, all sharing the
same hardware resources. In other terms, by using a hypervisor it is possible to run
multiple instances of OpenPLC on the same machine and connect them all together
by using the hypervisor virtual network.

3.2.4

Virtualizing the network
The network component consists of bridges, routers, switches and other net-

work devices interconnecting the DCS and the supervisory control. The DCS communicates with the supervisory control over the network using a SCADA protocol.

60

Since OpenPLC provides support for Modbus/TCP and DNP3, the SCADA protocol
was already virtualized with the virtualization of OpenPLC.
Novel network paradigms like software defined networking (SDN) and network functions virtualization (NFV) are often used in testbeds to provide flexible
management for large-scale networks and to virtualize an entire class of network
node functions. Traditional networks use specialized applications such as firewalls,
link balancers etc. but an SDN deploys a specialized application that uses multiple
controllers to manage data plane behavior. NFV decouples the network functions
such as firewalling, intrusion detection, domain name service (DNS), network address
translation (NAT) so that all these components can be abstracted into an application.
Hu et al. provides a comprehensive survey of multi controller based SDN [83]. The
SDN research has been classified into four main categories (scalability, consistency,
reliability, load balancing). These novel technologies are often used by researchers
for creating high fidelity ICS networks. Since the proposed system is modular, technologies like SDN and NFV can be used in the virtualization architecture to create a
more realistic view of the system.
For a lower fidelity network virtualization, the network component can be
virtualized using only the hypervisor virtual network, or the virtual network provided
by the host machine. This type of virtualization only provides Ethernet support, and
does not model network supplementary devices such as bridges, routers, switches, or
data diodes. The virtualization of the network component with higher fidelity may
require the use of more sophisticated network emulators such as CORE [84], NS2/NS3
[85], OMNET++ [86], OPNET [87], QualNet [88], PlanetLab [89], NetBed [90], and
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MNE [91]. The usage and configuration of such network emulators is out of the scope
of this work, as this is a very complex subject by itself. More information can be
obtained on the referenced works.

3.2.5

Virtualizing the Remote Monitoring and Control
The most important part of the remote monitoring and control layer is the

HMI, which is the front-end interface by which operators can interact with the SCADA
system. Typically, there are two types of HMIs: a physical screen that is assembled
in the process panel with the other automation devices, and a software that runs on
computers in the control room. High fidelity virtualization of physical HMIs is hard
to achieve because most of them are proprietary with a closed source implementation.
Therefore, without information about its firmware and hardware capabilities, virtualizing those devices can become very challenging. On the other hand, software-based
HMIs don’t require any virtualization since they are just software and can run on a
virtual environment without any change.
OpenPLC provides an open source HMI software called ScadaBR. ScadaBR is
a Java-based application that runs on Windows, Linux or any other operating system
that can run an application server such as Apache Tomcat. It was initially developed
by MCA Sistemas [92] and distributed using an open source license.
Once ScadaBR is deployed, it runs as a service in the background. The user
interface can be accessed from a web browser, pointing to the correct address and port
(default port is 8085). The main interface is easy to use and offers visualization of
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variables, graphs, statistics, protocol configuration, alarms, creation of HMI screens
and variable monitoring.
Since ScadaBR is a software-based HMI, the same screens developed for a
physical SCADA system can be used with the virtualized SCADA without any change.

3.3

Case Studies

The SCADA Security Laboratory at the University of Alabama in Huntsville
has a physical testbed for a water storage tank and a physical testbed for a gas
pipeline. This section describes how the proposed virtualization framework was used
to virtualize these two physical testbeds. The goal is to prove that the virtualization
framework can create high fidelity SCADA testbeds by comparing the results for
the physical testbeds with their virtual counterparts. Additionally, to demonstrate
how this virtualization framework can be effective for studies in large testbeds, two
models of large SCADA systems are included in this section: a refrigerated liquefied
petroleum gas pipeline and a midstream oil terminal. Due to the prohibitive cost
and size of those large systems, it was not possible to make a comparison with a real
physical counterpart.

3.3.1

Water Storage Tank Testbed
The water storage tank in the SCADA Security Laboratory is composed of a

single reservoir filled with water, a pump, and a cylindrical storage tank. The pump,
when turned on, moves the water out of the reservoir to the tank. The tank also has
an escape valve at the bottom that allows the water to flow back to the reservoir.
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Figure 3.5: Water storage tank HMI.

The SCADA system measures the height of water in the tank and controls the pump
to keep the water level between two defined setpoints. Figure 3.5 shows the HMI for
the water storage tank testbed.
The physical dynamics of the system can be modeled with the following equation:

dV
= Qin − Qout
dt

(3.1)

Where V is the volume of water in the tank, Qin is the volumetric inflow, and
Qout is the outflow. For a small tank, it is possible to assume that the outflow of
water is nearly constant, which means that the system has a linear response.
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Given that V = Ah, where A is the cross-sectional area of the cylindrical tank,
the equation above can be rewritten as:

A

dh
= Qin − Qout
dt

(3.2)

Since A is constant for the system, this equation provides the variation of the
height of liquid in the tank given the inflow and outflow of water, therefore providing
the information needed for the virtual sensor measuring the height of water in the
tank. This is a simple linear system, which means that the transfer function method
can be used to virtualize the physics. Therefore, the equation above was used for a
non-computationally intensive model.
This system is controlled by a single PLC. Therefore, a virtualized version of
OpenPLC was deployed on a single virtual machine (VM) to create the virtual PLC
station. SimLink was used to establish the link between the mathematical model and
OpenPLC running on the VM. The network was provided by the virtual network
subsystem of the hypervisor running the virtual OpenPLC station. Finally, the HMI
was created using ScadaBR, and was the same for both the physical and virtual
testbeds.
Figure 3.6 shows the comparison between the physical testbed and its virtual
simulation. As the PLC controls the physical system for both the physical testbed
and the virtual testbed, it must be understood that there is a ladder logic program
created to keep the water level between two setpoints: 20% and 50%. The pump
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Figure 3.6: Comparison curves for the physical and virtual water storage tank.

turns on and stops once the level reaches 50%. When the water level reaches 20%,
the pump turns back on and the cycle repeats itself.
Figure 3.7 shows two superimposed curves in a plot of water level versus time.
One curve shows the true data of the physical system. The other curve shows the
data as logged by the HMI. An attack was performed on the Storage Tank 649.6
seconds into the experiment, where an attacker with access to the network injects
packets to place the system in manual mode as opposed to automatic, while turning
the pump on. The injection is performed by sending Modbus/TCP packets to the
PLC at a much faster rate than the HMI. The attacker follows this injection with an
ARP spoofing attack, a technique that consists in sending spoofed Address Resolution
Protocol (ARP) messages into the network to associate the attacker’s MAC address
66

Figure 3.7: Injection attack followed by DoS attack on the virtual testbed

with the IP addresses of the PLC and the HMI. The ARP spoofing allows the attacker
to intercept data frames on the network, modify the traffic, or stop all traffic by
dropping all frames in the communication, causing a Denial of Service (DoS). The
attacker performs these cyber attacks with the goal of causing the system to go into an
unsafe state, where an overflow may occur and also prevent the user from monitoring
or controlling the system. The attacker accomplishes this using the DoS attack on
top of the ARP spoofing.
This attack was inspired by the Maroochi attack, where packets were injected
to alter the behavior of a water treatment plant in adverse ways [93] and also a
software malfunction on a controller at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant of
Tennessee Valley Authority, where a flood of packets prevented the normal operation
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Figure 3.8: Gas pipeline HMI.

of the controller and ability to communicate with that controller and therefore behaved like a DoS attack [94]. Note that in figure 3.7, the logged data at the HMI
discontinuous when the DoS attack begins as would be expected since the HMI is
no longer able to receive new updates on the state of the system. Both physical and
virtual testbeds had the same response during the attack.

3.3.2

Gas Pipeline Testbed
This testbed presents a gas pipeline setup in which air taken from the external

environment is pumped into an enclosed pipeline to create some arbitrary pressure.
A single-phase induction motor mechanically coupled to a fixed displacement pump
is used to pressurize a 3/4 inch diameter steel pipeline. This setup also has an outlet
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ball valve to let the pressure out. Figure 3.8 shows the HMI for the gas pipeline
testbed.
Since this system has complex dynamics, a sophisticated modelling software
was used to virtualize the physics. Simulink/Matlab provides some pre-configured
blocks for modelling hydraulic systems (Simscape) but models of gas and compressed
gas scenarios are not provided. Therefore, some custom blocks for peripheral devices
were developed to mimic the response of the physical system.
In the virtual environment, an ideal angular torque source was used to pump
compressed air from a reservoir into a gas charged accumulator. The reservoir is
analogous to the external environment of the physical system and the pressure developed inside the accumulator represents the response of the gas pipeline. When the
valve is opened, the pressure from the accumulator is released back into the reservoir. This system is also controlled by a single PLC. Therefore, a virtualized version
of OpenPLC was deployed on a single virtual machine (VM) to create the virtual
PLC station. SimLink was used to establish the link between the Simulink/Matlab
model and OpenPLC running on the VM. The network was provided by the virtual
network subsystem of the hypervisor running the virtual OpenPLC station. Finally,
the HMI was created using ScadaBR, and was the same for both the physical and
virtual testbeds.
Figure 3.9 shows the curves for pressure rising and falling from 0-25 psi for
both physical and virtual systems. In addition to ensuring that the virtual testbed is
similar in behavior to the actual testbed for the pipeline, cyber attacks were performed
on the testbed as experiments. A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack is a cyber-attack
69

(a) Rising curve

(b) Falling curve
Figure 3.9: Comparison curves for the physical and virtual gas pipeline.
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in which a malicious node is able to intercept the communications between two nodes.
The attacker is able to see the data it intercepts and also modify it [85]. An MiTM
attack was successfully implemented on the virtual testbed using ARP poisoning.
Ettercap was used to perform the MiTM and custom filters were written in etterfilter
to drop or modify the data. The MiTM attack performed command injection and
response injection in order to change the operation of the OpenPLC and change the
data displayed on the HMI. The attack injected a command to increase the current
pressure minimum and maximum setpoints on the OpenPLC by 13 PSI. This caused
the pipeline to operate in a higher pressure than the original configuration. The
attack also decreased 13 PSI from the response data sent to the HMI so that it would
still receive the pressure values according to the previously designated parameters
with the goal of causing the pressure values to appear normal.
A comparison between the PLC and HMI Logs of the behavior for this attack
is displayed in Figure 3.10. The HMI log is from the perspective of the HMI. Likewise,
the PLC log is from the perspective of the PLC. As expected, both logs show a very
similar response before the attack. When the MiTM attack is started a pressure drop
is observed in the HMI log. In this case, there is a sudden change, where the plot
drastically slopes downward and then upward, when the attack starts. This response
is different than the normal dynamics of the system and is particularly important as
it can be used as a signature while detecting similar MiTM attacks. After the dip in
pressure the pump turns ON and builds up the necessary pressure to appear normal
from the perspective of the HMI.
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Figure 3.10: System response during MiTM attack.

3.3.3

Refrigerated Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Pipeline
Oil terminals, refineries, liquid cargo motor tankers and tanker trucks are

critical infrastructures since they handle hazardous chemical and crude products that
require high operational vigilance and safety measures. Hence, cyber- attacks on
these critical infrastructures can cause catastrophic disaster scenarios.
The virtual testbed proposed in this case study performs refrigerated gas transfer from an LPG motor tanker (vessel) to a gas terminal situated 15 KM away. The
system consists of a primary pumping station with 4 additional booster stations,
each one controlled by an individual PLC, and equipped with a 300MT/Hr (Metric
tons/hour) centrifugal pump. This model of the gas pipeline was virtualized using
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Figure 3.11: HMI for the refrigerated liquified petroleum gas pipeline.

the proposed modular architecture. The system can give comprehensive insight on
how the oil and cargo transfer is affected when each module of the system is cyber attacked. The physics of the process was modelled by Matlab Simulink, using a similar
approach to the Gas Pipeline model mentioned earlier.
The entire virtualization has been done in accordance to the International
Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals (ISGOTT) [95] to have a realistic testbed
that would reflect most attack scenarios affecting a real-life gas pipeline operation. Security measures like emergency reclose of remote operated valves (ROV), non-return
valves (NRV), over pressure sensors, and pressure relief valves (PV) have been implemented in the model. The virtualization mimics the two major operations of a
liquefied gas transfer scenario: (1) recirculation and (2) cargo transfer.
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When the system is in recirculation mode, the liquified cargo in the refrigerated
pipeline is circulated to cool the pipeline below the boiling point of the liquid. A
constant pipeline pressure is maintained throughout the recirculation pipeline to cool
the pipeline uniformly. This operation is performed to reduce the hammering scenario
which might arise due to the expansion of the liquified gas inside the pipeline if the
pipeline temperature is not uniform throughout the surface.
In the present case study, the pipeline is used to transfer Propane or Butane.
The recirculation mode cools the pipeline to −4o C for Propane or −42o C for Butane.
Once the pipeline is cooled, the actual cargo transfer can be performed.
The entire operation of uniform pressurization and recirculation line-up was
modeled in accordance to the ISGOTT safety measures. Pneumatically triggered
remote operated valves (ROV) were used to remotely trigger the isolation of the gas
ship and an emergency master switch (EMS) was used to disconnect the coupling
of the ship manifold so that the system can have a realistic overview of an actual
recirculation operation.
Once the pipeline is cooled below the required boiling temperature of the cargo,
the system enters in cargo transfer mode. The pressure is slowly ramped up and, after
constant flow is received at the gas terminal, the pressure is capped at 7.5 bars. An
approximate flow rate of 1250MT/Hr is achieved at 7.5 bars discharge pressure.
Apart from the centrifugal pump in the liquid cargo ship, to maintain the
pressure in the pipeline 4 additional booster stations, each 3km apart, are also incorporated in the model. These stations are controlled by 4 PLCs which makes sure
that the line is pressurized uniformly throughout the cargo operation, and maintains
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a constant flowrate. The operator can control the system by using the HMI shown in
Figure 3.11. The screen displays the 5 pumping stations and their current parameters.
This entire operation requires high vigilance from all officials involved. Since
typical oil and gas infrastructures are distributed over vast areas, the system relies on
sensors and fail-safe mechanisms to upkeep the secure operation. However, these devices are not only vulnerable to remote cyber-attacks, but also susceptible to physical
tampering.

3.4

Application of the modular testbed

The modular nature of the proposed SCADA virtualization framework provides superior portability and lower cost when compared to hardware counterparts.
Therefore, the list below enumerates a few prominent application areas of this virtualization framework.

3.4.1

Education
Yunos et. al. [96] investigated and proposed a method to spread cyber security

awareness using focus group discussions. As per this analysis, the awareness strategy
should target all age groups and the prominent focus of the awareness program is to
be given to kids and youth. Providing school kids with the idea of cyber security and
threats associated with SCADA is challenging because of the cost of the instrument
and the setup complexity.
Hence, a portable virtual testbed serves as the ultimate solution. Virtual
testbeds can be delivered to these academic institutions via any convenient electronic
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data transfer. Additionally, at a very low cost the same virtual system can be used
to model a large range of systems, from simple temperature control to complicated
power plants.

3.4.2

SCADA Training
With eminent threats like Stuxnet [106], Havex [107] and Mirai [98] threatening

the progress of SCADA networks, the importance of educating the operator about the
associated cyber threats is essential. Operators should have the flexibility to analyze
the worst-case (disaster) scenarios in a system and should have an idea about the
cyber-attack vectors in their domain. A high fidelity virtual laboratory which mimics
the system closely is a necessity [99]. This not only facilitates hands-on training
of their system but can also provide a better understanding of how the system will
behave in case of abnormal scenarios [100].
Abdi et.al. [101] describes a PC-based SCADA training system by making a
virtual copy of the natural gas transmission and distribution system. The developed
system did mimic the physical system with required levels of fidelity but the system
is not completely virtualized and has a lot of physical components. The proposed
SCADA virtualization framework counters this problem by virtualizing all possible
components hence the testbed is portable and can be set up easily.
Thomas et.al [102] describes the cost and complexity of a physical SCADA
laboratory. This type of physical testbed might not need validation of their results
but it comes with the downside of portability and risk of equipment casualty. To
counter these downsides developing a virtual SCADA laboratory is the answer. This
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virtual testbed technology can provide an extensive SCADA laboratory at minimal
cost or space.

3.4.3

Research on cyber threats
To fully understand the dynamic range of threats to a SCADA system, re-

searchers should have access to the cyber-physical system [103]. This facilitates the
analysis and detection of the loopholes in the system that can be exploited.
However, companies having an installed cyber physical system might be reluctant in sharing the information of their system. Additionally, some cyber physical
systems execute hazardous or risky operations which might hinder the study of the
components.
For all these reasons, researchers are looking for a high fidelity virtual testbed
which can parry these issues [104]. Moreover, with the advent of novel data mining
techniques like computational modelling, clustering and deep learning, the need for
high fidelity data is increasing even more [101]. Hence to study different physical
systems or to push the SCADA system to the operational limit without getting into
the risk of equipment casualty, virtual testbeds are needed for research. The proposed
virtualization framework has proven itself useful in the study of some network-based
attacks like packet injection, ARP spoofing, and DoS, as demonstrated in the previous
section. However, this virtual environment can also be used to explore a large range
of different cyber attacks on SCADA systems, more specifically:

• Vulnerabilities in common SCADA network protocols, like Modbus and DNP3;
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• Bogus input data to the controller introduced by compromised sensors and/or
exploited network link between the controller and the sensors;
• Manipulated and misleading output data to the actuators from the controller
due to tempered actuators or compromised network link between the controller
and the actuators;
• Historian database attacks;

Additionally, this framework can also be used to study the effectiveness of
security measures and standards such as IEC 62351. The IEC 62351 is a standard
developed by WG15 for handling the security of TC57 series of protocols. IEC TC57
has developed several widely accepted communication standards, including DNP3,
which was derived from IEC 60970-5. The IEC 62351 standard describes measures to
comply with the four major requirements for secure data communications and data
processing: confidentiality, data integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. Some
of the methodologies proposed on the standard to enhance the security include:

• End-to-end data traffic protection of TCP/IP-based connections using TLS with
mandatory mutual authentication based on X.509 certificates;
• Implementation of role-based access control and statistical recording on the
application layer;
• Correct and safe usage of safety-critical parameters such as passwords, encryption keys and the whole life cycle of cryptographic information;
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• Secure distribution mechanism for symmetric keys based on GDOI and the
IKEv2 protocol.

Given that the proposed virtualization framework is based around OpenPLC,
DNP3 is supported natively, which enables the adoption of the security measures
defined in the IEC 62351 standard. Therefore, researchers can experiment with the
security enhancements proposed in the standard in order to validate their effectiveness
on the entire SCADA system.

3.4.4

Prototyping and Evaluation of Cyber Security Control
Testing out new technology on cyber-physical systems has been a huge chal-

lenge. The risk of breaking the system or causing any abnormal scenario is always
imminent. Hence validating new technology requires high fidelity physical testbeds
which tends to be very expensive. Even with a lot of physical protective sensors in the
prototyping testbed, the chance of equipment casualty can never be neglected [105].
Many researchers and companies involved in resolving SCADA problems retort to
older validated technology. This upshot in an old backdated solution might solve the
current problem in the scenario, but might open new loopholes that can be exploited.
Hence for prototyping any technology or tools for a cyber physical system a high
fidelity virtual testbed can be used to validate the effects of the updated technology
on the system.
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3.5

Conclusion

This chapter proposes a novel and modular approach for modeling SCADA
systems. By segmenting the SCADA system into smaller components, it is possible
to virtualize each component independently. Once all components are virtualized,
the virtualization process is complete.
This novel-virtualization approach proved efficient and portable, reducing the
size and cost of SCADA testbeds while still providing high fidelity for cyber security
research. This is demonstrated by the three use cases mentioned, where two of them
were virtualizations of an actual physical system. Chapter 4 will demonstrate the
capability of the virtualization framework to model large industrial scale mid-stream
oil terminals while adhering to the guidelines and standards set in the American
Petroleum Institute (API).
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CHAPTER 4

MODELLING A MID-STREAM OIL TERMINAL ADHERING TO
THE AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE STANDARDS

The literature review performed in chapter 2 identifies the lack of a to-scale
model of an industrial system capable of simulating the effects of cyber-attacks on
multiple subcomponents. This chapter addresses the gap and describes the architecture of a twelve station virtual midstream oil terminal testbed adhering to American
Petroleum Institute (API) standards. The testbed uses the methodology demonstrated in chapter 3.
The testbed incorporates five distinct subsystem models: (i) physical system; (ii) cyber-physical link; (iii) programmable logic controller (PLC); (iv) network;
and (v) human-machine interface (HMI). The virtual midstream oil terminal is a
high-fidelity model of a real midstream oil terminal. The components in the physical system model adhere to American Petroleum Institute (API) standards. The
programmable logic controller model is a software version of OpenPLC [81], which
is available in hardware or software. The network model, which is provided by a
VMWare Workstation, supports the Ethernet, TCP/IP and Modbus/TCP protocols.
The human-machine interface is the SCADABr open-source software product, which
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has been used to monitor and control real and virtual industrial control systems.
The human-machine interface is the same software that is used in real midstream oil
terminals.
The virtual midstream oil terminal testbed models three tank farms, a tanker
truck gantry, a shipping terminal with two ocean-going oil tankers and a 150 km
pipeline that is connected to a refinery. The three tank farms hold three liquid
petroleum products: (i) gasoline; (ii) diesel; and (iii) aviation turbine fuel (ATF).
The gasoline and diesel tank farms have fixed/four floating roof tanks each while the
aviation turbine fuel tank farm has three dome roof tanks. Each tank farm includes
a network of pipelines that supports recirculation, filling from external sources and
transfers to the tanker truck gantry. Each tank farm also includes a set of pumps to
move liquid cargo.
The tanker truck gantry incorporates three tanker truck models, each tanker
truck with two internal tanks. The trucks must be grounded to initiate a fill operation.
The shipping terminal supports loading and unloading operations. Each oceangoing tanker has four internal tanks. The 150 km pipeline system includes a graduated
pipeline that maintains pressure throughout the length of the pipeline.
In total, the physical system model incorporates 217 modeled sensors and actuators. Twelve networked programmable logic controllers are connected to the physical
system model to implement distributed control. The programmable logic controllers
communicate via Modbus/TCP over a TCP/IP network to the human-machine interface. The human-machine interface remotely polls the programmable logic controllers
for system state information and provides supervisory control capability.
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The high-fidelity testbed can be used to conduct cyber security research at
a larger scale than most industrial control system testbeds available to researchers.
Users can simulate cyber attacks and examine the impacts on physical system components. The scale of the virtual midstream oil terminal testbed enables researchers to
model cyber attacks that exploit multiple components simultaneously or in sequence.
This flexibility supports the reproduction of large-scale and cascading events, as well
as analyses of the interdependencies existing between systems. Researchers can also
use the pipeline testbed to prototype and evaluate the effectiveness of new cyber
security controls.
Cyber security researchers often need data captured from industrial control
systems during normal and cyber attack situations. Most industrial control system
operators either do not have such data or will not share their data for reasons of
sensitivity. The virtual midstream oil terminal can be used to produce the data
required for research. Additionally, since the testbed is virtual, the testbed itself
and the scripts used to generate interesting cyber attacks in the testbed are readily
shared.
The virtual midstream oil terminal can be distributed electronically and can
run on virtual machines in a cloud computing environment. This makes the testbed
very useful for education and training. Students can use the virtual testbed to explore
the functionality of industrial control systems, experiment with cyber attacks and
evaluate security controls.
Modeling energy sector systems is highly relevant to cyber security research.
Malfunctions of critical components such as oil terminals, pipelines, storage tanks
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and cargo vessels can cause fires, explosions or harm to the environment, which can
impact energy supply and lead to large economic losses. In 2008, hackers successfully
suppressed alarms and penetrated the communications network of the Baku-TbilisiCeyhan pipeline [119]. The attack essentially blinded pipeline system operators. The
pipeline was intentionally over-pressurized by the hackers, resulting in a rupture and
explosion that spilled more than 30,000 barrels of crude oil. It took 24 hours to
extinguish the resulting fire and the entire pipeline was not functional for eighteen
days. This incident led to a serious political conflict between Georgia and Russia. In
2012, the Shamoon virus, released by the hacktivist group Cutting Sword of Justice,
destroyed 30,000 computers at Saudi Aramco, which supplies 10% of the world’s oil
[120]. Saudi Aramco was forced to work offline for five months.

4.1

Background

Oil terminals and refineries are critical infrastructure assets that demand high
operational vigilance. A malfunction, such as a pipeline rupture or vapor leak, can
release a cloud that can ignite and cause a large fire or explosion. Zhou et al. [121]
have performed an extensive study of 435 fire and explosion accidents in China. Sixtysix major fires and explosions occurred between 2000 and 2013, causing a total of 390
deaths and 950 injuries. The study also reveals that 76.09% of the accidents were
caused by vapor clouds from fuel leaks, pipeline ruptures and mechanical failures.
Several power system testbeds have been developed for simulating cyber attacks against power systems [122]. The Testbed for Analyzing Security of SCADA
Control Systems (TASSCS) has been developed to evaluate the effects of eight types
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of cyber attacks [70]. It provides a high-fidelity simulation of a SCADA network that
uses the Modbus and DNP3 protocols. TASSCS does not simulate programmable
logic controllers; instead, a Modbus server is hosted on a control server. As a result,
vulnerabilities associated with programmable logic controllers cannot be examined
using TASSCS.
Adhikari et al. [68] have developed a testbed specifically for cyber security
research related to bulk electricity transmission systems. The testbed implements
wide-area measurement functionality using a real-time digital simulator, hardware-inthe-loop protection relays, phasor measurement units and phasor data concentrators.
However, the testbed does not incorporate any programmable logic controllers.
Morris et al. [32] have developed a high-fidelity gas pipeline testbed for collecting data for intrusion detection research. The testbed is modular and portable,
but Python programs are used for control instead of employing simulations of actual
programmable logic controllers.
DeterLab is a power system testbed used by more than 2,600 researchers [61].
It incorporates 400 general purpose computing nodes and supports simulations of
cyber attacks such as SQL injection, TCP SYN flooding and worms. DeterLab enables high-fidelity simulations, but its architecture is not modular. The security of a
power system can be analyzed as a whole; however, researchers interested in analyzing specific industrial control system problems such as programmable logic controller
functionality, SCADA network communications and physical system vulnerabilities
cannot use this testbed. Additionally, the computing power required to operate the
testbed significantly reduces its portability.
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At this time, no published research exists related to midstream oil terminal
testbeds. Therefore, the virtual high-fidelity testbed that models a midstream oil
terminal should be of considerable interest to researchers. The testbed simulates
real-world programmable logic controllers and is also lightweight and portable.

4.2

Testbed Architecture

This section describes the architecture of the virtual midstream oil terminal
testbed.

4.2.1

Virtual Testbed Modular Framework
The midstream oil terminal testbed is implemented using a modular framework

discussed in chapter 3. The framework organizes a SCADA system in terms of five
major components: (i) physical system; (ii) cyber-physical link; (iii) digital control
system; (iv) communications network; and (v) human-machine interface. Each of the
five major components is replaced by a virtual counterpart.
Figure 4.1 shows how each modularized component of a SCADA system is
replaced by its equivalent virtual counterpart. The modular architecture described
in this section and used to implement the midstream oil terminal testbed was also
employed by Alves et al. [123] to model a laboratory-scale gas pipeline. Alves and colleagues compared a physical gas pipeline against a virtual model of the same pipeline.
They demonstrated that the virtual testbed provided high simulation accuracy for
normal operations as well as for cyber attack scenarios.
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The physical system is an operational system such as an oil terminal, power
system, chemical plant or manufacturing plant. In the virtual model, the physics and
operational dynamics of the physical system are simulated via Simulink, a graphical
programming environment for simulating, analyzing and modeling multi-domain dynamic systems. Simulink provides toolkits that model a variety of physical system
components. The physical system model also includes sensors and actuators. Sensors are modeled in Simulink by connecting internal signals to probes. Actuators are
modeled by connecting binary inputs from the cyber-physical link to control physical
components such as valves and switches. The physical system may be modeled using
tools other than Simulink when appropriate.
Sensors and actuators are connected to the programmable logic controller via
cyber-physical links. A cyber-physical link is as simple as a wire or it may use
sensor network communications technologies such as WirelessHart and Zigbee [124].
When modeling wires, the physical connectivity between sensors and actuators and
a programmable logic controller is virtualized using UDP sockets. In a real system,
each sensor and actuator is independently connected by wires to a programmable logic
controller. Likewise, in the virtual model, each sensor and actuator communicates
with a programmable logic controller using a unique UDP port. The unique UDP
ports enable the programmable logic controller to maintain separate communications
with each sensor and actuator, thereby maintaining fidelity with the physical system.
A programmable logic controller is a computing device that monitors and
controls the physical process and provides a network link for supervisory monitoring
and control at a control center. It connects to sensors and actuators via cyber-physical
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Figure 4.1: SCADA components and their virtual counterparts.

Simulink/MATLAB Model

Physical System

links. The virtual testbed models programmable logic controllers using OpenPLC
[125]. OpenPLC is open-source programmable logic controller software that supports
all five IEC 61131-3 standard programming languages and the Modbus/TCP and
DNP3 protocols. OpenPLC supports a wide variety of hardware platforms. In the
case of a virtual testbed, software versions are executed in virtual machines using
Windows or Linux operating systems.
The human-machine interface is a dedicated graphical user interface used by
operators to remotely monitor and supervise an industrial process. The humanmachine interface communicates with programmable logic controllers using standard
communications protocols and provides the operator with the real-time status of the
physical system. The human-machine interface may run on a virtual machine or on
a separate host computer. Communications between a programmable logic controller
and human-machine interface can employ virtual networking provided by a hypervisor
or a real network. The human-machine interface software and application-specific
user interface for the process control system are typically the same for real-world and
virtual versions.

4.2.2

Layout of the Midstream Oil Terminal Test bed
The physical system is modeled using the Simulink SimHydraulics toolkit,

which provides constructs for modeling pipes, bends, valves and other hydraulic components. The exact configurations of the various physical system sub-components are
described later in this chapter.
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Table 4.1: Components controlled by the PLCs

PLC Index

Component controlled by the PLC

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Loading marine tanker pipeline
Unloading marine tanker pipeline
Pipeline transfer operation
Discharging oil tanker
Loading marine tanker
Tanker truck gantry
Gasoline pump house
Diesel pump house
ATF pump house pipeline
Gasoline tank farm
Diesel tank farm pipeline
ATF tank farm pipeline

The physical system model incorporates 217 sensors and actuators. The sensors and actuators are connected to twelve virtual programmable logic controllers
using a virtual wire bridge with a UDP socket for each sensor and actuator. Each
virtual programmable logic controller is an OpenPLC instance that runs on a Debian virtual machine. The programmable logic controller programming is developed
using ladder logic. The actuators and sensors in the Simulink model of the virtual
oil terminal communicate with the programmable logic controllers using a software
interface hosted by the PLC 1 virtual machine. The software interface distributes the
sensor readings to the programmable logic controllers and delivers control commands
and information from the programmable logic controllers to the Simulink model.
The midstream oil terminal human-machine interface was created using SCADABr,
an open-source, web-based, human-machine interface development environment. The
Modbus/TCP protocol is used for communications between the human-machine in-
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terface and programmable logic controllers. The attack scenarios simulated in this research assume that the attacker is physically connected to the network that houses the
programmable logic controllers. Since programmable logic controllers enable clients
to connect to them without authentication, an attacker can connect to any programmable logic controller and query the status of the registers and coils.
Figure 4.2 presents a high-level layout of the simulated testbed. Table 4.1
lists each of the twelve programmable logic controllers and the component it controls.
A complete list of physical components is discussed in the appendix section of this
dissertation.

4.3

Midstream Oil Terminal Standards and Components

Oil and gas sector operations are divided into three sectors: (i) upstream; (ii)
midstream; and (iii) downstream. The upstream sector generally involves exploration
and drilling to locate and recover crude oil and natural gas. The midstream sector
moves the materials from remote production locations to population centers. The
downstream sector refines the materials into petroleum products and distributes the
products to the retail market. Tanker trucks, marine tankers, pipelines and storage
terminals are employed in all three sectors.
Figure 4.3 shows an overview of the virtual midstream oil terminal. The
midstream oil terminal stores gasoline, diesel and aviation turbine fuel (ATF). Each
of the three tank farms has a pump house. The tank farms are connected to a tanker
truck gantry, which loads fuel into tanker trucks. The tank farms also load and unload
marine tankers (MTs). The tank farms are connected to the marine tankers via a
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12 km pipeline. The tank farms are also connected to a shore refinery via a 150 km
cross-country pipeline. The network of pipelines and valves is abstracted in Figure
4.3. The HMI for controlling the mid-stream oil terminal is shown in Figure 4.4.

4.3.1

Oil Terminal Standards
The American Petroleum Institute (API) promulgates standards for oil ter-

minal equipment and components. The relevant American Petroleum Institute standards are followed to achieve high fidelity between the simulated model and a real
midstream oil terminal. Table 4.2 lists the standards used in the simulation. The
specifications and operational guidelines for marine tanker operation documented in
the International Safety Guide for Oil Tanker and Terminals (ISGOTT) [126] are also
used in the simulation.
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Table 4.2: Specification of oil terminal components

4.3.2

Standard Number

Standard Title

API Spec 5L [129]
API Spec 6D [131]
API Spec 6H [128]
API Spec 11L6 [127]
API Spec 12B [130]
MC 306 [132]
RP 1109 [133]

Specification of pipeline (Tank farm)
Specifications for pipeline valves
Specification for pipeline connectors
Specification of motors and pumps
Specification of liquid cargo tank
Tanker Truck Specifications
Specification of pipeline transfer operation

Midstream Oil Terminal Components
This section provides detailed descriptions of the major components and ac-

tivities of the midstream oil terminal: (i) tank farms; (ii) pump houses; (iii) tanker
truck gantry; (iv) pipeline transfer; and (v) vessel operation.

4.3.2.1

Tank Farm

A tank farm is a network of tanks, valves, pumps and pipes that stores cargo
in an oil terminal. The tank farms form the core of a midstream oil terminal because
all terminal operations are either from or to tank farms. The presence of a fuel-air
mixture makes a tank farm susceptible to fire and explosion due to the storage of
volatile cargoes such as diesel, gasoline and aviation turbine fuel. According to a case
study performed by Zhou et al. [121], 76.09% of major accidents in oil terminals were
due to the presence of a fuel-air mixture and 25.75% of major accidents originated
in tank farms. Due to the critical nature of a tank farm, a number of standards
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are adopted to ensure safe operation. API SPEC 5L [129] and API SPEC 12B [130]
specify tank farm pipeline and valve configurations, respectively.
The modeled midstream oil terminal has three tank farms, one each for gasoline, diesel and aviation turbine fuel. Volatile cargoes such as diesel and gasoline are
susceptible to vapor loss [134]. API SPEC 12B [130] requires the use of fixed roof
or floating roof tanks for storing these cargoes. Aviation turbine fuel is a type of
superior kerosene oil with quality standards that require less than 15 ppm of water to
be present in stored or dispatched fuel [135]. To adhere to these requirements, fixed
and floating roof tanks cannot be used; instead, dome roof tanks with fixed ceilings
are employed for storage.

Table 4.3: Specification of tanks in the tank farm.

Number of Tanks
Type
Height
Diameter
Inlet
Outlet
Inlet/Outlet

Gasoline TF

Diesel TF

ATF TF

4
Fixed-roof
15m
20m
16”
18”
16”

4
Fixed-roof
15m
20m
16”
18”
16”

3
Dome-roof
18m
18m
18”
20”
16”

Table 4.3 lists the numbers of tanks, tank types, tank heights, tank diameters, inlet diameters, outlet diameters and inlet/outlet diameters for the tank farms
modeled in MATLAB Simulink for the virtual midstream oil terminal. There are
three tank farms in the model, one each for gasoline, diesel and aviation turbine fuel.
The gasoline and diesel tank farms have four tanks each while the aviation turbine
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Figure 4.6: HMI showing the layout of the gasoline tank farm

fuel tank farm has three tanks. The tanks are named according to ISGOTT naming
conventions [126]. Each tank is named TK followed by the tank farm number and
tank number. For example, the first tank in the diesel tank farm is TK 21 and the
second tank in the aviation turbine fuel tank farm is TK 32.
Each tank has three dedicated pipeline connections: (i) receipt; (ii) dispatch;
and (iii) recirculation. The receipt pipeline receives cargo from a marine tanker or
from the shore terminal via a pipeline transfer. The dispatch pipeline connection
is used as an outlet; this pipeline transfers cargo out from the tank to a tanker
truck, marine tanker or another tank. The recirculation pipeline connection is used
for operations within the tank farm. Operations such as inter-tank transfers using
gravity or pumps are performed using the recirculation connection. The recirculation
connection can be used as a tank inlet or outlet.
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Figure 4.7: HMI showing the layout of the diesel tank farm

Figure 4.8: HMI showing the layout of the ATF tank farm
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According to the Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD) Standards 169, 118
and 129 and the recommendation by Lal et al. [136], three types of valves, each
controlled by a different actuation mechanism, should be used between each tank and
its pipeline connection. Hence, in the virtual midstream oil terminal model, each
pipeline connection to a tank incorporates three valves. The valve closest to the tank
is controlled pneumatically, the second valve is electrically actuated using a motor and
the third valve is operated manually. Figure 4.5 shows a typical modeled tank with
three pipeline connections and valves. The pneumatic valve, labeled remote operated
valve (ROV), and the motor operated valve (MOV) can be operated remotely from
the human-machine interface. The manual valve is operated physically. In the Matlab
Simulink model, manual valves are operated by toggling a switch manually. The HMI
interfaces for controlling the tank farms are shown in figures 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8. Each
HMI interface shows the dispatch valves from the tanks to the pump house and the
receipt connection from the pipeline transfer and the Marine Tankers (MT) into the
tank farm.

4.3.2.2

Pump House

The pump house is the heart of the midstream oil terminal. Each tank farm
has a dedicated pump house. The gasoline, diesel and aviation turbine fuel pump
houses have five, five and three pumps respectively. The modeled pumps are of
various sizes and can be connected in parallel to achieve the desired flow rate. The
valves in the pump houses can be remotely configured to dispatch cargo from tanks
to marine tankers, tanker trucks or to other tanks in the tank farm. The gasoline and
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Table 4.4: Specification of the pump house.

Pump Type
Pump Spec.

Gasoline
Pumphouse

Diesel
Pumphouse

ATF
Pumphouse

Centrifugal

Centrifugal

Centrifugal

1 x 100 m3/hr 1 x 100 m3/hr
2 x 200 m3/hr 3 x 250 m3/hr 3 x 250 m3/hr
2 x 500 m3/hr 1 x 500 m3/hr

Inlet

16 inch

16 inch

18 inch

Outlet

20 inch

20 inch

24 inch

Drive Motor

3 Induction

3 Induction

3 Induction

1 x 40 kw
(79 Amp)
2 x 90 kw
(180 Amp)
2 x 200 kw
(345 Amp)

1 x 40 kw
(79 Amp)
3 x 110 kw
(192 Amp)
1 x 200 kw
(345 Amp)

Motor Specification

3 x 110 kw
(192 Amp)

diesel pump houses have dedicated pipelines for transferring cargo to the tanker truck
gantry. Per API SPEC 11L6 [127], the pumps use three-phase induction motors that
deliver constant torque via an universal coupling connected through a common shaft
to the centrifugal pumps. Table 4.4 shows the detailed specifications for the pumps
in the virtual midstream oil terminal. The HMI interfaces for controlling the pump
houses are shown in figure 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11.

4.3.2.3

Tanker Truck Gantry

The tank truck gantry is the most operationally active area of the terminal.
The presence of moving trucks and open volatile cargoes makes this area susceptible
to fires and explosions. More than 51% of major accidents in oil terminals originate
in tanker truck gantries [121].
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Figure 4.9: HMI showing the layout of the Gasoline pump house

Figure 4.10: HMI showing the layout of the diesel pump house
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Figure 4.11: HMI showing the layout of the ATF pump house

A tanker truck gantry typically has several loading zones with dedicated loading arms for transferring liquid cargoes into tanker trucks. The allowable cargo capacity in a tanker truck is between 2,000 and 16,000 gallons (7,570 and 49,205 liters).
At least 3% of a tank must be left empty to provide space for product expansion.
A tanker truck gantry with three loading bays is modeled in the virtual midstream oil terminal. One bay is allocated for gasoline, the second bay is for diesel
and the third mixed bay can load gasoline or diesel. Aviation turbine fuel cannot be
loaded on a truck.
Each modeled tanker truck has two internal 6 kl tanks. API RP 1007 [132]
states that the body of a tanker truck must be electrically grounded during loading
operations to prevent static charge accumulation in the tanker truck. Therefore, each
modeled tanker truck bay has sensors connected to a programmable logic controller
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Table 4.5: Specification of tanker truck loading bays.
Bay 1

Bay 2

Bay 3

Cargo type

Gasoline

Diesel

Gasoline and Diesel

Loading arm

2x6

2x6

1x6
1x6

Bay

Single cargo
express loading bay

Single cargo
express loading bay

Mixed load bay

Valve configuration

Butterfly valve for flow regulation

Tanker truck config.

Two 6KL tanks

Safety Features

Overfill sensor
tanker truck ground connection
Flow regulator for loading arm

that detects if the tanker truck is not grounded correctly. The programmable logic
controller prevents the loading operation if the truck is not electrically grounded. The
tanker truck gantry programmable logic controller also regulates product flow using
a butterfly valve. An overfill sensor connected to the programmable logic controller
stops product flow when the tank truck is full. Table 4.5 provides the specifications
of the three modeled loading bays. Figure 4.12 shows the level of the internal tanks,
status of the ground connector and the loading arms arms going into the tanker
trucks.
The tanker truck gantry PLC also regulates product flow using a butterfly
valve. An overfill sensor is connected to the PLC to stop product flow when the tank
truck is full. Table 4.5 provides specification details for each modeled loading bay.
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Figure 4.12: HMI showing the layout of the TT gantry

4.3.2.4

Cross-Country Pipeline

The virtual midstream oil terminal testbed models a 150 km cross-country
pipeline from a shore-based oil refinery to the tank farm. Pipeline transfer is a
cost efficient and safe way to transfer liquid cargo over long distances. Operational
hazards are minimized because the volatile cargo is never exposed to the ambient
environment. Due to the length of a pipeline, remotely-monitored sensors provide
pipeline state information to operators. A cyber attack that spoofs pipeline sensor
readings can disrupt and harm the pipeline transfer operation [119].
The modeled pipeline complies with API RP 1109 [133]. Multiple flow rate and
pressure sensors are modeled to enable remote monitoring of the status of the pipeline
transfer operation. The diameter of the pipeline decreases farther from the source
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to compensate for the drop in pressure due to the long-distance pumping operation.
Figure 4.13 shows the specifications of the cross-country pipeline.

4.3.2.5

Terminal-to-Jetty Pipelines

A wide array of liquid and liquefied gas cargoes are transferred across large
distances using marine tankers. Marine tanker loading and unloading require the use
of many cyber-physical systems, including a marine loading arm (MLA), on shore
holding tanks, pumps, on-ship tanks on-ship pipelines.
The testbed simulates two terminal-to-jetty 12 km pipelines. One pipeline is
dedicated to vessel loading and the other to vessel unloading. ISGOTT [126] has
published safety regulations for oil tanker cargo operations. During cargo operation,
double-wall segregation of valves is mandatory, i.e., two valves must separate the
operating pipeline from other pipelines. As a result, the modeled terminal-to-jetty
pipeline has six valves, two for each cargo type on the terminal side as shown in
Figure 4.14.
The terminal-to-jetty pipelines are coupled to the manifolds of marine tankers
using marine loading arms. A marine loading arm is a sophisticated pipeline that
connects the shore pipeline to a marine tanker to facilitate cargo transfer. A marine loading arm incorporates safety features that prevent oil spillage and offer a
mechanism for the connection and disconnection of the shore pipeline and marine
tanker. Position sensors are used in a marine loading arm to sense the orientation
of the marine tanker. If the ship drifts away from the jetty, an emergency valve
called a power emergency release coupling is activated to release the marine loading
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arm from the ship and close the pipeline valves to prevent spillage. This emergency
release mechanism is crucial to the dynamic jetty-vessel coupling system because it
prevents damage to the loading arm. Figure 4.15 and 4.16 shows the internal tanks
and controls of the unloading and loading MT.
Each simulated ship has six tanks; three port-side tanks (P1, P2, P3) and
three starboard-side tanks (S1, S2, S3). The internal pipeline connections are not
modeled and the simulation does not consider the effects of ballast tanks and ballasting operations that pump sea water into and out of a ship to compensate for the
outgoing and incoming liquid cargo.

4.4

Oil terminal Operations

The midstream oil terminal can simulate a variety of cargo operations. The
supported normal cargo operations include inter-tank, tank-to-tanker-truck, tank-toship, ship-to-tank, and refinery-to-tank transfers. This section describes the simulation of the results obtained for all normal operations in a mid-stream oil terminal. The
threat models and cyber-attacks related to the midstream oil terminal are discussed
in chapter 5.

4.4.1

Inter Tank Transfer operation
Inter-tank transfer moves liquid cargo from one tank to another in a tank farm.
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Inter Tank Transfer using Gravity
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Figure 4.17: Inter-tank transfer operation using gravity

4.4.1.1

Inter-Tank Transfer Using Gravity

An inter-tank operation may leverage gravity (head) associated with the difference in the liquid levels in the two tanks. For an inter-tank transfer using gravity,
the valves between the two tanks are opened to enable cargo to flow from the tank
with the higher liquid level to the tank with the lower liquid level. Over time, the
tanks reach equilibrium, at which point both the tanks have the same liquid level.
Figure 4.17 shows the liquid levels in gasoline tanks TK 11 and TK 12 observed
from the human-machine interface during an inter-tank transfer operation. Three
valves (remote operated, motor operated and manual) in the recirculation pipeline
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of each tank are involved in the inter-tank transfer. All three valves are opened to
initiate transfer and may be closed at any time during the transfer. Figure 4.17 shows
that the flow rate between tanks is not constant. In fact, the flow rate is dependent on
the difference between the liquid cargo levels in the tanks – the greater the difference
in levels, the greater the flow rate.

4.4.1.2

Inter Tank Transfer Using Pump Assist

In some cases, the difference in liquid levels in the two tanks (head) may not be
adequate to facilitate the transfer of cargo with a sufficient flow rate, or the transfer
of cargo may have to go against gravity. In these cases, an intertank transfer is
accomplished using pumps. To facilitate the operation, the human-machine interface
is used to connect the dispatch pipeline of the source tank to the inlets of the relevant
pumps and the pump outlets are connected to the recirculation connections of the
destination tanks. The human-machine interface is used to start and stop the pumps
at the beginning and end of the operation, respectively.
Figure 4.18 shows sensor readings from the inlet flow rate sensor at the destination tank during inter-tank transfer operations. The inter-tank transfer was repeated
four times with one, two, three and four pumps working in parallel to complete the
transfers. The graphs are labeled with the numbers of pumps used for the operations.
When a single pump is used, a delay of 20 to 30 seconds occurs between the start of
the transfer operation and the increase in the flow rate observed at the tank inlet.
The delay is primarily because the air inside the pipeline must be pushed out before
the cargo can flow. When multiple pumps are used, the air is pushed out much faster,
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Flowrate of gasoline in a pump assisted Inter Tank Transfer operation
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Figure 4.18: Inter-tank transfer operation using centrifugal pumps in parallel

causing the flow rate to increase at a faster rate, which appears to be instantaneous
in Figure 4.18. As the number of pumps used increases, a higher flow rate is seen due
to the accumulation of flow from more pumps in parallel. The three-pump case has
a slightly higher flow rate than the two-pump case because the third pump has a low
rating of 100 m3/h.

4.4.2

Tanker Truck Loading Operation
The Tanker Truck (TT) distributes the liquid cargo from a mid-stream oil

terminal to consumer outlets like gas stations and small scale industries. A supply
and distribution (S and D) department handles the logistics and creates a loading
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plan for each TT. A loading plan has details about the capacity and cargo type
(Gasoline, Diesel, and ATF). An enterprise resource planning (ERP) software like JD
Edwards, SAP ERP matches the loading plan to a compatible loading bay when the
TT enters the oil terminal. The planning and logistics embody the IT infrastructure
of a mid-stream oil terminal and is beyond the scope of this research. This testbed
presents the characteristics of the cyber-physical components involved during a TT
loading operation.

4.4.2.1

Gasoline Tanker Truck Loading

The gasoline TT loading involves three operational areas of the midstream oil
terminal: tank farm, pump house, and TT gantry. Each section has its own controller,
actuator, and sensors. The first step of a TT loading operation involves lining up the
dispatch valves (P10AV1, P10AV2) of TK 11 from the gasoline tank farm (TF1) to
the pump house. This lets the liquid cargo to flow from TK 11 to the gasoline pump
house. Then the two isolation gate valves (P7AV1, P7AV2) separating the pump
house from the tank farm lets the cargo supply connect to the suction-inlet of the
centrifugal pumps. During the line-up operation, sensors attached at the dispatch
pipeline of TK 11 and at the inlet of the gasoline pump house observe a change in
pressure and flowrate. The pipeline has a combination of air and liquid cargo; When
the tank dispatch valves are open the hydrostatic pressure of the tank pressurizes the
pipeline and pushes the air out through a master relief valve. The system attains
a steady-state, once the cargo flow rate becomes zero after the liquid cargo fills the
entire cargo pipeline.
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Figure 4.19: Pressure and flow rate during a pipeline line-up of TT loading

Figure 4.19 summarizes the characteristics of the pump inlet line-up operation.
When P10AV1, P10AV2 (blue line in the graphs) is opened, the pipeline experiences
4.8x105 Pascal hydrostatic pressure from the cargo stored in TK11. The liquid cargo
from the tank rushes in to fill the air gaps in the pipeline portraying a spike in flow
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rate (2500 KL/hr). While the air gaps are being filled, actuation of the isolation
valves P7AV1, P7AV2 (red lines in the graphs) creates another flow rate spike. This
is because the isolation valves provide more pipeline volume for the liquid cargo to
flow in. The system becomes stable when the flowrate reduces to zero kiloliters/per
hour; here it takes 7-10 secs. Pressurizing the pipeline uses 1.6 KL of the liquid cargo
from TK 11 as shown in Figure 4.19.
After lining up the gasoline pump house to the TT gantry, the valves between
the TT loading bay 1 and the gasoline pump house outlets are lined-up. The cargo
transfer is started by turning ON a centrifugal pump in the gasoline pump house.
The characteristics shown in figure 4.20 represents the pressure and flow rate at four
different locations on the oil terminal during a TT loading operation. The sensors
are located at the dispatch pipeline of TK 11, the inlet of the gasoline pumphouse,
the outlet of the gasoline pump house, and the outlet of the loading bay 1.
The pump is turned ON at 67 seconds and a spike in flow rate and pressure
is observed at the outlet of the pump house between 68-70 seconds. Because the TT
gantry is 1 Km from the pump house the spike in flow rate is delayed and is observed
between 77- 81 seconds. The centrifugal pump creates a difference of pressure head
between the pump house outlet and the outlet of the TT gantry loading arm and
allows the cargo to flow from the suction inlet steadily to the internal tanks of the
TT. A steady flow rate of 270 KL/Hr is observed between 80-247 seconds. During
this period the 6KL internal tanks of the TT are filled with gasoline. The valves at
loading bay 1 are closed once the loading is complete at 248 seconds. The pump is
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Figure 4.20: Pressure and flow rate during a Gasoline TT loading operation

Table 4.6: Summary of gasoline TT loading operation
Operation time
Cargo loading time
Cargo amount
Steady state pressure
Steady state flow rate
Subsystems involved

267 Seconds
172 Seconds
12 KL
4.8 bars
270 KL/Hr
Gasoline Tank Farm
Gasoline Pump House
TT loading Gantry

turned OFF at 267 seconds. The gasoline TT loading operation is summarized in
Table 4.6.

4.4.2.2

Hybrid Tanker Truck Loading

The hybrid loading operation loads gasoline and diesel into two different internal tanks of the tanker truck (TT) simultaneously. Each cargo uses a dedicated
loading arm. In the simulation, loading bay 3 has gasoline and diesel loading arms
coupled to their respective cargo pipelines. This section investigates a hybrid loading
operation of 12 KL TT (6KL gasoline and 6 KL diesel).
The hybrid loading involves five subsystems of the mid-stream oil terminal:
gasoline tank farm, diesel tank farm, gasoline pump house, diesel pump house, and
the TT gantry. The dispatch pipelines from TK 12 (from gasoline tank farm) and TK
22 (from the diesel tank farm) are lined-up to feed the inlets of the centrifugal pumps
of their respective pump houses. This operation is like the line-up operation shown
in figure 19. The outlet of the pump houses is lined-up to feed the liquid cargo to the
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Figure 4.21: Pressure and flow rate of gasoline pipelines during a hybrid TT
loading operation

TT gantry. The simulated distance of the gasoline pump house to the TT gantry is
1 Km while the diesel pump house is 1.5 Km.
After completing the line-up, one centrifugal pump is turned ON in each pump
house to transfer liquid cargo to the loading arm in TT gantry. The gasoline pump
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Figure 4.22: Pressure and flow rate of diesel pipelines during a hybrid TT loading
operation

is turned ON at 66.2 seconds as shown in figure 4.21 while the diesel pump is turned
ON at 63.79 seconds as shown in figure 4.22. After the expected pressure and flow
rate spikes at the start of the pumping operation, a steady-state flow rate of 210
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Table 4.7: Summary of hybrid TT loading operation

Gasoline
Operation time
Cargo loading time
Cargo amount
Steady state pressure
Steady state flow rate
Subsystems involved

Diesel

200 Seconds
87 Seconds
108 Seconds
6 KL
6 KL
4.8 bar
4.64 bars
270 KL/Hr
210 KL/Hr
Gasoline Tank Farm
Diesel Tank Farm
Gasoline Pump House Diesel Pump House
TT loading Gantry

KL/Hr and 270 KL/Hr is obtained in case of diesel and gasoline respectively. Even
though the configurations of the centrifugal pumps are the same, the flow rate in case
of diesel loading is reduced due to the greater simulated distance of the TT gantry
from the diesel pump house (1.5 KM in contrast to the 1 KM for gasoline). Another
reason for lower flow rate is because diesel has a higher density (0.832 kg/L at 15
degree celsius) than gasoline (0.755 kg/L at 15 degree celsius). Table 4.7 provides a
summary of the loading operation.

4.4.3

Pipeline transfer (PLT) operation
The pipeline transfer (PLT) operation is a cost-effective transport channel for

allowing cargo transfer between two terminals. In this study, the mid-stream oil
terminal is connected to an oil refinery using a 150 KM pipeline. Operations are
performed in batches and are executed after the mid-stream oil terminal and the
off-shore refinery agrees on each consignment. The refinery coordinates with the oil
terminal and sends bulk amounts of cargo through the cross country pipeline.
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Figure 4.23: Flow rate of pipeline transfer during the start of the operation

The simulated scenario shows a transfer of 2000KL of gasoline from the oil
refinery to the midstream oil terminal. This operation involves two subsystems: cross
country pipeline and the gasoline tank farm. Pipeline transfer (PLT) operation begins
with lining-up the receipt valves (P7AV3, P7AV4) of gasoline tank TK 12. The
gasoline receipt valves on the cross country pipeline are opened to connect to the
receipt pipeline of TK 12. Multiple centrifugal pumps connected in parallel are turned
ON from the oil refinery to start the pipeline transfer operation. During the operation,
information about the flow rate and pressure is recorded at five different locations.
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Figure 4.24: Pressure during a pipeline transfer operation

The first four sensors are at 30 km, 60 km, 90 km and 120 km from the refinery. The
final sensors are at the receipt pipeline of the gasoline tank TK 12.

At the start of the simulation, the pipeline is full of gasoline and air mixture.
When the pump is turned ON the cargo is not received immediately. The 150 km
pipeline is first pressurized and the air inside the pipeline is pushed out through the
master relief valve. The cargo reaches the terminal 272 seconds after the start of
pumping; this is observed by analyzing the liquid cargo level in TK 12 shown in
figure 4.26.
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Figure 4.25: Flow rate of pipeline transfer during the end of the operation

Figure 4.23 shows the flow rates during the first 850 seconds of the operation.
At the start of the pumping operation, the station located closest to the refinery
(PLT 30 km station) experiences the most surge in pressure and flowrate. After 700
seconds the flow rate attains a steady-state value of 1091 KL/Hr across all stations.
Attaining a steady-state flow rate is essential for a PLT operation. It shows that the
cross country pipeline has no leaks.
The pressure curve shown in figure 4.24 starts with zero pascal values and
attains unique constant values for each sensor at the steady state. The sensor closest
to the refinery labeled as “PLT 30 KM Station” (30 km from the refinery) attains
a steady-state value of 4.9 bars while the other stations located 60 km, 90km and
120 km for the refinery attain steady-state values of 4.69 bars, 3.73 bars, and 2.029
bars respectively. The decreasing value of the steady-state pressure is due to the fluid
resistance offered by the rigid circular walls of the pipeline.
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Figure 4.26: TK 12 level during PLT operation

Once 2000 KL is received by the gasoline tank TK 12 the receipt inlets (P7AV3,
P7AV4) to the tank is shut off and the oil terminal instructs the officials at the refinery
to stop the centrifugal pumps. After the pump is turned OFF the cargo keeps moving
for 140 seconds eventually reaching a steady-state value of 0 KL/Hr across all stations
as shown in figure 4.25. The pressure sensors converge to a steady-state value of 3.977
bars as shown in figure 4.24. The total PLT operation for transferring 2000KL of
gasoline takes 2 hours 4 minutes and 41 seconds.
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Table 4.8: Summary of the PLT operation
Operation time
Cargo loading time
Cargo amount
Steady-state flow rate
Subsystems involved

4.4.4

2 hours 4 minutes 41 seconds
2 hours 48.9 seconds
2000 KL
1091 KL/Hr
Gasoline Tank Farm
Cross country pipeline

Marine Tanker operations
This section demonstrates the physical characteristics of the midstream oil ter-

minal during an MT loading and unloading operation using the 12km long terminalto-jetty pipeline.

4.4.4.1

Marine Tanker Unloading

During the unloading operation, the MT docks at the liquid cargo jetty. A
marine loading arm (MLA) physically connects the MT’s cargo manifold to the 12
Km long jetty-terminal pipeline. After a successful connection, two valves (manifold
valve P2AV7 and the PERC valve P2AV8 as shown in figure 4.14) isolate the MT
until the start of the loading operation.
The operators at the oil terminal open the valves on the jetty-to-terminal
pipeline to direct the liquid cargo to the right tank farm. This simulation transfers
6000KL of diesel from the MT to the TK 21. Hence the receipt valves (P11AV3,
P11AV4) connected to TK 21 are lined-up with the jetty-terminal pipeline.
The MT has six internal tanks (P1, P2, P3, S1, S2, and S3) each having 1000
KL of diesel cargo. These tanks are lined-up to feed the inlet of the centrifugal pump
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Figure 4.27: Flow rate during the start of the unloading operation

(P2AP1) in the MT. As a final step of the pipeline line-up, the manifold valve and the
PERC is opened to connect the discharge outlet of the pump to the shore pipeline.
Turning the pump ON starts the cargo unloading operation.
Pressure and flow rate sensors located at the inlet of the pump and the terminal
end of the 12 Km long jetty-terminal pipeline measures the physical characteristics
of the unloading operation. Figure 4.27 and 4.28 shows the flowrate and the pressure
curves during the start of the operation. The starting state of the simulation assumes
the entire volume of the 12 Km pipeline to be full with diesel. Opening the manifold
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Figure 4.28: Pressure during the start of the unloading operation

valve and the PERC changes the steady state flow rate and the pressure in the pipeline
as seen in the pressure and the flow rate curves (between 6.1 to 7.693 seconds). This
change is normal because the steady state conditions of the jetty-to-terminal pipeline
is different from that of the internal pipelines of the MT. The pump is turned ON at
7.693 seconds; this causes the flow rate on the terminal side to rise rapidly eventually
settling to a steady-state value of 1829 KL/Hr. The pressure on the terminal-side
pipeline increases from 1.889 bars to 4.22 bars. The flow rate and the pressure takes
29 seconds to attain steady-state.
The transfer operation reaches steady-state at the 36 second mark. By the
mathematical definition of steady-state in continuous time, during this condition the
partial derivative of the physical property (p) with respect to time is zero [137].
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∂p
=0
∂t

(4.1)

The analog to digital converter (ADC) converters attached to the sensors polls
the continuous time-series data at a specific rate (10 polls per second for SIMULINK).
The polling process remodels the data into a discrete-time series data format. In a
discrete system, the formulation of equation 4.1 changes to equation 4.2. Instead of
taking a partial derivative, the value previous timestamp at t-1 is subtracted from
the value of the present timestamp at t.

pt − pt−1 = 0

(4.2)

The system attains steady-state once the pressure and the flowrate on the MT
and the terminal side complies with the constraints in equation 4.2 for a time window
of n time stamps. The n is the minimum number of time stamps taken by an actuator
element to cause a change in the physical process.

n =Polling rate of ADC per second × min(Actuation time
(4.3)
of any physical component in seconds)
The remote operated valves (ROV) takes 3.2 seconds to actuate ; this is the
shortest amount of time taken by a physical element to cause a change in the simulation. MATLAB polls ten data points every second. Using equation 4.3 , the value
of n is 32. Hence steady state is reached once the flow rate stays comparable for 32
timestamps.
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Figure 4.29: Flow rate during the end of the unloading operation

As the internal tanks of the Marine tanker get empty, they are shut off automatically. These shut offs are reflected as momentarily dips in the flow rate curve
at 12030 seconds, 12040 seconds, and at 12060 seconds in figure 4.29. The effects
of the shut-offs result in a decrease in pressure on the MT end and are observed in
figure 4.30. The pressure decreases to zero as all the internal tanks of the MT become
empty. The flowrate drops to zero and the pressure attains a steady-state value after
the pump is turned OFF at 12080 seconds and the receipt valves of TK 21 are closed
at 12084 seconds.
Figures 4.31 and 4.32 show the complete flow rate and pressure characteristics
during the unloading operation. The diesel is unloaded onto TK 21. Over time, the
level of TK 21 increases (shown in figure 4.33). A higher level exerts more hydrostatic
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Figure 4.30: Pressure during the end of the unloading operation

Figure 4.31: Flow rate during MT unloading operation
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Figure 4.32: Pressure during MT unloading operation

Figure 4.33: Level of TK 21 during an MT unloading operation
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pressure (eq 4.4) on the pipeline.

Hydrostatic Pressure = ρgh

(4.4)

Where, ρ=Density of liquid cargo
g=Gravity
h=Level of cargo in the tank
Hence a rise of pressure from 0.4 bar to 0.7 bar is observed on the terminal
end. The rise of pressure decreases the pressure difference created by the pump at
the MT. This results in a gradual dip of flow rate from 1829 KL/Hr to 1755 KL/Hr.
The level of TK 21 and the levels of the internal tanks of the MT are shown
in Figures 4.33 and 4.34 respectively.

Table 4.9: Summary of the marine tanker unloading operation
Operation time
Cargo amount
Subsystems involved

3 hours 51 minutes 50 seconds
6000 KL
Diesel tank farm
Jetty-terminal pipeline
Unloading marine tanker
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Figure 4.34: Level of internal tanks of MT during an unloading operation

4.4.4.2

Marine Tanker Loading

The MT loading operation transfers liquid cargo from the tank farm in the
mid-stream oil terminal to an MT docked at the jetty. Four operational areas work
together during the cargo transfer: gasoline tank farm, gasoline pump house, terminalto-jetty pipeline, and loading marine tanker.
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The transfer operation starts with the line-up of the pipelines, tank, and
pumps. Opening the dispatch valves (P10AV13, P10AV14) of Tank TK 13 at tank
farm one, lets the liquid cargo to flow from the storage tank to the inlet of the pump
house. Thereafter, the outlet (P7AV15, P7AV16) of the pump house is lined up to
transfer the cargo to the 12KM long terminal-to-jetty pipeline. A marine loading
arm (MLA) connects the shore pipeline to the MT. Valves P1AV7, P1AV8 located
inside the MLA isolates the shore pipeline from the MT until the start of the transfer
operation.
After the shore-side pipeline line up, the valves (P5AV1, P5AV2, P5AV3,
P5AV4, P5AV5, P5AV6) to the internal tanks of the MT are opened to allow the
inflow of liquid cargo from the MLA. The pumps at the gasoline pump house are
turned ON and the isolating valves in the MLA are opened to start the cargo transfer
operation.
The flow rate and pressure sensors for monitoring the state of the transfer
operations are installed at five locations: at the despatch valves of TK13, at the inlet
of the pump house, at the outlet of the pump house, at the terminal end of the 12
km long terminal-jetty pipeline and inside the MT receiving the liquid cargo.
The gate valves separate sections of the pipeline which results in different
steady-state pressures. During pipeline line-up opening the valves create a turbulent
flow of gasoline from a high to low-pressure region. Figure 4.35 demonstrates the
turbulent flow until the gasoline pumps are turned ON at 16.7 seconds.
At 16.7 seconds two gasoline pumps are turned ON to start the loading operation. The pump causes the flowrate and pressure to spike across the connected
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Figure 4.35: Flow rate during the start of the MT loading operation

pipelines but eventually attains a steady-state at 48 seconds. At steady-state, gasoline pump house outlet flow rate and the incoming flow rate into the MT converges
to a constant value of 1579 Kl/Hr. A constant flow rate across a long pipeline is very
important to ensure that there is no leakage during a cargo transfer operation. The
outlet of the gasoline pump house attains a constant 3.29 bars while the pressure
at the inlet of MT attains a constant value of 1.16 bars. The difference in pressure
moves the liquid cargo from the gasoline pump house across the 12KM terminal-tojetty pipeline to the inlet of the MT. The suction of the centrifugal pumps creates
a region of negative pressure (-0.9 bars) at the inlet of the pump house and a pres-
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Figure 4.36: Pressure during the start of the MT loading operation

sure difference of 2.33 bars between the despatch valve of TK 13 and the inlet of the
gasoline pump house. This allows for a smooth supply of gasoline from the dispatch
valves of TK 13 to the inlets of the pump house. The flow rate and the pressure for
the first 60 seconds of MT loading are shown in Figures 4.35 and 4.36 respectively.
As the liquid cargo is pumped out of TK 13, the level of cargo in TK 13 goes
down. This reduces the hydrostatic pressure at the dispatch valves of TK 13. Figure
4.37 shows the steady decline of pressure during the cargo transfer operation.
Figure 4.38 and 4.39 shows the flow rate and pressure during the end of MT
loading operation. The controller inside the MT closes the valves to the internal tanks
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Figure 4.37: Pressure during the MT loading operation

once the cargo level reaches 1000KL. At 13740 seconds, valves to all six tanks (S1,
S2, S3, P1, P2, and P3) are closed. The engineers at the MT instruct the operators
at the terminal to turn OFF the gasoline pumps and to close the pipeline line-up.
Figure 4.40 shows the level of the internal tanks during the MT loading operation.
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Figure 4.38: Flow rate during the end of MT loading operation

Figure 4.39: Pressure during the end of MT loading operation
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Figure 4.40: Level of internal tanks of MT during a loading operation

Table 4.10: Summary of the marine tanker loading operation
Operation time
Cargo loading time
Cargo amount
Subsystems involved

2 hours 4 minutes 41 seconds
2 hours 48.9 seconds
2000 KL
Gasoline Tank Farm
Gasoline pump house
Terminal-to-jetty pipeline
Loading Marine Tanker
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4.5

Conclusion

The virtual midstream oil terminal testbed described in this chapter is a large
scale simulation of multiple interconnected industrial control systems. This work
demonstrates that large scale virtual testbeds are valuable research tools for the
industrial control system cyber-security research community. The testbeds can be
developed with existing tools and large scale systems can be simulated on personal
computers.
Failure in an oil terminal can result in catastrophic scenarios which cause loss
of life and property. With the emergence of cyber-threats capable of hindering the
normal operation of components the eminent threat to these systems has dramatically
increased. The virtual midstream oil terminal testbed is modeled in compliance with
the existing standards currently followed by the oil and gas industry. This testbed is
used in chapter 5 to study the impact of cyber-attacks on a midstream oil terminal.
Chapters 6 and 7, explores novel intrusion detection mechanisms for protecting the
terminal from the attacks modelled in chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5

A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF THREATS AGAINST THE
MID-STREAM OIL TERMINAL TESTBED USING S-T-R-I-D-E AND
ATTACK TREES

This chapter combines a collection of techniques to create a systematic workflow for identifying threats and for developing meaningful cyber-attacks against the
midstream oil terminal described in chapter 4. The workflow for threat discovery
leading to the development of cyber-attack can be broadly segmented into four steps:
1. Threat modeling
2. Recognizing intrusion scenarios
3. Enumerating exploits
4. Finding an exploit path using attack trees
The upcoming sections apply the above steps to the mid-stream oil terminal
testbed and result in two outcomes: (1) threats involving each component of the
midstream oil terminal and (2) paths that might be taken by an attacker to exploit
such threats. Using the information from the threat modeling, sixteen cyber-attack
scenarios, and their impact on the midstream oil terminal are demonstrated during
various cargo operations.
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5.1

Threat modeling

Threat modeling for an industrial control system requires a systematic analysis
of each component to identify the absence of appropriate safeguards and to enumerate
existing vulnerabilities. The threat models reveal three important information items
about a cyber-attack scenario: (1) the most likely cyber-attack vectors, (2) probable
goals of the attackers, and (3) the attack path that an attacker can pursue to achieve
any desired goal. This research focuses on an asset-centric threat modeling technique
introduced by Microsoft called STRIDE.
STRIDE is a widely accepted method of quantifying threats against each system component [57]. The STRIDE method represents a mnemonic for six unique
types of security threats: (i) Spoofing: attack on the authenticity of each element,
(ii) Tampering: attack on integrity, (iii) Repudiation: denying or disowning a certain
action executed in the system, (iv) Information disclosure: attack on confidentiality,
(v) Denial of Service (DoS): attack on availability, (vi) Elevation of privilege: getting higher privilege access to a system element by a user with restricted authority
[56]. These threats are quantified for all system components of the targeted industrial
control system using the following steps put forth by Khan et. al. [56].
• Step 1: Decomposing the ICS into structural components
• Step 2: Plotting a data flow diagram for each component
• Step 3: Identifying STRIDE threats in a Data Flow Diagram (DFD)
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Step 1: Decomposing the ICS into structural components
The components of the industrial control system are hierarchically broken
down into independent functional elements. A simple technique is to start from the
five broad categories of ICS discussed in chapter 3: Remote Monitoring and control
(Human-Machine Interface (HMI)), Network (SCADA protocol), Distributed Control
System (Programmable Logic controller (PLC)), cyber-physical link and the physical
system. These components are further decomposed into a collection of fundamental
units. The limit of the decomposition is set by the scope of the study [58]. Figure
5.1 illustrates the decomposition of components in the midstream oil terminal.

Figure 5.1: Hierarchical decomposition of midstream oil terminal into fundamental
components
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Step 2: Plotting data flow diagram for each component
A Data Flow Diagram (DFD) represents the information flow between the
fundamental components identified after decomposition. These components are represented as four basic symbols in the DFD.
External Entity (EE): An external entity is an outside element that provides data
to the system or receives outputs from the system. External entities are components
outside of the boundaries of the information systems.
Process (P): The process is part of a system that either relays or transforms the
flow of information.
Data Store (DS): A data store represents the storage of persistent data that is
necessary for other processes to operate.
Data Flow (DF): A data flow represents the flow of information, with its direction
represented by an arrowhead that shows at the end of the flow connector.
Twelve PLC controllers supervise the state of the midstream oil terminal.
Creating a DFD diagram for each PLC with all connected sensors and actuators is
not ideal. A more pragmatic solution for physical systems with multiple controllers
is to create a generic DFD with a single controller node connected to all forms of
sensors and actuators used in the physical system. This solution works because
threats experienced by similar dataflow or processes are identical [58]. Figure 5.2
illustrates a generalized DFD which presents the breakdown of processes, data stores,
data flows and trust boundaries. Figure 5.2 is used in conjunction with the STRIDE
methodology to enumerate the six security threats for each asset of the target system.
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Figure 5.2: Data Flow Diagram (DFD)

Step 3: Identifying STRIDE threats in the DFD
To perform threat analysis it is necessary to identify attacker intentions (or
threat consequences (TC)) based on expert knowledge of the system. Table 5.1 identifies threat consequences and assigns a code to each for reference.
Khan et. al.’s STRIDE-per-elements approach algorithm shown in Figure 5.3
[56] is used to match the threat consequences listed in Table 5.1 to the DFD elements
in figure 5.2. The algorithm considers each STRIDE threat vector and scans through
all the elements in the data flow diagram. If any element is found vulnerable to a
STRIDE threat, it is appended to table 5.2 along with the threat consequences.
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Table 5.1: Threat consequences based on expert knowledge of the mid-stream oil
terminal testbed
Code
TC-1
TC-2
TC-3
TC-4
TC-5
TC-6
TC-7
TC-8
TC-9
TC-10

Description
Opening / Closing valve during liquid cargo operation
Over flow of cargo tanks
Over pressure in pipelines
Accumulation of static charge during loading
Pipeline rupture
Inability to communicate with the controller
Inability to communicate with the sensors
Wrong system operation
Slow flow rate during operation
Disclosure of system secret

Hazards
H-1 - H-2 - H-4
H-1 - H-2 - H-3- H4
H-1 - H-2
H-1 - H-2
H-1 - H-2 - H-4
H-1 - H-2
H-1 - H-2
H-2 - H-3 - H-4
H4
H4

H1= Human injury, H2= Equipment damage, H3= Operational delay, H4=
Financial loss

Figure 5.3: Threat analysis using STRIDE-per-element approach [56]

5.2

Recognizing intrusion scenarios

After the enumeration of STRIDE threats, the next step is to identify an
intrusion scenario. Identification of the intrusion scenario lets the researchers gauge
the privilege gained by the attacker. Additionally, it helps researchers to narrow down
on a subset of threats exploitable from the compromised nodes.
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Table 5.2: Threat modelling using STRIDE-per element methodology
STRIDE

S

T

R
I
D

E

DFD Elements
DF-1
DF-2
DF-3
DF-4
DF-5
DF-6
DF-7
DF-1
P-1
DF-2 or P-2
DF-3 or P-3
DF-4 or P-4
DF-5 or P-5
DF-6 or P-6
DF-7 or P-7
DS-1
EE-1
DF-1, EE-1
EE-1
DF-1
P-1
DF-2 or P-2
DF-3 or P-3
DF-4 or P-4
DF-5 or P-5
DF-6 or P-6
DF-7 or P-7
EE-1
P-1
DS-1

TC
TC-1, TC-2, TC-3, TC-4, TC-5, TC-6, TC-7, TC-8, TC-9
TC-3, TC-5
TC-4, TC-8, TC-9
TC-1, TC-2, TC-8
TC-2, TC-3, TC-9
TC-1, TC-3
TC-4
TC-2, TC-3, TC-5, TC-6
TC-6
TC-3, TC-5, TC-7, TC-9
TC-4, TC-7, TC-9
TC-1, TC-2, TC-7
TC-2, TC-3, TC-5, TC-8
TC-2, TC-3, TC-5
TC-4
TC-1, TC-2, TC-3, TC-4, TC-5, TC-6, TC-8, TC-9, TC-10
TC-1, TC-2, TC-3, TC-5, TC-8, TC-9
TC-10
TC-2, TC-3, TC-5, TC-6
TC-2, TC-3, TC-5, TC-6
TC-2,TC-6
TC-3, TC-5, TC-7,TC-9
TC-4, TC-7, TC-9
TC-1, TC-2, TC-7
TC-2, TC-3, TC-5, TC-8
TC-2, TC-3, TC-5, TC-7
TC-4, TC-7
TC-1, TC-2, TC-3, TC-5, TC-8, TC-9, TC-10
TC-6, TC-10, TC-8
TC-1, TC-2, TC-3, TC-4, TC-5, TC-8, TC-9, TC-10

This research focuses on cyber-attacks from compromised Trusted Nodes (TN).
Considering the ICS-CERT Defense-in-Depth architecture, a TN is a component of
Area Control (level 2) [12]. To compromise a TN, the malicious attacker has to find
a path through the defensive strategies positioned in Enterprise Network (level 5),
Logistic Network (level 4), and Operations and Control (level 3). Once compromised,
the malicious attacker gains limited or complete control over a TN at level 2 of the
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defense-in-depth architecture. Level 1 (Basic Control) and level 0 (Process) have no
security module built into them and trust any commands from the trusted node.
Hence, during the intrusion, the attacker from the compromised trusted node (1)
can monitor and control the core services and operational control system at level 2
or below, (2) can replace the actual ladder logic with malicious code and, (3) can
install a software trojan inside the PLC. Considering these three circumstances, the
next section puts together a list of exploits relevant to the selected threats. Table 5.2
shows the selected threats for the intrusion scenario involving a compromised trusted
node.

5.3

Enumerating exploits

Considering the intrusion scenario explained in section 2, an attacker can execute the following exploits. In the text below exploits are named “EX-“ followed by
an exploit index number.
Man-in-the-Middle attack (MiTM attack): [EX-1, EX-2, EX-3, EX-4]
These exploits use a MiTM attack tool (ettercap) to tap into the network
traffic of a PLC and an HMI from a trusted node. During the exploit, the network
packets get redirected through the compromised node and the attacker has full control
over the information being sent or received by the HMI and the PLC. The attacker
can change the information of the network packets to spoof the state of the sensors
and actuators (EX-2, EX-3). He can also drop all packets from the PLC and deny
service to the HMI (EX-1). Also, to gain more knowledge about the functionalities of
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the system the attacker can monitor and collect data from the information exchange
between the HMI and the PLC by performing a reconnaissance operation (EX-4).
Injection attack: [EX-5, EX-6]
The MODBUS protocol does not support authentication. Any node having
network connectivity to the PLC can send commands to change the state of any
actuators. The injection attack takes advantage of this and issues malicious command
settings to the PLC that cause incorrect operation in the physical system (EX-5). EX5 sends a single malicious command from the compromised trusted node. The change
caused because of such a malicious command is visible from the HMI and an operator
can change back the settings to normalize the state of the sensor or actuator. EX-6
is a modification of exploit EX-5; instead of sending a single network packet with the
malicious command, the attacker keeps sending the same malicious network packet at
a faster rate than the HMI. This changes the state of the physical system and denies
service to the HMI (EX-6). For this work, the injection packets were crafted using
the pyModbus module of Python.
Volumetric Denial of Service attack: [EX-7]
This exploit aims to incapacitate the functionality of the PLC. The attacker
sends enormous volumes of network packets from the compromised trusted node to
open ports on the PLCs. The PLCs cannot process the large influx of network packets
and crashes (EX-7). This stops the monitoring and control operation of the PLC and
incapacitates the system. A denial of service tool called the Low Orbit Ion Cannon
(LOIC) and Hping3 are used to perform the volumetric denial of service attacks.

150

Compromised ladder logic: [EX-8, EX-9]
The attacker exchanges the actual ladder logic of the PLC with a malicious
one. The malicious ladder logic causes undesirable control operations (EX-9) and can
trap the PLC in a loop (EX-8). In exploit EX-8, the PLC stays trapped in the loop
and cannot provide service to the HMI or control any physical system operations.
The activation of malicious logic depends on the inputs or a sequence of events.
Software Trojan: [EX-10, EX-11, EX-12, EX-13, EX-14]
This is one of the most sophisticated exploit types. The attacker, in this
case, installs a software trojan inside the PLC. Because the trojan is inside the PLC,
it can perform an array of attacks. The trojan can kill the PLC process (EX-10)
and create a denial-of-service similar in outcome to EX-7 and EX-8. In EX-11, the
trojan observes the functionality of the PLC and records all the data onto a log file
(reconnaissance attack). The trojan redirects traffic between the PLC and HMI and
changes the information on the network, causing a MiTM scenario (EX-12, EX-13).
The hardware layer used by the PLC to talk to the sensors and actuators in a physical
system can be compromised by the software trojan. The compromised hardware layer
allows the trojan to spoof the states of the actuator and the sensors (EX-14). The
software trojan leaves no footprint on the SCADA network and the effect of the
attack is only observed on the physical system. A Python script is used to implement
the functionalities of the software trojan. The script resides inside the PLC and is
activated only when specific system conditions are met.
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Table 5.3: Summary of exploits
Threat
Consequences
(Primary and
secondary threat
consequence)
TC-2, TC-3, TC-5,
TC-6
TC-1, TC-2, TC-3,
TC-4, TC-5, TC-6,
TC-7, TC-8, TC-9
TC-1, TC-2, TC-3,
TC-4, TC-5, TC-6,
TC-7, TC-8, TC-9

Exploit
ID

Brief
description of
attacks

EX-1

Drop

EX-2

Both-side spoof

EX-3

Injection

Compromised
DFD element

Exploit type

STRIDE
Category

EE-1 and DF-1

MiTM

E,D

EE-1 and DF-1

MiTM

E,S

EE-1 and DF-1

MiTM

E,S

EE-1 and DF-1

MiTM

E,I

TC-10

EX-4

EE-1 and DF-1

Command
Injection

R

TC-1, TC-2, TC-3,
TC-5, TC-8, TC-9

EX-5

EE-1 and DF-1

Command
Injection

R

TC-1, TC-2, TC-3,
TC-5, TC-8, TC-9

EX-6

EE-1 and DF-1

Volumetric
DDoS

D

EE-1 and DS-1

Ladder logic
tampering

E,T-D

EE-1 and DS-1

Ladder logic
tampering

E,T-S

EE-1 and DS-1

Software Trojan

E,T-D

EE-1 and DS-1

Software Trojan

E,T-I

EE-1 and DS-1

Software Trojan

E,T

EE-1 and DS-1

Software Trojan

E,T

EE-1 and DS-1

Software Trojan

E,T

5.3.1

TC-2, TC-3, TC-5,
TC-6
TC-1, TC-2, TC-3,
TC-4, TC-5, TC-6,
TC-8, TC-9, TC-10
TC-1, TC-2, TC-3,
TC-4, TC-5, TC-6,
TC-8, TC-9, TC-10
TC-1, TC-2, TC-3,
TC-4, TC-5, TC-6,
TC-8, TC-9, TC-10
TC-1, TC-2, TC-3,
TC-4, TC-5, TC-6,
TC-8, TC-9, TC-10
TC-1, TC-2, TC-3,
TC-4, TC-5, TC-6,
TC-8, TC-9, TC-10
TC-1, TC-2, TC-3,
TC-4, TC-5, TC-6,
TC-8, TC-9, TC-10
TC-1, TC-2, TC-3,
TC-4, TC-5, TC-6,
TC-8, TC-9, TC-10

EX-7

Exploit Type

Network Attack

Data Collection
(reconnaissance)
Single network
packet
Repeated
injection from
single client
Volumetric DoS
attack

EX-8

Time delayed
PLC crash

EX-9

Time delayed
overriding
MODBUS data

EX-10

PLC Crash

EX-11

Reconnaissance

Compromised
ladder logic

Software exploit

EX-12

EX-13

EX-14

Single injecting
values to
registers
Repeated
injection of
values
False reporting
values

Calculating exploit cost
An attacker can use different exploits to achieve similar goals. To have a better

understanding of the attacker’s interests and motives, this research calculates the cost
of the exploits using a generic threat matrix. Duggan et. al. [139] of the Sandia
National Lab developed this methodology for the Operational Threat Assessment
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(OTA). A generic threat matrix allows researchers to identify potential attack paths
and assign an analytical value to measure the resource requirement for each exploit.
The exploits listed in table 5.3 are labeled based on five discrete characteristics
or distinguishing properties, concerning the resource requirement: time, technical personnel, cyber-knowledge, kinetic knowledge, level of access. Time is the period dedicated by the attackers to planning, developing, and deploying to reach an attacker’s
goal. Technical personnel is the number of group members that attackers dedicate to
build and deploy the exploit to achieve a goal. Knowledge is the level of theoretical
and practical proficiency necessary for employing the exploit. To design exploits for
cyber-physical systems, the attacker requires an understanding of the functionalities
of cyber and kinetic elements in the system. Hence this parameter is subdivided into
cyber-knowledge and kinetic-knowledge. Level of access is a qualitative parameter
which assesses the extent of infiltration necessary for executing the attacker’s goal.
Parameters like time and technical personnel provide a quantitative value,
while knowledge and level of access are assigned qualitative labels. The labels are
scored with a resource cost listed in Table 5.4. A final resource cost for each exploit
signifies the relative requirement of resources for each exploit. A lower-cost implies
lesser resource requirements. This cost is used in the next section to find the most
probable attack paths using attack trees [140]. The matrix also provides a qualitative
assessment of the covertness of each exploit; although this is not included in the
exploit resource cost scoring.
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Table 5.4: Cost assigned to parameter labels
Parameter
Time

Technical personnel

Cyber-Knowledge

Kinetic-Knowledge

Level of access

Possible Values
Days-to-weeks
Weeks-to-months
Years-to-decades
Ones
Tens
Hundreds
L
M
H
L
M
H
L
M
H

Assigned Cost
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3

Table 5.5: Resource cost of each exploit

Exploit
EX-1
EX-2
EX-3
EX-4
EX-5
EX-6
EX-7
EX-8
EX-9
EX-10
EX-11
EX-12
EX-13
EX-14

Attack
characteristics
Stealth
L
L
L
L
M
L
L
H
H
H
H
H
H
H

Time
Days-to-weeks
Weeks-to-months
Weeks-to-months
Days-to-weeks
Days-to-weeks
Days-to-weeks
Days-to-weeks
Weeks-to-months
Weeks-to-months
Years-to-decades
Years-to-decades
Years-to-decades
Years-to-decades
Years-to-decades

Resource
Technical
Knowledge
personnel
Cyber Kinetic
Ones
L
L
Ones
M
H
Ones
M
H
Ones
L
L
Ones
L
H
Ones
L
H
Ones
L
L
Tens
M
H
Tens
M
H
Hundreds
H
H
Hundreds
H
H
Hundreds
H
H
Hundreds
H
H
Hundreds
H
H

Access
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
H
H
H
H
H
H
H

Resource
Cost (in
units)
5
9
9
5
8
7
5
12
12
15
15
15
15
15

Cyber-knowledge, Kinetic-knowledge, Level of access = H, M, L
Time = Days-to-weeks, Weeks-to-months, Years-to-decades
Technical personnel= Ones, Tens, Hundreds
5.4

Finding exploit paths using attack trees

To analyze the diverse ways of executing a cyber exploit, this research uses
a methodical way of describing the security of systems by B. Schneier called the
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Figure 5.4: illustrates the process of attack tree construction using a flowchart

attack tree [140]. This method represents attacks against a SCADA system in a tree
structure, with the goal as the root node. The leaf nodes constitute the identified
STRIDE threats and exploits for successfully executing the cyber-attack goal.
This section identifies several attacker’s goals during cargo operations in the
midstream oil terminal. This is done by selecting the threat consequences relevant
to each cargo operation from table 5.1. The selected threat consequence and the
attacker’s goal are portrayed as the root node in an attack tree. Each branch of
the attack-tree represents an exploit (from table 5.3) capable of achieving the TC. A
completed attack tree shows all attack-paths for achieving the attacker’s goal.
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5.4.1

Tanker truck operation
Tanker truck loading operation moves liquid cargo from a tank farm to a tanker

truck through the cargo pump house.

5.4.1.1

Attacker Goal- Understanding the technical details of the tanker
truck loading operation (TC-10)

Attack background and setupThis cyber-attack is often the first step taken by an attacker. The compromised
trusted node passively engages with the system to detect the connected devices and
gathers information about their functionalities. This information is logged and sent
back to the intruder to a remote location which is used to plan future exploits and
attacks.
Attack background and setupFigure 5.5 shows the attack path for performing a reconnaissance attack during
a tank-truck operation. Attack path Attk-1 installs a software trojan inside the
PLCs controlling the tanker truck loading operation. The trojan sniffs and logs
the network interactions between the PLC and the trusted nodes. The resource
cost of implementing such an exploit is high because the attacker has to find an
existing vulnerability in the PLC firmware to introduce a backdoor inside the PLC.
An alternative way, shown as Attk-2 on the attack tree is to perform a Man-in-TheMiddle (MiTM) attack between a PLC and an HMI. Tools like Ettercap can ARP
spoof the targets (the HMI and the PLC). This lets a trusted node connected to the
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Figure 5.5: Attack tree for performing reconnaissance attack during a tanker truck
loading operation

same network eavesdrop on a network interaction between the PLC and the HMI.
The attacker can log this interaction to figure out the functionality of the PLC. This
attack has no impact on the physical operation of the mid-stream oil terminal.

5.4.1.2

Attacker Goal- Causing pressure spikes during loading operation
(TC-3, TC-1)

Attack background and setupLiquid cargo operations in an oil terminal often involve multiple subsystems.
For example, the tanker truck loading operation involves the tank farm, pump house
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and tanker truck gantry. The liquid cargo stored in a tank farm is transferred into the
internal tanks of the tanker trucks using the centrifugal pumps in the pump house.
The state reflected by the simulation at any given instant during the cargo operation
considers the states of all the interconnected subsystems (tank farm, pump house
and tanker truck gantry, vessel operation and pipeline transfer) in the oil terminal.
Therefore, during a tanker truck loading operation, if an attacker manages to sabotage
any of the oil terminal components, the effects of the attack may be evident across
multiple interdependent subsystems. This section studies the attack paths that can
cause pressure spike during a TT loading operation.
Attack pathsPressure spike is dangerous during cargo operation. It creates unsafe vibrations
in the pipelines and can cause a pipeline rupture if the pressure exceeds the hydrotested pressure threshold (simulated pipelines have a hydro tested limit of 18 bars).
Figure 5.6 shows the unique attack paths for creating pressure spikes on the pipelines.
The attacker uses different exploits to toggle the state of the dispatch valve P10AV7
connected to TK 12 of the gasoline pump house. The gasoline cargo transfer operation
simulation is repeated five times. The first simulation shows the normal pressure and
flow rate of the system (figure 5.7 and figure 5.8), the next four simulations analyze
the impact of each attack-path on the physical system.
Three pressure sensors and three flow rate sensors were used to observe the
system state. Sensors were positioned at the inlet and outlet of each centrifugal pump,
and at the inlet of the loading arm of the tanker truck. Figure 5.8 shows the normal
flow rate (kl/h) at three distinct locations during a cargo transfer operation. The
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Figure 5.6: Attack tree for creating pressure spikes during a tanker truck loading
operation

flow rates at the inlet and outlet of the pump rise almost instantaneously and attain
a steady state value of 270 kl/h. Since the tanker truck is located some distance away
from the pump house, the rise in the flow rate at the tanker truck gantry is delayed.
When the cargo reaches the tanker truck, the initial rush produces a spike in the
flow rate, which is followed by a drop to the steady state flow rate of 270 kl/h at the
loading arm. Figure 5.7 shows the measured pressure values at three locations. The
pump inlet has the lowest steady state pressure of 1.18 bar while the pump outlet
has the highest pressure of 1.8 bar. The difference in pressure is due to the boost
provided by the centrifugal pump. After the cargo reaches the pipeline, it starts losing
pressure as it travels along the pipeline. When it reaches the tanker truck gantry, a
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Figure 5.7: Tanker truck loading pressure (normal conditions using a single pump)

lower steady state pressure of 1.6 bar is measured at the loading arm. Note that the
spikes in pressure measured by the three sensors at the start of the cargo transfer
operation are due to the pressure build up in the pipeline.
During each attack scenario, the attacker compromises the motor-operated
valve (P10AV7) in the dispatch pipeline of gasoline tank TK 12. The valve is toggled
three times during the cargo operation, creating spikes in the flow rate and pressure
unsafe for pipelines and valves. To have a close comparison of the attack-paths, the
attacks toggle the valve P10AV7 at 25 sec, 55 sec, and 125 seconds after attaining
steady-state.
160

Normal flowrate during a Tanker Truck loading operation
700

Flowrate in Kiloliter per Hour

600

500

400

300

200

Pump Inlet Flowrate
Pump Outlet Flowrate
Tanker Truck Inlet Flowrate

100

0
20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Time in Seconds

Figure 5.8: Tanker truck loading flow rate (normal conditions using a single pump)

Cyber-attack Attk-3 and Attk-4 are executed from a separate attack node (a
virtual machine running Kali Linux is added to the network connecting the humanmachine interface and programmable logic controller). Attk-3 is a MiTM scenario,
Ettercap is used to ARP spoof the HMI and the PLC (P10) controlling the gasoline
tank farm. This allows the attacker to relay the network traffic of the HMI and PLC
through itself. Using the custom filter of Ettercap the attacker changes the network
packets being sent from the HMI to the PLC on the fly. This lets the attacker toggle
the state of the dispatch valve (P10AV7) of TK 12.
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Attk-4 simulates an injection attack scenario. A Python script using the pymodbus3 library is used to craft the injection packets. Attack node used in Attk-3
injects packets every 50 ms to open and close the valves. The human-machine interface is configured to send commands that set the states of all the actuators, including
the valve, every 500 ms. Because the attacker sends commands at a faster rate and
the valve has a relatively high latency to open and close, a command to set the
valve actuator state sent by the human-machine interface is overridden quickly by
the attacker node.
Attk-5 and Attk-6 are costlier exploit paths but create a low footprint on
the network traffic making them harder for centralized network intrusion detection
systems (NIDS) to detect. These attack paths execute inside the PLC controlling the
gasoline tank farm. For Attk-5 few rungs of malicious ladder logic code are added to
the actual ladder logic. This code toggles the state of the valve when specific scenarios
are met.
In the case of Attk-5 the malicious code in the ladder logic checks if the operators have opened the dispatch valve P10AV7 and P10AV8. Once both valves are
actuated, the ladder logic sets a memory register “TankFarm Ready” as True. A second memory register (“Steady state“) checks if the flowrate is within 267-273 Kl/Hr.
This ensures the TT loading operation is at a steady state. Once both conditions
are met, the malicious code toggles the state of motor operated valve P10AV7 three
times during the simulation using a set of three ON-delay timer and 2 second pulse
timer instructions. The instances of the cyber-attack are pre-programmed to execute
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Figure 5.9: Malicious ladder logic code

25 sec, 55 sec, and 125 sec after steady-state (it takes 12-14 sec to reach steady-state).
Figure 5.9 shows a snippet of the malicious ladder logic code.
Similar to the Attk-5, the attack-path using the software trojan attacks the
gasoline TT loading operation when the operation attains steady-state. Attk-6 uses
a python module (pymodbus3) to check the state of the valves and flow rate from
the MODBUS memory of the PLC controlling the gasoline tank farm. During the
cyber-attack, the software trojan injects value every 10ms into the MODBUS memory
through the loopback network. Command sent from the HMI every 500ms is rapidly
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overwritten by the trojan. The attack lasts for 2 secs, which is enough to toggle the
state of the valve and cause a pressure spike. The valve is toggled three times during
the cargo operation at 25 sec, 55 sec, and 125 sec after steady-state. This is similar
to the injection attack of Attk-4 but because the injection is performed from within
the PLC, the attack does not leave behind a network footprint. TT loading operation
transferring gasoline cargo from TK 12 using a single pump (P7AP2) to the internal
tanks of the tanker trucks is repeated four times. During each simulation, the attacker
chooses a unique attack-path to toggle the dispatch valve of the gasoline tank TK 12
at 25 sec, 55 sec, and 125 sec after attaining steady-state. On each attack instance,
dispatch valve P7AV10 is closed for two seconds and then reopened.
Closing the dispatch valve P7AV10 during a TT loading operation stops the
flow of liquid cargo out of TK 12. The inlet of the gasoline pump connected to the
dispatch valve stops receiving the cargo which results in a negative pressure spike as
shown in figure 5.11. Stopping the flow of liquid cargo decreases the flow rate across
all flow rate sensors. Once the attacker opens the valve after two seconds, a pressure
spike accompanied by a flow rate spike is observed at the pump outlet and the TT
loading arm. Figure 5.11 and 5.10 shows the pressure and flow rate response during
each attack path.
It is interesting to note that the unique attack-paths create similar trends in
pressure and flowrate. The attack paths are executed at the same time windows to
have an identical operational condition. But the peak pressure and flow rate values
observed in each case are not the same. This is because different attack-paths take a
different amount of time to act on the system. For example, network borne exploits
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Figure 5.10: Flow rate during cyber-attacks

like a repeated injection and MiTM (Attk-3 and Attk-4) might have a lag because of
network latency. This lag might be less in case of the ladder logic exploit or software
trojan.
Hydraulic pipelines have two types of pressure limit: safe operational limit
and hydro test limit. A safe operational limit is the range of pressure the pipeline is
supposed to operate at (in case of the mid-stream oil terminal it is ±12 bars). The
hydro test is the technique in which pipes, pressure vessels, gas cylinders, tanks are
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Figure 5.11: Pressure during cyber-attacks

tested at 1.5 times the design pressure of the system or pipes or vessel to check for
leaks during commissioning. The hydro test limit for the pipelines in the midstream
oil terminal is 18 bars. Any pressure spike over 18 bars in a closed pipeline system is
not safe and can cause pipeline rupture and hazardous cargo spillage.
In the cyber attack scenario demonstrated above, a motor operated valve
(P7AV10) in the tank farm is attacked and its effect is observed across multiple
components of the system. This scenario is specifically interesting to cybersecurity
researchers because it provides the ability to study the effect of attacks on interdependent components in the midstream oil terminal. Additionally, this attack scenario
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is similar to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline incident [119]. The spikes in pressure
followed and the negative pressure observed in the pipeline can lead to cracks, implosions, or ruptures in the pipeline and potentially lead to an explosion.

5.4.1.3

Attacker Goal- Overflowing cargo tanks (TC-2)

Attack background and setupGasoline Tanker Truck (TT) loading involves three operational areas of the
midstream oil terminal: gasoline tank farm, gasoline pump house, and tanker truck
loading bay 1. This section investigates various attack paths for overflowing an internal tank of the TT during a loading operation.

Figure 5.12: Overflow tank added to the TT to handle excess liquid cargo during
cyber attack scenarios

The MATLAB simulation is a closed environment simulation. Hence to simulate over into a tanks external environment excess liquid cargo (overflow) is directed
to an overflow tank with specifications similar to the internal tanker truck tank. The
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liquid level of the overflow tank at any point during the simulation shows the amount
of excess liquid cargo (overflow) pumped into the internal tanker truck tank.
Attack pathsThe tank truck gantry is the most operationally active area of the terminal.
The presence of moving trucks and open volatile cargoes makes this area susceptible to
fires and explosions. Over 51% of major accidents in oil terminals originate in tanker
truck gantries [121]. An attack tree shown in figure 5.13 exhibits three approaches
for overflowing the internal tanks of the tanker truck.

Figure 5.13: Attack tree for creating an overflow scenario during a tanker truck
loading operation

Using the first approach an attacker can attempt to spoof the reading of the
level sensor of the tanker truck. The operator monitoring the loading operation from
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the control room might not notice the inconsistency which can lead to an overflow
scenario. A second approach will be to force the valve of the loading arm to stay
open during the final moments of the operation. When the operator tries to close the
loading arm valve the attacker denies services to the HMI.
Considering the exploits listed in table 5.3 an attacker can spoof the readings
of the level sensor using a MiTM exploit (EX-2) or using a software trojan (EX-14)
installed inside the PLC (P6) controlling the loading arm valve of the tanker trucks.
In attack path Attk-7, a compromised trusted node executes a MiTM attack
between the HMI and the PLC (P6) controlling the TT. An application called Ettercap ARP spoofs the HMI and PLC. This enables the attacker to intercept data
frames on the network and change the traffic on the fly. In the case of the simulated
cyber-attack scenario, the attacker subtracts 520 liters from the level reported by the
PLC and sends it to the HMI. An operator monitoring the operation will see a level
different than the actual level sensor reading on the SIMULINK. This inconsistency
can result in operators making incorrect control decisions.
The effect of Attk-7 on the TT loading operation is observed using a set of
three data sensors: the first data sensor is placed at the HMI, the second is the sensor
data from SIMULINK, and the third measures the level of the overflow tank. The
attack starts at 110 seconds (simulation time) and the level observed on the HMI
drops by 520 liters. If the operator is not vigilant he might miss the drop in level
when the attack is initiated. After the drop, the operator keeps seeing a reduced level
throughout the operation. The internal tank of the TT having a 6KL capacity gets
overflowed and the excess cargo diverts to an overflow tank. Figure 5.14 shows the
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Figure 5.14: Level sensor readings during a cyber-attack scenario Attk-7

level of sensors reading on the actual system and as seen on the HMI. The level of the
overflow tanks increases once the internal tank overflows. A MATLAB data point on
the overflow tanks reports an overflow of 542.3 liters of gasoline during the operation.
Attack path Attk-8 compromises the link between the hardware layer of the
OpenPLC and the physical system simulation in SIMULINK. The software trojan
delays the level sensor reading of the internal tanks of the gasoline TT by 7 seconds.
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Figure 5.15: Level sensors readings during a cyber-attack scenario Attk-8

This results in HMI reporting an older value different from the actual reading of the
level sensor.
A set of three data sensors records the state of the TT loading operation
during the cyber-attack scenario. Two data sensors inside the SIMULINK simulation
to record the state of the level of the tanker truck and the level of the overflow tank.
The third data sensor is placed at the HMI to record the level of the internal tank of
the TT as seen by the operator.
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Figure 5.16: Level sensors readings during a cyber-attack scenario Attk-9

Figure 5.15 shows the level of the actual reading of the internal tanks and
overflow tank during Attk-8. The HMI sees a delayed response, which looks similar
to actual reading. The delayed response misleads the operators in taking a wrong
control decision and creates a cargo overflow scenario. A data point on the level of
the overflow tank reveals 408.3 liters of excess cargo spillage because of the Attk-8
scenario.
Attack path Attk-9 uses a different approach to create an overflow scenario.
The attacker keeps the loading valve (P6AV1) open and denies service to the HMI
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during the final moments of the TT loading operation. An injection attack, from
the trusted node, sends commands to the PLC controlling the loading arm valve.
Injection packets crafted by the pyModbus module are written to the PLC memory
at a higher speed (once every 10 milliseconds) than the HMI writes (once every 500
milliseconds). Hence the attacker overrides the commands of the operator. This
attack is initiated at the closing moments of the TT loading operation when the
operator needs to close the loading arm valve.
Two data sensors monitor the state of the TT loading operation during an
injection attack. Figure 5.16 shows the level of the internal tank of the TT and the
level of the overflow tank. The injection attack starts at 156.3 seconds; the operator
sends a command to close the valve to the internal tank of the TT at 161.7 seconds
but the attacker keeps overwriting the commands and keeps the loading valve open.
The attack stops at 170.5 seconds and the operator closes the valve at 171.5 seconds.
By the time the valve is closed 694.2 liters of excess liquid cargo is spilled into the
overflow tank.

5.4.1.4

Attacker Goal- Accumulation of static charge (TC-4)

Attack background and setupThe loading and unloading process of tanker trucks transporting large quantities of flammable semi-conductive fluids generates static electricity. If this static
charge is not grounded, it can cause a spark in a flammable location.
The loading bays in the mid-stream oil terminal provide a grounding station
to eliminate the risk of static discharge. Static protection standard National Fire
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Protection Standard 77(NFPA 77) and API recommend tanker trucks transferring
flammable products in hazardous locations to ground the truck prior to any transfer
operation by connecting the truck to a proven ground source. The PLC controlling
the tanker truck gantry checks for the status of the ground connector before starting
the loading operation. If the grounding connection is not made the PLC stops loading.
This safety feature prevents sparks and unsafe operational hazards. If an attacker
spoofs the state of the grounding connector the PLC might allow operations without
a proper coupling with the grounding clamp. This condition can lead to spark and
fire. This section investigates plausible scenarios for defeating the security feature
provided by the static charge protector.
Attack pathsCreating an unsafe accumulation of static charge requires a misoperation during TT loading. The PLC stops the operator from loading without a connected
grounding clamp. Hence the attacker is left with two attack paths: the first attack
path shuts off the PLC security feature that prevents loading without a proper ground
connection and the second spoofs the connection state of the static charge compensator. Both of the attack-paths disable the security feature provided by the PLC.
Figure 5.17 illustrates the attack paths.
In attack path Attk-10, the attacker inserts malicious code inside the PLCs
ladder logic. An up-counter block counts the number of times the ground clamp is
connected during TT loading operations. The safety feature preventing the loading
without a properly connected ground clamp stays effective until the count reaches ten.
After the tenth connection, the counter block sets the state of the contacts named
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Figure 5.17: Attack tree for creating scenarios for defeating the security feature
provided by the static charge protector.

Earthing, Earthing0, and Earthing1. Setting the state of the contacts renders the
safety feature useless. A snippet of the malicious ladder logic code is shown in figure
5.18.
Attack path Attk-11 uses the capabilities of the software trojan to compromise
the hardware layer of the PLC controlling the TT gantry. The compromised hardware
layer spoofs the state of the ground clamp reported by the physical system simulation
in SIMULINK. Security feature inside the PLC ladder logic receives the spoofed state
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Figure 5.18: A snippet of a malicious ladder logic code

of the ground clamp and assumes the connection is made. This can lead to an unsafe
loading scenario if the TT operators forget to attach the ground clamp.

5.4.2

Marine Tanker loading operation
During Marine Tanker (MT) loading, the liquid cargo from the mid-stream

oil terminal is transferred to the internal tanks of a marine tanker at a jetty using a
12.5 km terminal-to-jetty pipeline. This operation involves four operational zones of
the mid-stream oil terminal: tank farm, pump house, terminal-to-jetty pipeline, and
the MT tanker. Because of the interdependent nature of this operation, disrupting
the functionality of components can create an impact on the physical state of other
operational zones in the mid-stream oil terminal. This section investigates a cyberattack scenario for creating an unsafe overpressure in the terminal-to-jetty pipeline.
The attacker conceals the overpressure condition from the operators and eventually
causes a pipeline rupture. This scenario is similar to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
pipeline cyberattack that caused a physical pipeline rupture in 2008 [119].
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5.4.2.1

Attacker Goal- Concealing pressure spikes and pipeline rupture

Attack background and setupFour pressure sensors monitor the state of the MT loading operation. P10SP7
at the dispatch valve of TK 13 measures the hydrostatic pressure due to the level
of cargo. During the loading operation, this pressure decreases as shown in Figure
5.19. At steady state, the inlet (P7SP1) and outlet (P7SP2) pressure sensors at
the gasoline pump house and the pressure sensor (P1SP1) on the terminal-to-jetty
pipeline maintains a constant value. To conceal any undesired change in pressure the
attacker has to maintain the constant pressure value of P7SP1, P7SP2, and P1SP1
while gradually decreasing the pressure value shown on P10SP7.
The attacker can compute the rate of change of pressure sensor P10SP7 by
studying the values during normal operation. Figure 5.20 illustrates the rate of change
of P10SP7 over each time stamp during normal cargo operation. At the start of the
operation, the change of pressure varies and eventually attains a value of -1.892 pascals
at steady-state. Hence the attacker can subtract a constant value of -1.892 pascal
every time stamp to approximately mimic the value of P10SP7 as shown in figure
5.21.
For an attacker to cause a pipeline rupture, the operating pressure has to
exceed the hydro-test pressure of the terminal-to-jetty pipeline (hydro test is the
technique in which pipes, pressure vessels, gas cylinders, tanks are tested at 1.5
times of design pressure of the system or pipes or vessel to check for leaks during
commissioning). In the case of the mid-stream oil terminal, the hydro testing pressure
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Figure 5.19: Normal pressure during the MT loading operation

Figure 5.20: Change of TK 13 dispatch valve pressure during a normal cargo
operation
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Figure 5.21: Comparison of normal pressure sensor value to the spoofed P10SP7
value

is set to 18 bars. During a loading operation, if the pipeline operates at a pressure
value higher than 18 bars, the MATLAB simulation mimics a leak of 16-inch diameter
5 km away from the oil terminal (7.5 km from the jetty). The leak releases the
pressurized liquid cargo from the terminal-to-jetty pipeline into a tank (leakage tank).
The reference pressure inside the tank is set to 1 bar to simulate the effect of cargo
flow to an external environment.
During a normal cargo operation, valves P1AV7 and P1AV8 connect the
terminal-to-jetty pipeline to the marine tanker. Closing any of these valves inter-
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rupts the flow. The pumps on the oil terminal keep pressurizing the pipeline and
increases the pressure. This becomes fatal once the hydro tested pressure limit of
18 bars is reached. In the attack scenario, the attacker closes the valve P1AV7 and
spoofs the state of the pressure sensors to conceal the attack.
Attack paths-

Figure 5.22: Attack tree for rupturing a pipeline and spoofing the states of the
sensor and to conceal it from the operator

To achieve the desired malicious goal, the attacker compromises PLC 1 (controlling the terminal-to-jetty pipeline), PLC 7 (controlling the gasoline pumphouse),
and PLC 10 (controlling gasoline tank farm) using software trojans. The software
trojans inside the PLCs initiate a spoofing attack on pressure sensors P7SP2, P1SP1,
and P10SP7 500 seconds after the start of the MT loading operation. Sensor value
spoofs use compromised hardware layers inside the PLCs. The PLC reads the mod180

ified value from the hardware layer and relays false information to the HMI. During
spoofing, pressure sensors P7SP2 and P1SP1 show constant values of 3.3 bars and
3.201 bars, respectively. The attacker subtracts -1.892 x e−5 bars every time stamp
to mimic a normal response for pressure sensor P10SP7. Figure 5.20 illustrates the
change of pressure during normal cargo operation. Figure 5.21 illustrates a comparison between the normal pressure sensor value to the spoofed values of P10SP7.
With the sensor values spoofed, 510 seconds after the start of the operation
the software trojan abruptly closes the valve P1AV7. P1AV7 is kept closed using a
repeated command injection attack from inside the PLC. Injection packets are crafted
in pyModbus and are sent every 10 milliseconds using the internal loopback network
of the PLC.
Figure 5.23 illustrates the physical characteristics of the system during the
cyber-attack. Closing valve P1AV7 slowly pressurizes the terminal-to-jetty pipeline.
The pump house outlet pressure (P7SP2) and the terminal-side jetty pipeline pressure
(P1SP1) surges to 19.13 bars and 16.68 bars at 4916.52 seconds and 4917.66 seconds
respectively. These high-pressure scenarios trigger a 16-inch wide pipeline rupture 5
km away from the terminal. The rupture rapidly lets the liquid gasoline out of the
pipeline to a tank at the atmospheric pressure of 1 bar. Hence the pressures promptly
dip to a constant value. An operator looking over the operations from the HMI will
not notice any change in the pressure sensor readings.
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Figure 5.23: Pressure sensors readings during cyber attacks

5.4.3

Marine tanker unloading operation

5.4.3.1

Attacker Goal- Fluid hammering during cargo operation (TC-8)

Attack background and setupThis section investigates possible attack-paths for initiating a unsafe “fluid
hammer” scenario in the 12.5 Km long jetty-to-terminal pipeline during an MT unloading operation. ‘Fluid hammer’ commonly refers to pressure upsurge inside a
pipeline. These pressure surges are generated by an abrupt change in the rate of flow
of liquid. Examples of such scenarios are pump startup, pump power failure, and
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valve opening or closing. During an MT unloading operation, a pump in the marine
tanker supplies a steady stream of liquid cargo to the designated tank farm using the
jetty-to-terminal pipeline. Abruptly changing the state of a valve can hinder the flow
of cargo and can cause a pressure upsurge and a fluid hammer scenario.
Attack pathsThe valve P2AV1 is a 16-inch diameter gate valve on the terminal side of
the 12.5 km long jetty-to-terminal pipeline. Closing P2AV1 abruptly during an MT
unloading operation or closing the valve concurrently with the pump P2AP1 inside
the MT can cause the liquid velocity in the line to change quickly. This creates a
pressure wave that moves back from the terminal toward the unloading MT. Figure
5.24 illustrates possible attack paths for achieving a pipeline hammer scenario during
an MT unloading operation. The MT unloading operation is repeated three times to
study the impact of each attack path on the pressure characteristics of the jetty-toterminal pipeline.
In attack path Attk-13, the attacker monitors the pressure reading of the
marine tanker’s centrifugal pump inlet. At steady-state, the pressure maintains a
near-constant value of 0.2 bars. When the operation is complete, the pump turns off
and the pressure surges to 3.3 bars. This is because stopping the pump stops the liquid
cargo transfer from the pump inlet to the jetty-to-terminal pipeline. The pressure
on the terminal side also sees a sharp surge from 0.7 bars (at steady-state) to 1.48
bars (post-operation). The attacker utilizes this pressure surge and closes the valve
P2AV1 when the marine tanker side pressure reaches 2.7 bars. Abruptly shutting
down the valve right after turning the pump off accentuates the effect of a pressure
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Figure 5.24: Attack tree for creating a fluid hammering scenario during MT
unloading operation.

surge. The pipeline already pressurized with liquid cargo experiences a pressure wave
that propagates back and forth in the 12.5 km jetty-to-terminal pipeline. Figure 5.25
illustrates the oscillating readings of the pressure sensors on either side of the 12.5
km long pipeline. The transposed oscillations signify the back and forth movement
of the pressure wave.
The attacker uses a command injection attack to keep the valve P2AV1 closed.
A python script uses packets crafted in pyModbus module to rapidly send (once every
10 milliseconds) malicious network packets from the compromised trusted node to the
PLC (P2) controlling the valves of the jetty-to-terminal pipeline. If an operator sends
a command from the HMI to open the valve it immediately gets overwritten.
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Figure 5.25: Liquid cargo hammering scenario during MT unloading operation
(Attk-13)

Figure 5.26: A snippet of a malicious ladder logic code
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Figure 5.27: Liquid cargo hammering scenario during MT unloading operation
(Attk-14)

The second attack path Attk-14 uses malicious ladder logic code to set the
state of the valve P2AV1 when the marine tanker side pressure attains a value of
2.7 bars. The malicious logic continually checks for the marine tanker side jetty-toterminal pressure and sets a boolean variable “Activateattack“ if the marine tanker
side pressure is greater than 2.7 bars. Once the “Activateattack“ bit is True, a
malicious ladder logic rung keeps the valve P2AV1 closed. Figure 5.27 shows the
physical characteristics of the attack. The transposed oscillations are similar to the
pressure curves seen in figure 5.25. Attack path Attk-14 has no network footprint
and cannot be detected using a centralized network intrusion detection system.
Attack path Attk-15 uses a software trojan inside the PLC (P2) controlling the
valve P2AV1 in the jetty-to-terminal pipeline to create the fluid hammering scenario
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Figure 5.28: Liquid cargo hammering scenario during MT unloading operation
(Attk-15)

during the MT unloading operation. A python script inside PLC 2 monitors the
marine-tanker side pressure using a PyModbusTCP client. At the end of the operation
turning the pump off, creates a surge in pressure. When the pressure is over 2.7 bars
the trojan activates a command injection attack using the internal loopback network
of the PLC. The command injection attack is similar to the Attk-13. The injection
attack closes the valve and creates a fluid hammering scenario as shown in figure 5.28.
A centralized network intrusion detection system cannot detect the injection attack
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using attack path Attk-15. This is because the software trojan executes the attack
using the internal loopback network of the PLC.

5.4.4

Pipeline transfer operation

5.4.4.1

Attacker Goal- Concealing leakage in pipeline (TC-5,TC-3,TC-1)

Attack background and setupThe PipeLine Transfer (PLT) operation transfers liquid cargo between two
oil terminals. In the simulation, a shore terminal transfers liquid cargo to the midstream oil terminal using a 150 kilometer pipeline. Physical supervision of such
long pipelines are not feasible and companies rely on distributed sensor networks
for monitoring purposes. Sensor malfunction or a cyber-attack involving spoofed
sensor readings can render the operators blind to the actual state of the system.
This section investigates a pipeline rupture scenario during a 6000 kiloliters pipeline
transfer operation. The attacker spoofs the readings of the pressure sensors during
the attack to hide the actual state of the physical system. The 150 km PLT pipeline
has five pressure sensors placed at 30,60,90, 120, and 150 km from the shore terminal.
Being an interconnected system, any change in the state of the PLT operation is
reflected in all five sensors.
Attack pathsThe attack path Attk-16 is similar to Attk-12. The attacker uses a software
trojan to compromise the PLC controlling the PLT operations (P3). A spoofing attack
starts at 3050 secs on all five pressure sensors. Sensor value spoofs use compromised
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Figure 5.29: Attack tree for creating a fluid hammering scenario during MT
unloading operation.

hardware layers inside the PLC 3. The PLC reads the modified value from the
hardware layer and relays false information to the HMI. During spoofing, pressure
sensors placed between the shore terminal and the midstream oil terminal report
constant values of 4.92, 4.68, 3.72, 2.01, and 0.24 bars.
At 3075 secs, the software trojan uses the loopback network to launch a command injection attack to close a 16-inch gate valve on the mid-stream oil terminal
side of the 150 km PLT pipeline. The actual pressure of the system starts to surge but
an operator overseeing the cargo transfer will not see any change on the HMI due to
the spoofed pressure sensor readings. The pressure surge exceeds the pipeline hydrotested threshold of 18 bars at 5425 secs and results in a leakage of 16-inch diameter
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Figure 5.30: Concealing pipeline rupture during PLT operation (Attk-16)
Note: PLT 30 km station is 30 km from the shore terminal and 120 km from the
mid-stream oil terminal. Similarly, PLT 60 km station is 60 km from the shore terminal
and 90 km from the mid-stream oil terminal.

10 km away from the off-shore oil terminal. Figure 5.30 illustrates the actual physical
characteristics and the spoofed pressure sensor reading during the cyber attack.

5.5

Conclusion

This chapter performs a systematic investigation of threats associated with
individual components of the mid-stream oil terminal. The threats are enumerated
using a technique called STRIDE and matched to a list of exploits viable from level 2

190

(Area Control) of the midstream oil terminal. Finally, this chapter analyzes possible
attack paths for exploiting malicious goals during various liquid cargo operations. The
comprehensive threat analysis in this chapter provides a thorough understanding of
the physical implications of the cyber-attacks and the attack paths. In chapters 6
and 7, this research focuses on creating defensive measures inside the PLC to detect
and sometimes prevent the dangerous effects of the cyber attacks.
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CHAPTER 6

A NOVEL MULTI-LAYERED EMBEDDED INTRUSION
DETECTION FRAMEWORK

Chapter 5 provides a comprehensive threat model associated with the midstream oil terminal. The attacks are executed from a compromised trusted node.
A trusted node is a computer having connectivity to the Operational Technology
(OT) network. During normal operation, applications like historians, data loggers,
and centralized intrusion detection systems run on the trusted nodes. The Human
Machine Interface (HMI) is a specially designed trusted node that periodically queries
the PLC on the state of the physical process. Hence the compromise of such nodes
allows the attacker to disable the centralized intrusion detection system. The attack
can also masquerade their malicious activity from an operator. To safeguard the PLC
against such scenarios, this chapter introduces a novel embedded network intrusion
detection (IDS) framework. The developed framework can detect a MiTM (EX-1,
EX-2, EX-3, and EX-4), a repeated command injection (EX-6), and a volumetric
Denial of Service (EX-7) attack against the PLC.
The embedded intrusion detection framework is installed inside the PLC. The
framework collects data and runs it through several detection layers. If any layer
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detects an abnormal scenario, the IDS carries out a predefined set of actions and
reports the incident to the operator. The upcoming sections of this chapter describe
the construction of the embedded intrusion detection system and perform a series of
experiments for evaluating the embedded IDS.

6.1

Architecture of the embedded IDS

Chapter 3 presents a modular structure of a typical SCADA system. The
modular components are Remote Monitoring and control (Human-Machine Interface
(HMI)), Network (SCADA protocol), Distributed Control System (Programmable
Logic Controller (PLC)), cyber-physical link, and the physical system. The embedded
IDS does not make any modification to the physical layout of the SCADA system.
Instead, the IDS operates as a software module inside the PLC. The IDS interacts
with the external clients (HMIs and trusted nodes) and relays safe network packets
to the PLC. Figure 6.1 shows the layout of the SCADA system with the embedded
IDS.
Figure 6.2 shows the internal modules of the embedded IDS. On installation
of the embedded IDS, the IDS reassigns PLC’s listening port to 4321. The IDS uses

Figure 6.1: IDS embedded inside the PLC
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Figure 6.2: Modules inside the embedded IDS

a custom IPTable rule to block the external communications to port 4321. After the
port reassignment and the execution of the IPTable rule, a Relay Server Module listens to the designated port of the SCADA communication protocol. For MODBUS,
the designated port is 502. Other internal modules of the embedded IDS are built
inside the Relay Server Module. A Data Sensor module extracts network telemetry
information from the incoming packets and forwards the information to a Data Preprocessing unit. The Data preprocessing unit has two data pipelines: Data pipeline
I and Data pipeline II. These data pipelines are inputs to the Analysis Engine and
perform distinct data transformation to serve two algorithms. The data pipeline I
inputs the processed network telemetry information into an anomaly detector algo-
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rithm. If the network traffic is benign, the analysis engine forwards the data to port
4321 and relays back the response of the PLC to the external node. On detecting
an abnormality in the data, the analysis engine inputs the data from pipeline II into
a supervised algorithm and categorizes the abnormality. The IDS also invokes the
incident response system to execute a pre-programmed response for the categorized
attack. Later sections of this chapter discuss each module of the embedded intrusion
detection system.

6.1.1

Relay server module
The relay server module is an embedded TCP proxy server application. It

acts as an intermediary between the external nodes (HMI and trusted nodes) and the
OpenPLC process. OpenPLC allows users to configure the listening port as a runtime
command-line argument. The relay server uses this feature to reassign OpenPLC’s
listening port from 502 (default for MODBUS) to port 4321. After reassignment,
the relay server listens on port 502 on behalf of the OpenPLC process and uses an
IPTable rule to block external clients from port 4321.
Instead of connecting to the PLC process, the trusted node and the HMI directs
the requests to the relay server module. This server intercepts the traffic, evaluates
the nature of the network packet, and sends it to the PLC process through an internal
loopback network. During the evaluation, the relay server passes the network packet
through the data sensor, data preprocessing, analysis engine, and incident response
system. Figure 6.3 shows the internal and external network of the PLC.
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Figure 6.3: Network layout of the embedded IDS

6.1.2

Data Sensor
The embedded IDS has a data sensor for extracting information about the

behavior of the external nodes connected to the PLC. Data sensors are real-time
loggers that can record and monitor changes in attributes of a system. The midstream oil terminal uses twelve data sensors, one inside each PLC. Each sensor listens
on the default SCADA protocol port (502 in case of MODBUS), and collects fourteen
network telemetry metrics from incoming network packets.

6.1.2.1

Network telemetry metrics

The network telemetry metrics are a collection of features from the physical
layer of the network packets. These metrics rely only on header information and do
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not require any knowledge of the payload. The metrics can be classified into two
categories; per-packet-metrics: the data sensors collect these metrics for each incoming network packet; per-connection-metrics: the data sensor uses a rolling window to
compute statistical metrics for each peer (trusted node or HMI).
Per-packet metrics
The data sensor parses incoming network packets and collects three per-packet
metrics.

• Number of peers: The data sensor maintains a list of unique MAC addresses
that are sending network packets to the PLC. The number of unique MAC
addresses represents the number of peers. This information signifies the number
of external nodes (HMI or trusted nodes) communicating with the PLC.
• Packet size: Size of network packet in bytes.
• Protocol efficiency: This signifies the amount of data each network packet
carries. It is expressed as the ratio of the size of TCP payload in bytes to the size
of the network packet in bytes [145-146]. Equation 6.1 shows the formulation
of protocol efficiency.

Protocol efficiency =

Size of TCP payload in bytes
Size of network packet in bytes

(6.1)

Per-connection metrics
The per-connection metrics signify the properties of peer nodes connected to
the PLC. Hence for each connection to a peer node, the data sensor independently
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computes a set of eleven metrics. This research chooses some of the metrics based on
information from existing literature on anomaly detection using network telemetry
data.
• Mean flow of packets: The number of network packets received by the PLC
from a connected peer node in 60 seconds [147].
Mean flow of packets = Total number of network packets received by a client
in last 60 seconds
• Inter-packet arrival time: This metric measures the frequency at which a
connected peer node sends network packets to the PLC. The data sensor computes this metric as the difference in arrival time between consecutive packets
received from each peer.
• Packet size-Moving mean:The packet size-mean is the average size of the
network packet in bytes over a rolling window of 1000 network packets. A
rolling window is a FIFO (first in first out) data structure with size n; where
n is the number of data samples held in the FIFO. On receiving a new sample,
the window slides forward and discards the oldest sample. For a sample xi the
sliding window WiH,J is defined as

WiH,J = {xi−H , ..., xi , ..., xi+J }

(6.2)

The parameters H and J are positive integers specifying the number of samples
to include before and after the sample xi . Because the data sensor computes
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information in real time, the moving window comprises 1000 samples before xi .
Hence H from Eq 6.2 is 1000 and J is 0.
Equation 6.3 is used to compute the moving mean of the window WiH,J . Here,
WiH,J represents the number of elements in the window WiH,J .

µ̂i =

1

X

WiH,J

xm WiH,J

xm

(6.3)

• Packet size-Moving variance: Packet size variance measures how far the
network packet sizes are spread out from their average value. The data sensor
uses a rolling window WiH,J holding 1000 previous network packet sizes for
computing the moving variance.

σ̂i2 = 

1
WiH,J

X

(xm − µ̂i )2
− 1 xm W H,J

(6.4)

i

Where µ̂i is the mean of network packet sizes defines in the window WiH,J .
• Packet size-Moving median: Similar to the moving mean and moving variance, the data sensor calculates the moving median over a rolling window WiH,J
containing 1000 previous network packet sizes. Moving median values are not
influenced by outliers in the data sequence and provide unskewed central values
of network packet sizes.

yi = median
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WiH,J



(6.5)

• Scaled packet size: Scaled packet size is the ratio of the size of the received
network packet to the size of the largest network packet sent by the connected
peer node [146].

Scaled packet size =

Size of received network packet in bytes
Size of largest network packet sent by the peer in bytes

(6.6)

• Scaled inter packet arrival time: Scaled inter-packet arrival time is the
ratio of the current inter-packet arrival time to the longest inter-packet arrival
time recorded for that peer node [146].

Scaled inter packet arrival time =

Current inter-packet arrival time in seconds
Longest recorded inter-packet arrival time for the peer node in seconds

(6.7)
• Number of source ports used by the client: Counts the number of TCP
source ports used by each connected peer node [145].
• Number of clients using this MAC: This metric parses the network packets
and counts the number of IPs using the MAC address of the peer. This is
useful for detecting ARP spoofing attacks when an attacker links the MAC of
a compromised node to the IP of the legitimate computer [145,147].
• Entropy of packet sizes: Shannon entropy of the distribution containing
the last 1000 network packet sizes sent by the peer, quantifies the amount
of information conveyed by the current network packet. In other words, it
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quantifies the probability of events based on the past 1000 events. Those events
that are rare (low probability) are more surprising and therefore have more
information than those events that are common (high probability) [147].
– Low probability event: high information (surprising).
– High probability event: low information (unsurprising).

H(X) = −

n
X

P (xi ) logb P (xi )

(6.8)

i=1

• Kullback–Leibler divergence of current connectivity characteristics
to baseline data: Before deploying the data sensor, a list containing network
packet sizes and inter-packet arrival time during normal operation of the midstream oil terminal is used to generate a probability distribution. This distribution is calculated for each peer node and signifies the normal behavior of the
nodes connected to the PLC. During the operation of the data sensor, whenever
a network packet is received from a peer node, the data sensor calculates the
Kullback–Leibler divergence of the baselined normal probability distribution to
the probability distribution of the current connection. The Kullback–Leibler
divergence quantifies the disparity between the normal peer connection to the
current behavior of the peer. The data sensor computes the divergence for network packet size distribution and inter-packet arrival time distribution [148].
– Low probability event: high information (surprising).
– High probability event: low information (unsurprising).
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DKL (P k Q) =

X


P (x) log

xχ

P (x)
Q(x)


(6.9)

After calculating the network telemetry metrics, the data sensor forwards a
tuple of information to the data preprocessing unit.

6.1.3

Data preprocessing
The data preprocessing module transforms the data tuples into a format that

is parsable by the classifier layers. This module yields two distinct data pipelines.
The pipeline I provide transformed data to the semi-supervised algorithms in the data
classifier layers. Pipeline II selects the attributes and provides a subset of five features
to a supervised algorithm. This dissertation uses four datasets for demonstrating the
data pipelines and for evaluating the embedded IDS. Hence, the following subsections
will describe the datasets and will use them to discuss how the data preprocessing
module manages each data pipeline.

6.1.3.1

Datasets for evaluating the embedded IDS

This section discusses the characteristics and attributes of four datasets: dataset
I, dataset II, dataset III, and dataset IV. An embedded sensor placed inside the PLC
collects the datasets.
Before data collection, this research adds a trusted node to the midstream
oil terminal testbed. This node has connectivity to the operational network of the
midstream oil terminal. The trusted node portrays a computer running an application
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that requires information on the physical processes and has the privilege to query the
PLCs.The datasets consist of interactions between the HMI, the trusted node, and
PLC 6 during a tanker truck loading operation. This research models the dataflow
and rate of interaction on the findings of Werling and Mahmood’s study [142-143].
Werling’s study shows three data flows in a typical oil and gas system [142]. Nodes
involved in the data flow are the HMI, the trusted node, and the PLC. The volume of
network traffic from the HMI and trusted nodes to the PLC during normal SCADA
operation conforms to the study performed by Mahmood et al. The HMI queries
the state of the PLC every 500 milliseconds and a python service running inside the
trusted node randomly interacts with the PLC 6-10 times per minute [143].
Data set I and IV illustrate the behavior of an HMI, a trusted node, and
PLC 6 during a normal TT loading operation. Dataset I contains 123,821 tuples of
telemetry information of network packets sent from the HMI to the PLC and 14,531
tuples of telemetry information of network packets sent from the trusted node to the
PLC. Each tuple contains a list of fourteen network telemetry features. Dataset IV
presents 53,954 tuples of network telemetry during a normal TT loading operation.
Semi-supervised algorithm baselines the performance of the SCADA system using
dataset I and uses the unseen data from dataset IV for evaluating the performance
of the algorithm.
Dataset II contains a mix of normal and anomalous data during a TT loading
operation. The anomalous data illustrates a scenario of a compromised trusted node.
From the compromised trusted node, an attacker performs three types of network
attacks: a man-in-the-middle attack (EX-1, EX-2, EX-3, and EX-4) between the
203

Table 6.1: Number of data samples

Paper Title

Data Label

Normal samples

Normal
EX-1
EX-2
EX-3
EX-4
EX-6
EX-7

Anomalous samples

Number of
samples in
dataset II
135352
3106
4212
4253
4237
9997
3023

Number of
samples in
dataset III
46704
3228
4226
4267
4234
10432
3139

HMI and the PLC, a repeated command injection attack (EX-6) on the PLC, and a
volumetric denial of service attack (EX-7). Chapter 5 discusses these attacks. Dataset
III is similar to dataset II and contains a mix of normal and anomalous data during
a TT loading operation. Table 6.1 shows the count of each sample type in dataset II
and dataset III.

6.1.3.2

Pipeline I- Input to semi-supervised clustering algorithm

The data pipeline I normalizes the incoming data and compresses the information of fourteen attributes into a two-dimensional vector space using principal
components analysis (PCA). To demonstrate the data preprocessing pipeline this
section uses data set I containing 136352 tuples of normal interaction of the HMI, the
trusted node, and PLC 6 in the midstream oil terminal testbed. During the normal
operation, PLC 6 is controlling the tanker truck gantry.
The network telemetry metrics have different ranges of values. For example,
“network packet size” during normal SCADA operation ranges from 66 bytes to 81
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bytes, while “packet size variance” ranges from 33.44327 to 36.03596. Because the
range of “packet size“ features is higher than the “packet size variance, the feature
“packet size” will have more influence on the results of the classifier. To set equal
importance to all features, every feature value is transformed using equation 6.10.
This transformation called normalization rescales the value of each feature between
0 and 1.

xnew =

x − xmin
xmax − xmin

(6.10)

The data preprocessing module stores the minimum and maximum value of
each feature and performs the transformation in real-time when a tuple of data is
received from the data collection layer [149].
After normalizing the data, the data preprocessing module extracts necessary
information from fourteen metrics and projects them into a two-dimensional feature
space. This process is called dimensionality reduction. The data pre-processing module uses principal component analysis (PCA) to compress the information content
of fourteen features into two high variance vectors. Ideally, these vectors are highly
uncorrelated and contain most of the information conveyed by the entire feature set
[150].
The dimensionality of the lower sub-space (two in this case) is determined by
looking at the cumulative explained variance ratio as a function of the number of
PCA components (Shown in figure 6.4). Choosing two PCA components generates
a cumulative variance of 0.9873 for dataset I. The high variance score demonstrates
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Figure 6.4: Cumulative variance represented by PCA components for dataset I

Figure 6.5: Visualization of normal network traffic using PCA components
(dataset I)
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that two PCA vectors are sufficient for compressing the information provided by the
network telemetry features.
Figure 6.5 visualizes the normal network traffic of the HMI and the trusted
node represented in the dataset I using the compressed PCA vectors. The data
pipeline I transfer the normalized two-dimensional vector to the semi-supervised data
classifier module.

6.1.3.3

Pipeline II-Input to Supervised Tree-based algorithm

Data pipeline II selects a subset of network telemetry metrics and relays it
to the supervised data classifier layer (random forest classifier with 200 trees). The
subset contains five normalized features: mean flow, packet size, mean packet size,
protocol efficiency, and the number of source ports used by the client. The supervised
random forest classifier uses these features and categorizes the anomalies into three
classes: MiTM, command injection, and volumetric denial of service.
Choosing a normalized subset of five features improves the prediction accuracy
and prevents overfitting during the training of the random forest classifier. The rest
of this section shows the change of prediction accuracy of the random forest classifier
with four subsets of features. For each evaluation, this analysis trains a random
forest classifier with 200 trees on 75 percent of dataset II and validates the accuracy
of the classifier on the remaining samples of dataset II. The trained classifier also
tests prediction accuracy on the unseen anomalous sample of dataset III. Hence for
each training, the classifier yields a training accuracy (on 75 percent of dataset II),
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Figure 6.6: Correlation heatmap of all features

a testing accuracy (on the remaining 25 percent of dataset II), and another testing
accuracy on the anomalous samples of dataset III.
For the first test, the classifier trains on all features. The training accuracy
on 75 percent of dataset II is 94.251 % and the testing accuracy on the remaining 25
percent of dataset II is 92.236 %. Testing the performance of the classifier on dataset
III shows an accuracy of 90.354 %. The higher accuracy using raw data reveals a
good representation of the anomaly classes by the data attributes.
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During the second test, the classifier uses normalized values of attributes. The
normalization process rescales the values of each attribute between 0 and 1 using
equation 6.10. An equal range of values for each attribute leads the classifier to
devote similar importance to each attribute. Normalization increases the training
and the testing accuracy of the classifier as seen in Table 6.2.
Attributes having high correlations with each other signifies a strong relationship. These attributes convey similar trends to the machine learning algorithm
and are redundant. These redundant attributes reduce the accuracy of the classifier.
Hence the third test normalizes the data, plots the correlation heatmap, and drops
all data columns having an absolute correlation value equal to or greater than 0.9.
Figure 6.6 shows the correlation matrix of all features. The attribute “Scaled packet
size“ has a 0.99 correlation with the “Packet size” attribute. Dropping Scaled packet
size increases the accuracy of the classifier.
The final evaluation normalizes the values, drops the correlated attributes
(“Scaled packet size“), and selects the best subset of features using a method called
Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE) [152]. RFE builds the first model using all the
normalized features of the dataset except “Scaled packet size“. The model scores the
prediction accuracy and calculates the feature importance of each attribute. Feature
importance for random forest classifiers is the decrease in node impurity weighted
by the probability of reaching that node. RFE prunes the least important feature
from the current feature set and re-trains the classifier. This procedure is recursively
repeated on the pruned set to maximize the accuracy of the classifier. For the network
telemetry metrics, the random forest classifier achieves the best performance using
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Figure 6.7: Relative importance of features

a feature subset of the mean flow, packet size, mean packet size, protocol efficiency,
and the number of source ports used by the client. Figure 6.7 shows the relative
importance of each feature obtained during the RFE feature selection method.
Hence data pipeline II normalizes the incoming data and provides a subset of
the five features to the supervised classifier layer.
Table 6.2 summarizes the accuracy gain obtained from the data preprocessing
and features selection procedure.
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Table 6.2: A summary of training and testing accuracy of the random forest classifier

Operations

Training
Accuracy
(Dataset II)

Testing
Accuracy
(Dataset II)

0.94251
0.94571

0.92236
0.92244

Testing
Accuracy
(Dataset III)
0.90354
0.90379

0.94567

0.93263

0.91385

0.98421

0.97367

0.97027

All features
Normalization
Normalization
+
Correlation threshold
Normalization
+
Correlation threshold
+
Selected feature using RFE

6.1.4

Anomaly Detector
The data pipeline I supply transformed data into a semi-supervised novelty

detection algorithm. In a semi-supervised analysis, the training data has no outliers
and contains information on the normal behavior of the system. During training, the
goal of such an algorithm is to learn the normal behavior of the HMI and the trusted
nodes communicating with the PLC.
Breunig et al. put forth a semi-supervised approach for baselining the normal
trends in a dataset [151]. The research uses a method called the Local Outlier Factor
(LOF). LOF computes the local density deviation of a data point with respect to its
neighbors. With the density deviation known from the training dataset, the algorithm
can learn the range of densities around a normal cluster of data points.
When the trained model receives a new observation from the data pipeline I
it computes the ratio of the average densities of the point’s neighbors to the density
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of the point itself. This ratio yields three scores that classify the data into different
categories:
• LOF (k) ≈ 1 - Similar density as neighbors (Normal)
• LOF (k) < 1 - Higher density than neighbors (Inlier/ also normal)
• LOF (k) > 1 - Lower density than neighbors (Outlier)
The parameter k in the LOF score calculation is the distance of the point to
the kth neighbor. If k is set to 5, k-distance will be the distance of the point to the
fifth closest neighbor. A higher value of k finds outliers against the entire data set
while lower value distinguishes outliers from local clusters.

Figure 6.8: Number of false negative values for different k-neighbor values

This research optimizes the value of k using a number of false negative vs k
neighbor plots as shown in the figure 6.8. During the optimization, the LOF classifier
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baselines the normal behavior of the HMI and the trusted node using dataset I. The
trained LOF classifier predicts the state of the data tuples in dataset II. The process
of training and classification is repeated 20 times with k values ranging from 5-24
and the false negative errors in each case are shown in figure 6.8. A k value of 10
minimizes the false negative errors and maximizes the accuracy of the model (shown
in figure 6.9).
False negatives are of special importance for anomaly detection. It refers to
a condition where the incoming data is of a cyber-attack scenario but the anomaly
detector classifies it as normal. Optimizing the LOF classifier to have the lowest
false-negative decreases the likelihood of missing a cyber-attack scenario. Figure 6.9
shows the change in classification accuracy for different values of k-neighbors.
The LOF classifier learns the normal behavior of the trusted node and the
HMI and creates a decision boundary. Figure 6.10 shows the training observations
from the dataset I and the learned decision boundary for k=10.
Dataset III contains unseen data samples (data samples that are not in the
training set). Figure 6.11 shows the projection of unseen normal and abnormal observations over the learned frontier. The visualization illustrates a good separation
between normal and abnormal samples. The accuracy and performance metrics of
the LOF classifier is discussed in the later sections.
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Figure 6.9: Change of classification accuracy with k-neighbor values

Figure 6.10: Learned decision boundary for normal baseline data (Dataset I)
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Figure 6.11: Visualization of learned clusters and unseen abnormal observations

Figure 6.12: Learned clusters with unseen abnormal and unseen normal data
projected onto the data grid
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6.1.5

Traffic monitoring module
The traffic monitoring module performs real-time classification of incoming

network telemetry data. The trained LOF classifier projects the new data over the
decision boundaries and assigns a LOF score. LOF score measures the local deviation
of the density of a sample to its neighbors. This signifies how isolated the data tuple is
from the learned data clusters. A LOF score of more than one signifies an anomalous
data sample.
On detecting an anomaly, a tree-based algorithm (random forest classifier)
categorizes the anomaly into three classes: MiTM, repeated command injection attack, and volumetric denial-of-service attacks (DoS). The traffic monitoring module
forwards the categorized attack type and the IP and MAC address of the suspected
attacker to the incident response system.

6.1.6

Incident response system
The incident response system executes a pre-defined set of rules to defend the

PLC against the identified category of cyber-attack. On detection of a volumetric
attack like the DoS attack or a repeated command injection attack, the incident
response system logs the event and executes a custom IP table rule. The IP table
rule drops all incoming traffic from the attacker’s IP and stops the volumetric flood
of packets from the attacker’s computer. The PLC also restarts to reset the state of
the attacked network socket.
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For the MiTM attack, the IDS logs the IP of the possible attacker causing the
anomalous network condition. A user can add rules to take a unique set of incident
responses against identified attacks.

6.2

Results and discussion

For the performance analysis of the embedded IDS, this study uses the TT
gantry operations of the mid-stream oil terminal. PLC 6 with the embedded IDS controls the tanker truck operations and interacts with an HMI and trusted node. This
analysis studies the behavior of the IDS during normal and cyber-attack conditions.
During normal operations, the experiments study the impact of the IDS on
the PLC’s network response time and real-time capabilities. During the cyber-attack
scenarios, the attacker compromises the trusted node and performs a series of MiTM
(EX-1, EX-2, EX-3, and EX-4), repeated command-injection (EX-6) and a volumetric
denial-of-service attack (EX-7) on PLC 6. This section analyses the response time of
the IDS during cyber-attacks and concludes with a brief discussion on the network
telemetry metrics.

6.2.1

Accuracy of LOF anomaly detector
The LOF anomaly detection algorithm baselines the normal behavior of the

trusted node and the HMI using dataset I. The baselining process generates the
decision boundaries shown in Figure 6.10.
Once trained, this analysis feeds the classifier with unseen data (which are not
in the training set). Dataset II having 28828 anomalous samples and 135352 normal
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samples are fed into the predict method. The classifier scores each tuple; LOF scores
equal to one are normal, less than one are inliers (also normal in network anomaly
detection [147,151]) and values over one are outlier or anomalous data. Comparing
the classifier prediction to the data labels of dataset II provides an accurate overview
of the classification performance.
1. True Positive (TP)- A true positive is an outcome where the model correctly
predicts the anomalous class. The classifier predicts 28828 true positive data
samples.
2. True Negative (TN)- A True negative is an outcome where the model correctly predicts the normal class. The classifier predicts 135255 true negative
data samples.
3. False Positive (FP)- A false positive is an outcome where the model incorrectly predicts normal data as anomalous. The classifier predicts 97 false
positive readings out of 164180 data tuples.
4. False Negative (FN)- A false negative is an outcome where the model incorrectly predicts anomalous data as normal. The model training optimizes the
value of k-neighbors to minimize false-negative errors. The classifier achieves a
false negative error value of 0 for a k-neighbor value of 10.
The error matrix or the confusion matrix (Table 6.3) gives a holistic view of the
performance of the LOF classifier.
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Table 6.3: Confusion matrix of the classifier

Predicted

Anomalous
Normal

Actual
Anomalous Normal
28828
97
0
135255

Classification accuracy is the ratio of the number of correct predictions to the
total number of input samples. The LOF classifier yields high accuracy of 99.94 %.
This metric works well if the dataset has an equal number of anomalous and normal
samples. However, for dataset II the number of anomalous samples is much lower than
the normal samples. To have a better understanding of the classifier performance,
this section analyzes other metrics such as precision, recall, specificity, F1 score, and
Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC).

Classification accuracy =

Number of correct predictions
= 0.9994
Total number of samples

Precision- Precision is the ratio of true positives to the sum of true positives and
false positives. This metric is interesting for anomaly detection and provides the
percentage of correctly predicted anomaly from the pool of total predicted anomaly.

Precision =

True Positives
= 0.9966
True Positives + False Positives

Sensitivity/Recall- It is the ratio of the true negatives to the sum of true negatives
and false negatives. In anomaly detection, recall provides the percentage of correctly
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predicted anomalies from a pool of actual anomalies. During training, the k-neighbor
value minimizes the number of false negatives. Minimizing false negatives maximizes
recall value. This is very important because the cost of misclassifying an instance of
cyber-attack is very high.

True Positives
= 0.9993
True Positives + False Positives

Specificity =

Specificity- Specificity is the ratio of true negatives to the sum of true negatives
and false positives. In the case of anomaly detection, it computes the percentage of
correctly predicted normal tuples from a pool of all normal data.

Precision =

True Positives
= 0.9966
True Positives + False Positives

F-Score- F score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall.

F-score =

2 × True Positives
= 0.9983
2 × True Positives + False Positives +False Negatives

Matthews correlation coefficient (MCC)-The Matthews correlation coefficient
(MCC) is a measure of the quality of binary classifications. The coefficient takes
into account true and false positives and negatives and is considered the most robust
measure for assessing the performance of the classifier if the class distribution in the
dataset is imbalanced [153].
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TP × TN − FP × FN
= 0.998
MCC = p
(TP + TP) (TP + FN) (TN + FP) (TN + FN)

Table 6.4: Summary of classifier evaluation metrics
Precision
0.9966

Recall
1

Specificity
0.9993

F1 Score
0.9983

MCC
0.998

The LOF anomaly detector accurately pinpoints network anomalies like MiTM,
repeated command injection, and denial of service attack. On feeding normal unseen
data, the LOF anomaly detector made 97 false positives errors.

6.2.2

Effect of the embedded IDS on the SCADA system
In this section, two tests are performed to inspect the impact of the IDS on

the network response time and on the real time performance of the PLC.

6.2.2.1

Response time of the PLC

The IDS generates the attributes from the network packets, compares the
attributes to the trained algorithm and relays the network traffic between the HMI
and PLC. To measure the overhead of the IDS on the network between the PLC
and the HMI, the response time of the PLC is measured for MODBUS read/write
operations.
MODBUS TCP protocol uses four unique data blocks: Coil (Discrete Output),
Discrete Input (or Status Input), Input Register and Holding Register. The address
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or the register numbers in each of those data blocks overlaps. Therefore, querying a
piece of data requires both the address (or register number) and function code (or
register type). The function codes most commonly recognized by Modbus devices are
indicated in the table below. This is only a subset of the codes available - several of
the codes have special applications that most often do not apply.

Table 6.5: MODBUS Function Codes
Function Code
1
2
3
4
5
6
15
16

Register Type
Read Coil
Read Discrete Input
Read Holding Registers
Read Input Registers
Write Single Coil
Write Single Holding Register
Write Multiple Coils
Write Multiple Holding Registers

The mid-stream oil terminal is used to measure the response time for the eight
MODBUS operations listed in the table 6.5. For each function code, the HMI requests
specific information from the PLC or sends a command to change the state of a coil
or a register. When the operation is complete, the PLC responds back to the HMI.
This operation is performed 500 times for each MODBUS function code and the time
taken by the PLC to respond to the actions of the HMI is recorded. The recorded
time in microseconds with and without the embedded IDS are listed in the table 6.7
and 6.6 respectively.
Network latency data has outliers which is evident from the high standard
deviation values shown in table 6.6 and 6.7. Median is a more robust statistical
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Write multiple
holding registers
Write multiple coils
Write single
holding register
Write single coil
Read input registers
Read holding registers
Read discrete input
Reading coil
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Response time without embedded IPS
Network overhead of the embedded IPS

Figure 6.13: Median response time of PLC in microseconds with and without the
embedded IDS

measure against outliers and skewed data than the mean, and is usually the preferred
measure of central tendency when the distribution is not symmetrical. From the
median values it is evident that the IDS introduces an average overhead of 2031
microsecond between the PLC and the HMI. Figure 6.13 shows the network latency
introduced by the IDS graphically for each MODBUS function code.
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Table 6.6: Response time of the PLC in microseconds without the embedded IDS
MODBUS Operation
Read Coil
Read Discrete Input
Read Holding Registers
Read Input Registers
Write Single Coil
Write Single Holding Register
Write Multiple Coils
Write Multiple Holding Register

Statistical Measure
Mean Std. Dev. Median
1370.32
2107.99
602.07
1012.36
2136.46
368.99
669.29
1375.93
353.58
747.35
1740.86
339.16
645.62
1410.55
321.58
642.74
1474.27
325.33
585.72
1252.26
333.63
668.82
1572.72
316.25

Table 6.7: Response time of the PLC in microseconds with the embedded IDS
MODBUS Operation
Read Coil
Read Discrete Input
Read Holding Registers
Read Input Registers
Write Single Coil
Write Single Holding Register
Write Multiple Coils
Write Multiple Holding Registers
6.2.2.2

Statistical Measure
Mean Std. Dev. Median
3151.54
2485.15
2134.32
3626.39
2627.34
2488.09
3305.56
2449.79
2452.94
3136.09
2151.87
2429.43
3183.82
2224.77
2424.29
3124.65
2127.97
2431.01
3067.57
2088.58
2417.58
3441.93
2569.72
2430.81

Effect on IDS on real-time behavior of the PLC

This experiment analyses the effect of embedded IDS on the real-time performance of PLC 6. The cycle time of the PLC is set to 50 milliseconds and an embedded
logger monitors the cycle time for a period of 24 hours. This experiment is repeated
twice to study the cycle time data with and without the embedded IDS.
Data over 1728000 observations with no embedded IDS records a mean cycle
time of 50.04 milliseconds and a standard deviation of 0.0142. Repeating the experi-
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ment with the embedded IDS does not alter cycle time as shown in Table 6.8. Hence,
the IDS has no impact on the real-time performance of the PLC.

Table 6.8: PLC cycle time in milliseconds
PLC
PLC without the embedded IDS
PLC with the embedded IDS

6.2.3

Average
50.04
50.04

Standard deviation
0.0142
0.0142

Deployment time
Deployment time is the time taken by the embedded IDS to baseline the char-

acteristics of the network and to start the monitoring process. There are two steps to
this process; On connecting the PLC to the operational network for the first time, the
IDS collects the network telemetry metrics and trains a reference model. A second
training session collects more data, calibrates the reference model, and starts monitoring the incoming network traffic. During the time of training and calibration, the
model assumes the data to be free of cyber-attacks. Hence the analysis of deployment
time quantifies the time taken by the embedded IDS to get operational when deployed
in a new network. Figure 6.14 shows the time taken to train the reference model and
the final model for a range of HMI scan times (50 - 500 milliseconds). Faster HMI
scan time speeds up the deployment time of the IDS.
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Figure 6.14: Deployment time of embedded IDS

6.2.4

IDS response time during volumetric denial of service attack using
Hping3
This section performs a volumetric denial of service attack using Hping 3 on

PLC 6 from a compromised trusted node. During the attacks, this analysis varies the
length of the network packets and the number of attacker threads used by Hping3.
For each scenario, this section measures the time taken to respond to the attacks and
the number of successful requests made by Hping3.

6.2.4.1

Varying message size

The denial of service tool Hping3 allows users to configure the size of network
packets using the “-d “option. This analysis repeats the volumetric denial of service
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Number of allowed request
Figure 6.15: Number of allowed request for various message length during DoS
attack using Hping3

attacks ten times. During the attacks, the analysis uses the ‘-d‘ option to change the
network packet sizes from 200 to 2000 bytes while keeping the number of attacker
threads constant at 500. Figure 6.15 shows the number of allowed requests to the
PLC while Figure 6.16 shows the time taken by the IDS to block the attack.
This study shows that the message length of the network packets does not
affect the response of the IDS. But when using a smaller network packet size Hping3
can make more successful requests.
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Time taken in milliseconds

982
980
978
976
974
972
500

1,000

1,500

2,000

Network message length in bytes
Number of allowed request
Figure 6.16: Time taken by the IPS to block the attacker for various message
lengths during DoS attack using LOIC

6.2.4.2

Varying number of attacker threads

This analysis repeats the volumetric denial of service attacks ten times. During
the attacks, this analysis keeps the network packet size constant at 1200 bytes and
changes the number of attacker threads from 100 to 10000. Figure 6.18 shows the
number of allowed requests and figure 6.17 shows the time taken by the IDS to respond
to the attackers. The results show that the number of threads used during the attacks
does not influence the response of the IDS.
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Figure 6.17: Number of allowed requests for different number of threads during
DoS attack using Hping3
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Figure 6.18: Time taken by the IDS to block the attacker for various number of
threads during DoS attack using Hping3
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6.2.5

IPS recovery time for detected DoS attack
The incident response system executes a pre-defined set of actions to react

to a cyber-attack scenario. For the command injection attack and the volumetric
denial of service attack, the incident response system blocks the attacker using a
custom IP table rule. Experiments in sections 6.2.4 show that even though the IDS
reacts quickly, yet some packets are successfully sent by Hping3. To flush out these
packets, the IDS restarts the network sockets. This enables the PLC to receive fresh
queries from the HMI without going through every network packet sent by Hping3
and speeds up the recovery after the attack. Restarting the network sockets disrupts
the communication between the HMI and the PLC. To measure the downtime of the
socket during the restarts, this analysis repeats the volumetric DOS attack 100 times
with varying message size and attacker threads. 100 runs with randomized message
length and attacker threads yield an average recovery time of 6.3095 seconds. Hence
restarting the network socket disrupts the communication between the HMI and the
PLC for 6.3095 seconds.
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6.2.6

Visualizing network telemetry metrics
This section visualizes the behavior of the metrics mentioned in section 6.1.2.1.

The log has 138173 tuples of information from dataset II, containing the interaction
of the HMI and the trusted node with the PLC 6 (PLC controlling operations of the
TT gantry) over 24 hours.
The visualization uses histograms and kernel density estimation (KDE) to
show the distribution of each attribute during normal and anomalous SCADA operations. A histogram is a graphical display of data using bars of different heights. In
a histogram, each bar groups the values of a continuous attribute into ranges. Taller
bars show that more data falls in that range. The number of bins in the histograms
defines the shape of the histogram. Kernel density estimation plot demonstrates the
probability density function of an attribute. The KDE draws a continuous curve (the
kernel) at every individual data point of the attribute. After the computation of the
continuous curves, the KDE adds the amplitude of the continuous curves over the entire sample space to make a single smooth density estimation. The final plot smooths
out noise, shows the shape of the distribution and the peaks show the concentration
of values.

6.2.6.1

Normal Scenarios

Figures 6.19 and 6.20 shows a collection of histograms and KDE plots. These
plots visualize the behavior of a trusted node and an HMI during normal SCADA
operations.
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Figure 6.19: Histograms and KDE plots showing the characteristics of the network
telemetry attribute during normal SCADA operations
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Figure 6.20: Histograms and KDE plots showing the characteristics of the network
telemetry attribute during normal SCADA operations
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6.2.6.2

Cyber-attack Scenarios

Network-based cyber-attacks influence the values of the metrics monitored
by the data sensors embedded inside the PLC. This section illustrates a scenario
of a compromised trusted node. From the compromised trusted node, an attacker
performs three types of network attacks: a man-in-the-middle attack (EX-1, EX-2,
EX-3, and EX-4) between the HMI and the PLC, a repeated command injection
attack (EX-6) on the PLC and a volumetric denial of service attack (EX-7). Chapter
5 discusses these attacks in detail.
Man-in-the-Middle (MiTM)
During the MiTM attack, the attacker compromises the trusted node. The
MiTM uses Ettercap to ARP spoof the routing tables of the HMI and the PLC.
Because of the attack, the network traffic between the HMI and the PLC gets routed
through the compromised trusted node. In EX-1 (Attk-2), the attacker performs
the MiTM exploits and monitors the network interaction of the PLC and the HMI
(reconnaissance attack). EX-2 (Attk-7) spoofs the level sensor reading during TT
loading operation using a custom ettercap filter. EX-3 spoofs the state of the loading
valve of the TT loading operation. EX-4 is denial of service attack. The compromised
trusted node drops all network packets from the PLC to the HMI.
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Figure 6.21: Histograms and KDE plots showing the characteristics of the network
telemetry attribute during MiTM attacks (EX-1, EX-2, EX-3, and EX-4)
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Repeated command Injection
The attacker uses the repeated command injection attacks from the compromised trusted node and sends commands to the PLC controlling the loading arm
valve. Injection packets crafted in the pyModbus module writes to the PLC memory
at a higher speed (once every 10 milliseconds) than the HMI (Once every 500 milliseconds). Hence the attacker overrides the commands of the operator. Figure 6.22
shows the characteristics of the features during a repeated command injection attack.
Volumetric Denial of Service
The volumetric denial of service attack uses Hping3 and sends network packets
at a high rate to the PLC from a compromised, trusted node. The attacker aims to
overwhelm the PLC and deny service to the HMI. Figure 6.23 shows the characteristics
of the network features during the cyber attacks.

6.3

Conclusion

This chapter provides an overview of an embedded network intrusion detection
system. The presented framework baselines the normal state of the network and
detects anomalous network behaviors. On detecting an anomaly, the framework runs
the state of the system through a supervised classifier to categorize the class of the
attack. An incident response system executes a predefined set of rules to take required
action against a detected cyber-attack.
The embedded IDS adds a security layer to the SCADA architecture and improves the defense-in-depth security approach. The next chapter will develop defenses
for attack vectors related to the physical components of the system.
236

Figure 6.22: Histograms and KDE plots showing the characteristics of the network
telemetry attribute during repeated command injection (EX-6)
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Figure 6.23: Histograms and KDE plots showing the characteristics of the network
telemetry attribute during Volumetric Denial of Service attacks
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CHAPTER 7

A CONVOLUTIONAL NEURAL NETWORK-LSTM BASED
PHYSICAL SENSOR ANOMALY DETECTOR FOR
INTERDEPENDENT SCADA CONTROLLERS

Chapter 6 illustrates an embedded intrusion detection framework that monitors network telemetry information of the PLC and detects anomalous behavior. The
framework also categorizes identified anomalous behavior into three classes: MiTM,
repeated command injection, and a volumetric Denial of Service. However, the discussed embedded IDS lacks the data sensors and the analysis engine modules to
identify falsified sensor readings.
This chapter adds three modules to the embedded intrusion detection framework: a data sensor module that reads the state of the sensors and actuators from
the MODBUS memory of the PLC, a peer-to-peer network that circulates the current
state of the PLCs with other edge nodes, and a module inside the analysis engine.The
modifications add two capabilities to the existing embedded IDS:

• The IDS can predict the state of sensors of peer nodes if they are controlling
an interdependent physical process.
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• The IDS can detect falsified states of sensors which is Exploit 14 (EX-14) in
Section 3 of Chapter 5.

The upcoming sections of this chapter discuss the software trojan exploit,
outline the approach taken in this research to detect the threat, and evaluate the
approach using three midstream oil terminal operations.

7.1

A brief discussion on the software trojan exploit (EX-14)

Chapter 5 illustrates three cyber-attack scenarios (Attk-8, Attk-12, and Attk16) using Ex-14. The attack scenario involves a software trojan compromising the
hardware layer module of the communication link between SimLink and the OpenPLC process as shown in Figure 7.1. During normal operations, the hardware layer
interprets the sensor and actuator states encapsulated in TCP/IP packets and writes
the information to the MODBUS buffer of the PLC. When compromised, the hardware layer reads the correct states from the SimLink packets and writes a spoofed
reading on the MODBUS memory of the PLC. The control logic inside the PLC or
an operator supervising a process over an HMI changes a system state based on the
false readings. This incorrect operation creates an unsafe condition in the industrial
control system. Chapter 5 illustrates that Ex-14 can cause a cargo overflow in the
Tanker Truck (TT) loading operation (Attk-8), and pipeline rupture during a pipeline
transfer (Attk-16) and a Marine Tanker loading operation (Attk-12) in the midstream
oil terminal.
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Figure 7.1: Communication model of OpenPLC with sensors and actuators of the
physical system

7.2

Extension to embedded IDS for physical system anomaly detection

Effective detection of the false sensor readings due to the software Trojan
exploit requires the embedded IDS to have the following characteristics: (i) visibility
over the physical process, (iii) visibility of the states of neighboring PLCs, and (iii)
understanding of the normal behavior of the system. This chapter adds three modules
to the existing embedded IDS of chapter 6.
The first module is a physical system data sensor; It allows the embedded IDS
to monitor the states of the sensors or actuators. The second module is a peer-to-peer
communication framework. This allows the instances of the embedded IDS to have
visibility over the states of neighboring PLCs. The third module is a physical system
anomaly detector. This module learns the behavior of sensors and infers the values
of the sensors using the states of the actuators. Figure 7.2 shows the location of the
modules inside the embedded IDS.
Every PLC cycle, the physical system data sensor takes a snapshot of the
actuator and sensor readings from the MODBUS memory of the PLC. The instances of
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Figure 7.2: Modules inside the embedded IDS with the physical anomaly detector
and the physical system data sensors

the embedded IDS share the states using the peer-to-peer communication framework.
Sharing allows the embedded IDS to have visibility over the entire physical process.
Using these states the physical system anomaly detector predicts the current values
of the sensors. The physical system anomaly detector also maintains a confidence
interval for each sensor reading. If the reported value is out of the confidence interval,
the embedded IDS flags the reading as a false reading.
The upcoming sections provide a detailed discussion of the three modules.

7.2.1

Physical system data sensors
The embedded IDS uses two physical system data sensors: Physical Memory

Map (PMM) and System Memory Map (SMM). The Physical Memory Map (PMM)
monitors the current state of the PLC. The System Memory Map (SMM) maintains
the current state of all interconnected nodes.
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Physical Memory Map (PMM): The PLC receives the states of the sensors
and actuators from the hardware layer every scan cycle. The Physical Memory Map
(PMM) takes a snapshot of the MODBUS memory and uses the address information
from the configuration file of SimLink (Chapter 3 section 2) to interpret the values of
the sensors and actuators. The readings in the PMM update every PLC scan cycle
and mirror the states seen by the PLC ladder logic and the HMI. Hence during the
Ex-14 exploit, the PMM reads the falsified states of the sensors and actuators.
System Memory Map (SMM): The System Memory Map (SMM) takes
the present state information from the PMM and shares it with other PLCs using
the peer-to-peer communication framework. On receiving the state information of
the neighboring PLCs, the SMM structures them based on the configuration file of
SimLink.

7.2.2

Peer-to-peer communication framework
The peer-to-peer (P2P) communication architecture enables the embedded

IDS to share the physical state of the actuators and sensors of each PLC with other
edge nodes. A P2P network is a distributed application architecture in which interconnected nodes (“peers”) communicate with each other without the use of a centralized
server. Each peer in this research is an instance of the embedded IDS inside the PLC.
The nodes have equal administrative privileges and can concurrently function as a
client and a server. The upcoming sections discuss the network adaptor, the routing
protocol, and the physical topology of the peer-to-peer network.
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7.2.2.1

Network adaptor for isolating the peer-to-peer network

The mid-stream oil terminal uses twelve PLCs for controlling its subsystems.
The virtualization framework encapsulates each PLC in virtual machines having two
network adapters. Using the first adapter, the PLC communicates to the HMI and
trusted nodes. The second adapter allows the PLC to receive the physical reading
of the actuators and sensors from SIMULINK using the SimLink application. With
the use of separate IP ranges for each adapter, the PLC isolates each communication link. The P2P network adds a third network adapter to the virtual machines
hosting the PLCs. The adapter uses an IP address range between 200.200.200.1 to
200.200.200.255.

7.2.2.2

Routing in the peer-to-peer network

The P2P network uses a depth-first routing algorithm [159]. The algorithm
considers the network topology as a tree data structure. Every node takes turns and
broadcasts its physical states along each branch before backtracking. The broadcast
starts from PLC1. After PLC1 completes broadcasting, it sends a message to PLC2
to start its broadcast process. This process goes on in cycles and the PLCs keep
updating each other on the current state of the industrial control system.

7.2.2.3

Topology of the peer-to-peer network

The topology of a P2P network in a cyber-physical system refers to the logical
and physical interconnection between the instance of embedded IDS on the PLCs.
The large scale of cyber-physical systems requires PLCs to operate in a distributed
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architecture. Clusters of PLCs are separated by large distances and having point-topoint physical connectivity is not pragmatic. Hence while designing a P2P network
topology for the PLCs of a cyber-physical system the following considerations are
necessary:
• Cost of building the physical topology: The physical construction cost
should be reasonable.
• Network latency: The time each PLC takes to receive the physical states
of neighboring edge nodes. The impact of topology on the network latency of
the P2P network is well documented in the existing literature [154-157]. Low
latency gives a more accurate picture of the current system state and therefore
leads to improved classification accuracy of the IDS.
Hence this research seeks a P2P network topology that optimizes the interPLC distances and achieves a low latency. Gao et al. solves this multi-constraint
optimization problem using k-mean clustering and introduces a depth-first routing
protocol for achieving low latency [158]. Section 7.2.2.2 provides a description of the
routing protocol.
Topology construction for the midstream oil terminal using Gao’s approach
[158]
Gao’s approach combines star and mesh topology. Gao groups the PLCs into k
clusters based on the physical distance between the edge nodes. Each cluster behaves
like a star topology. The cluster selects a random central node and all edge nodes
in the cluster directly connect to the central node. The intra-cluster connections
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Table 7.1: Distance in kilometers betweens 12 PLCs in the midstream oil terminal
PLC
Functionality
Loading Oil
Tanker
Pipeline
Loading
Marine
Tanker
Controls
Pipeline
Transfer
Discharging
Marine
Tanker
Dispatch oil
Tanker
Pipeline
TT
Controls
Gasoline
Pumphouse
Diesel
Pumphouse
ATF
Pumphouse
Gasoline
Tankfarm
Diesel
Tankfarm
ATF
Tankfarm

PLC
Name

PLC1

PLC2

PLC3

PLC4

PLC5

PLC6

PLC7

PLC8

PLC9

PLC1

0

0

15

0

0

16

16

16

16

15

15

15

PLC2

0

0

15

0

0

16

16

16

16

15

15

15

PLC3

15

15

0

15

15

3

2

2

2

3

3

3

PLC4

0

0

15

0

0

16

16

16

16

15

15

15

PLC5

0

0

15

0

0

16

16

16

16

15

15

15

PLC6

16

16

3

16

16

0

3

3

3

2

2

2

PLC7

16

16

2

16

16

3

0

0

0

3

3

3

PLC8

16

16

2

16

16

3

0

0

0

3

3

3

PLC9

16

16

2

16

16

3

0

0

0

3

3

3

PLC10

15

15

3

15

15

2

3

3

3

0

0

0

PLC11

15

15

3

15

15

2

3

3

3

0

0

0

PLC12

15

15

3

15

15

2

3

3

3

0

0

0

PLC10 PLC11 PLC12

use a partial mesh architecture (a full-mesh network is where each node connects to
every other node in the network). The partial-mesh architecture directly connects
the central node of each cluster to two other central nodes using a point-to-point
connection.
The first step to construct topology using Gao’s approach involves developing
a distance matrix. The distance matrix illustrates the separation between edge nodes.
For the virtual midstream oil terminal, twelve PLCs control five sub-systems (tank
farms, pump houses, tanker truck gantry, pipeline transfer, vessel operation). The
subsystems are distributed across different distances in the simulation. This research
uses the simulation distance of the subsystems to create the distance matrix for twelve
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Figure 7.3: P2P topology for the midstream oil terminal using Gao’s approach

PLCs. Groups of PLCs controlling a subsystem form a cluster. Table 7.1 shows the
distance matrix for the midstream oil terminal testbed.
Using distances from the table 7.1 the twelve PLCs are divided into five clusters.
• Cluster I-[PLC1, PLC2, PLC4, PLC5]- Controls Marine Tanker (MT) operation and the terminal-to jetty pipeline.
• Cluster II-[PLC10, PLC11, PLC12]- Controls Tank Farm (TF) operations.
• Cluster III- [PLC7, PLC8, PLC9]- Controls pumphouses.
• Cluster IV- [PLC6]-Controls Tanker Truck (TT) operations.
• Cluster V- [PLC3]-Controls Pipeline Transfer operation (PLT).

247

Each cluster behaves like a star network setup and connects all edge nodes of
that cluster to a randomly designated central node. The central nodes of each cluster
connect to two other central nodes using a point-to-point connection. This completes
the interconnection between each cluster. Figure 7.3 shows the topology of the P2P
for the midstream oil terminal using Gao’s approach.
Topology configuration script in the P2P network
After designing the topology of the PLCs in a cyber-physical system using Gao’s approach, an operator configures the P2P using the “config.csv“ file. A
Python script parses the “config.csv“ and creates a logical overlay network encapsulated within a traditional TCP/IP routing framework. Figure 7.4 shows a sample
configuration file of a P2P network topology in the virtual midstream oil terminal
testbed.
The configuration file shown in Figure 7.4 illustrates the logical interconnectivity of each node with other neighboring edge nodes. An interpreter reading the
configuration file considers a line starting with hash (““) sign as a comment and skips

Figure 7.4: Configuration file for designing the topology of the P2P network
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the first line of the file having names of the configuration parameters. The rest of the
file contains a line of network configuration parameters for each edge node. For each
node, an operator configures the following four parameters:
• Node: Name of the PLC. The virtual midstream oil terminal names the twelve
PLCs as ”PLC” followed by a sequential number between 1 and 12. Hence
Figure 7.3 uses twelve lines of configuration to list the topology of the P2P
network of PLC 1 through PLC12.
Example: “PLC1”.
• Neighbors: Names of the neighboring PLCs logically connected to the current
PLC. The PLC names are represented as a list separated by commas.
Example: “PLC2,PLC3,PLC4,PLC5,PLC6”.
• NIPs: A list of IP addresses of logically connected neighboring nodes separated
by commas.
Example: “200.200.200.2,200.200.200.3,200.200.200.4,200.200.200.5,200.200.200.6”.
• NodeIPs: IP address of the current PLC.
Example: “200.200.200.1”.
A vertical bar (”|”) separates each configuration parameter.
Comparison of network latencies
This section compares the network latency of the physical P2P topology developed using Gao’s approach with four topologies from existing literature [154-157].
The analysis considers line topology, ring topology, star topology, full-mesh topology.
Line topology connects all edge nodes in a single line. Ring topology connects
every edge node to two neighboring devices. It is called a ring topology as its form
resembles a ring. A star topology connects all edge nodes to a centralized hub. In
the case of the midstream oil terminal, one of the edge nodes acts as a central hub
and connects to other edge nodes. A full-mesh topology creates a point-to-point
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(a) Line Topology

(b) Star Topology

(c) Ring Topology

(d) Full-mesh Topology

Figure 7.5: Different physical network topologies for P2P network

connection from each edge node to every other. Figure 7.5 illustrates each topology
for the twelve PLCs of the midstream oil terminal.
The network latency test measures the time taken by each PLC to complete
the sharing of physical states. For the midstream oil terminal, it is the sum of the
time taken by each PLC to send its physical state information to the other eleven
PLCs and the time taken to receive the states of all eleven PLCs. Hence for PLC1,
the network latency is
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Network latency of PLC 1= Time taken to send physical state information of
PLC 1 to all other PLCs + Time taken to receive physical state information of every
other PLCs
The analysis computes the network latency of all twelve PLCs for five topologies under consideration. Table 7.2 shows the measured latencies.
The star topology performs better than Gao’s approach. But Gao’s approach
provides more reliability, greater network bandwidth, and is cost-efficient. This is
because, star topology has a single point of failure; If the central node fails the
attached nodes get disabled. The central node has to handle heavy network traffic
from all other nodes. PLC having low computation capacity cannot handle such
network traffic. Additionally, the star topology is a centralized architecture. Hence
each node however far apart needs a physical connection to the central node. This
increases the construction cost of the network. Hence this research uses the topology
designed using Gao’s approach for the peer-to-peer network of the embedded IDS.
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Topology
of the
network
Line [154]
Ring [156]
Full Mesh
[156]
Star [157]
Gao’s
approach
[158]

14.16
23.14

1948.35

12.3

14.17

2200.75

12.49

10.71

PLC2

10.82
23.44

PLC1

10.67

13.6

1979.29

12.41
27.65

PLC3

11.52

10.59

2175.12

15.72
26.25

PLC4

18.93

10.75

2004.47

16.52
25.55

PLC5

17.55

15.22

2218.48

11.32
27.98

PLC6

13.39

12.72

2205.74

18.57
31.53

PLC7

13.8

13.25

2788.18

15.63
31.53

PLC8

11.43

12.88

2379.42

15.81
24.53

PLC9

11.92

15.29

2248.85

12.94
28.23

PLC10

Table 7.2: Network latency in milliseconds for different topologies

10.72

12.94

2169.44

15.36
29.54

PLC11

11.37

10.58

2572.38

14.73
24.5

PLC12

13.015

12.717

2240.87

Average
(in milliseconds)
14.49
26.99

7.2.3

Analysis Engine - Physical system anomaly detector
The physical system anomaly detector in the analysis engine runs every PLC

cycle and uses two types of state estimators to decide if readings of the sensors are
false. A data preprocessing unit aggregates the current readings from the Physical
Memory Map (PMM) and the System Memory Map (SMM). After aggregation, the
data preprocessing unit rearranges the readings and feeds the ordered list into a
FIFO stack. This stack is coupled to the inputs of the module containing the state
estimators. The state estimators predict a sensor value for the current timestamp. If
the prediction is within a confidence interval the physical system anomaly detector
marks the value as normal else the incident response system logs the false value of
the sensor.
The upcoming sections discuss the concepts of state estimation in the physical
system anomaly detector, analyzes the state estimation algorithm, and explains how
the state estimator uses a dynamic confidence interval for detecting a false sensor
reading.

7.2.3.1

Concept of state estimation

A state estimator models the values of a continuous or a discrete system parameter. It takes the current or older system conditions as an input and predicts
the state of the next time step.The analysis engine uses two types of state estimators: Type I and Type II. Each type performs a unique input to output mapping for
state estimation. This section uses the example of a generic interconnected system
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Figure 7.6: System with three interconnected PLCs

with three PLCs (shown in Figure 7.6) to illustrate the functionality of the state
estimators.
In the example, PLC X has m actuators and n sensors. Sensor and actuator
names start with ”s” and ”a” followed by the PLC name (X, Y, and Z) and the serial
number. The naming for PLC Y and PLC Z follows the same convention.
The Type I state estimator takes the value of the actuators and changes in
sensor value (∆st = st − st−1 ) at previous time stamps (t-1, t-2, t-3) as input and
predicts the change in sensor value at the current timestamp (t). Each sensor attached
to a PLC has a Type I state estimator. Hence, PLC X, Y, and Z have n, k, and q
Type I state estimators respectively. Figure 7.7 illustrates the mapping of the inputs
and the outputs of the Type I state estimator for PLC X.
The Type II state estimator models correlated sensor values of interdependent
processes in an industrial control system. An interdependent process is a large industrial system that uses multiple PLCs and adheres to a distributed control system
architecture. In such a system, a change of an actuator on one of the PLC may cause
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Figure 7.7: Type I state estimator for PLC X

changes in sensor states on other PLCs. An example of an interdependent industrial
operation is the TT loading operation at the mid-stream oil terminal. The TT loading operation uses three interconnected PLCs: a PLC controlling the tank farm, a
PLC controlling the pump house, and a PLC controlling the tanker trucks. During a
tanker truck loading operation, turning ON pumps at the pump house increases the
flow rate at the outlet of the pump house and at the TT loading bay; Sensors P7SF2
and P6SF1 observe these changes. The PLC controlling the tanker truck observes
a change in sensor reading even though the actuator states are the same. Here sensor P7SF2 and sensor P6SF1 illustrate a statistical correlation. Using the change in
values of one of the correlated sensors, the Type II state estimator can predict the
change in the other.
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The first step for modeling a Type II state estimator is identifying the correlated sensors. This research uses a statistical parameter called the Pearson Correlation Coefficient (PCC) [160] for measuring the linear relationship between two
sensor readings. The PCC coefficient ranges from -1 to +1. An exact value of +1
or -1 implies that a linear equation can completely describe the relationship of the
variables. While a value of 0 implies no linear correlation between the variables. For
this research, the interdependent processes in the midstream oil terminal require a
PCC value of at least |0.9| for building accurate state models [161]. Hence, while
identifying interdependent sensors, the case studies in the upcoming sections choose
the sensor pairs only if the PCC value is greater than or equal to |0.9|.

Table 7.3: Relations of sX1 and sX3 to the sensors of PLC Y and PLC Z

Relation of sX1 to sensors of
PLC Y and PLC Z
P CC(sX1 , sZ1 ) > |0.9|
P CC(sX1 , sZ3 ) > |0.9|
P CC(sX1 , sZ5 ) > |0.9|
P CC(sX1 , sY2 ) > |0.9|
P CC(sX1 , sY3 ) > |0.9|

Relation of sX3 to sensors of
PLC Y and PLC Z
P CC(sX3 , sZ2 ) > |0.9|
P CC(sX3 , sZ4 ) > |0.9|
P CC(sX3 , sY1 ) > |0.9|
P CC(sX3 , sY5 ) > |0.9|
P CC(sX3 , sY7 ) > |0.9|

Considering the example illustrated in Figure 7.6, Table 7.3 assumes some
PCC values for the correlated sensors. Using the values in Table 7.3, Figures 7.8 and
7.9 show a generalized mapping of the Type II estimators.
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Figure 7.8: Type II state estimators of PLC X for predicting correlated sensor
values of PLC Z

Figure 7.9: Type II state estimators of PLC X for predicting correlated sensor
values of PLC Y

7.2.3.2

Choice of algorithm for Type I and Type II state estimators

Predictions about a single timestamp are called a one-step forecast model. The
Type I and Type II state estimators are both one-step forecast models. These models
take a stack of values containing parallel input time series of sensors and actuators
values. The input time series are parallel because each series has an observation at
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the same time steps. The output depends on the input time series and predicts the
value of the current timestamp.
The algorithm for state estimation in the midstream oil terminal needs to infer
spatial and temporal structure from the data. The actuator and sensor data from
the midstream oil terminal have a spatial structure. For example, a tanker truck
loading operation in the midstream oil terminal involves the actuation of valves in
three locations; the change in sensor readings are spatially linked to these locations.
The state estimator has to infer the spatial relations from the data. Additionally, the
midstream oil terminal data has a temporal structure. For example, turning a pump
ON in the pumphouse increases the pressure and flow rate at the outlet of the pump
house at a future timestamp. Hence state estimation in a midstream oil terminal
requires the algorithm to understand spatial and temporal relation from operational
data.
Considering the requirement of spatial and temporal awareness, this research
uses a combination of Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) and Long Short-Term
Memory Network (LSTM) inside the state estimators. CNN-LSTM combination is the
current state-of-the-art for modeling multiple parallel input time series with spatial
and temporal structure [163, 164]. A deep CNN architecture extracts the spatial
features from the 1D input vector and the LSTM model interprets the features across
time steps. Together the hybrid CNN-LSTM model infers the spatial and temporal
information of the data.
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CNN-LSTM Structure
The CNN-LSTM combines two sub-models: the CNN model for feature extraction and the LSTM model for interpreting the features across time steps. The
CNN model has three layers: a 1-D convolutional layer, a Max pooling layer, and a
Flatten layer. Figure 7.10 shows the layout of the CNN layers and the LSTM backend
components. The 1-D convolutional layer analyzes the rolling window and extracts
the salient features. The kernel size parameter in the convolutional layer specifies the
number of time steps included in each input sequence. In this research, the kernel
size parameter is set to three because the Type I and II estimators use an input FIFO
stack containing three time steps. After the feature extraction, a Max pooling layer
reduces the dimensionality of the feature map and a Flatten layer converts the multidimensional feature map to a single dimensional array. A Time distributed wrapper
binds all three layers into a single CNN unit.
The CNN unit provides a single-dimensional feature vector to the LSTM network. Using these features, the LSTM learns the long-term dependencies between the
timestamps [165]. The LSTM network has two layers: an LSTM layer and a Dense
layer. The LSTM layer holds the neural network nodes for learning the behavior of
the system. This research optimizes the number of nodes using a technique called
GridSearchCV [166]. An LSTM layer with 200 nodes provides the lowest Root-MeanSquare Error (RMSE) values for the operational data of the midstream oil terminal.
The Dense layer adds the outputs of the nodes and provides the final prediction.
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Figure 7.10: Type II state estimators of PLC X for predicting correlated sensor
values of PLC Y

Data processing for Training CNN-LSTM
The operational data from an industrial control system contains states of the
actuators and sensors of each time step. The Type I and Type II state estimators using
the CNN-LSTM model, inputs a sequence of past states, and predicts the state of the
next time step. During training, the CNN-LSTM models require a data processing
script for transforming the sequence of past states into multiple input/output patterns
called samples. The samples for the Type I and II state estimators contain three time
steps as input and one time step as output. For example, considering the system
illustrated in Figure 7.6, Figure 7.11 shows the change of sensor (sX1 ) value for each
time step.
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Figure 7.11: Change of sensor (sX1 ) value for each time step

Figure 7.12 shows the samples after using the data preprocessing script. These
samples can act as input observations for training a Type I state estimator for sensor
sX1 . For training a Type II state estimator the target variable is a sensor correlated
to sX1 .
For the midstream oil terminal, the CNN-LSTM model trains using a data set
containing the normal operational data. The dataset has samples of all midstream
oil terminal operations discussed in chapter 4.
The training takes substantial computation resources. The edge nodes having
low computation power cannot train the state estimators. Hence, this research uses
a free google service called Colab for training. The CUDA enabled graphics card
available in Colab speeds up the training process.
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Figure 7.12: Samples for training a Type I state estimator
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Figure 7.13: Prediction of values of sensor P6SL1 and the dynamic confidence
interval

7.2.3.3

Confidence interval and detection of anomaly using state estimators

The physical system anomaly detector receives the predictions from the state
estimators and maintains a dynamic confidence interval for each estimator. The dynamic confidence interval of a state estimator is the standard deviation of a rolling
window containing 20 of its latest predictions. The dynamic confidence interval acts
as a threshold while measuring the variation of the state prediction from the current
sensor values. If the sensor value is out of the confidence interval the physical system
anomaly detector calls the incidence response system to log the false sensor value.
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A commercial taxi service called Uber uses this approach for quantifying uncertainty
while making predictions with LSTM [162]. Figure 7.13 shows the real time prediction and the confidence interval limits of a state estimator. The state estimator is
predicting the value of sensor P6SL1 during a tanker truck loading operation.

7.3

Case studies and evaluation

Chapter 5 shows the adverse effects of false reporting of sensor values (Ex14) during Tanker Truck loading (Attk-8), Marine Tanker loading (Attk-12), and
pipeline transfer operations (Attk-16) in the midstream oil terminal. This section
runs the embedded IDS inside the PLCs controlling the midstream oil terminal and
repeats exploit Ex-14 during the cargo operations. By doing so, this analysis evaluates
the behavior of the embedded IDS during the cyber-attacks. The case studies in
the upcoming sections limit the number of state estimators and the sensors to the
subsystems involved in the operation.

7.3.1

Tanker Truck loading operation - (Attack on single sensor)
The Tanker Truck (TT) loading operation involves three subsystems of the

midstream oil terminal: Tank Farm (TF), Pumphouse, and TT gantry. During TT
loading, the liquid cargo moves from the TF to the TT gantry through the pumphouse
(Section 4.4.2 of chapter 4 has a detailed discussion on the TT loading operation).
One of the adverse effects of cyber-attacks during the TT loading operation is an
overflow scenario. Section 5.4.1.3 of chapter 5 discusses an overflow scenario caused
by Ex-14. The software Trojan exploit delays the level sensor (P6SL1) reading of the
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Table 7.4: List of sensors involved in a gasoline TT loading operation
PLC Name
PLC 10 (Gasoline Tank Farm)

PLC 7 (Gasoline Pump House)

PLC 6 (TT Gantry)

Sensor Name
P10SL1
P10SP1
P10SF1
P7SF1
P7SF2
P7SP1
P7SP2
P6SF1
P6SP1
P6SL1
P6SL2

Purpose
TK11 Tank level
Dispatch valve pressure
Dispatch valve flow rate
Gasoline pump house inlet flow rate
Gasoline pump house outlet flow rate
Gasoline pump house inlet pressure
Gasoline pump house outlet pressure
Bay 1 flow rate sensor
Bay 1 pressure sensor
Bay 1 level sensor 1
Bay 1 level sensor 2

internal tanks of the TT by 7 seconds. This results in HMI reporting an older value
different from the actual reading of the level sensor. The delayed response misleads
the operators in taking an incorrect control decision and creates a cargo overflow
scenario.
The cyber-attack Attk-8 compromises a single PLC (PLC6) and spoofs the
readings of one level sensor (P6SL1) connected to it.
During the cyber-attack, the attacker compromises PLC 6 and delays the state
of the level sensor (P6SL1). Table 7.4 shows the complete list of sensors involved in
the gasoline tanker truck loading operation. For each sensor, the embedded IDS
has a Type I state estimator. The number of Type II state estimators depends on
the statistical relationship between the sensor readings. Hence, this analysis uses a
dataset containing normal operational data of the midstream oil terminal to compute
a matrix containing the Pearson Correlation Coefficient (PCC) of sensors responses.
Table 7.5 illustrates the matrix with the absolute PCC values of the sensors. A Type
II state estimator is built for sensors having PCC values higher than or equal to
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Table 7.5: Absolute values of Pearson Correlation Coefficient (PCC) of sensors

P10SL1
P10SP1
P10SF1
P7SF1
P7SP1
P7SF2
P7SP2
P6SF1
P6SP1
P6SL1
P6SL2

P10SL1

P10SP1

P10SF1

0.6251
0.9307
0.4751
0.3473
0.3156
0.1735
0.9482
0.9541

0.8215
0.9532
0.9213
0.4213
0.9012
0.7542
0.1247
0.1057

0.9644
0.6154
0.9124
0.5124
0.9249
0.6973
0.8503
0.8147

P7SF1
0.6251
0.8215
0.9644

P7SP1
0.9307
0.9732
0.6154

P7SF2
0.4751
0.9213
0.9124

P7SP2
0.3473
0.4213
0.5124

0.9732
0.1743
0.9455
0.9403

0.1745
0.0178
0.0943
0.0156

0.9721
0.7149
0.9566
0.9512

0.4541
0.7931
0.3150
0.4965

P6SF1
0.3156
0.9012
0.9249
0.9732
0.1745
0.9721
0.4541

P6SP1
0.1735
0.7542
0.6973
0.1743
0.0178
0.7149
0.7931

P6SL1
0.9482
0.1247
0.8503
0.9455
0.0943
0.9566
0.3150

P6SL2
0.9541
0.1057
0.8147
0.9403
0.0156
0.9512
0.4965

0.9. The Type II estimator lets the embedded IDS predict the state of the correlated
sensors in the neighboring nodes.
Table VI shows a complete list of Type I and Type II state estimators in
PLC 10, PLC 7, and PLC 6. This section represents these state estimators using a
specific nomenclature. The nomenclature uses the name of the sensor whose value
is being forecasted, followed by a subscript. The subscript represents the name of
the sensor that inputs to the state estimator. For example, a Type I state estimator
forecasting the value of sensor P10SL1 uses the past observation of P10SL1 for the
prediction. The nomenclature represents this state estimator as P 10SL1P 10SL1 . Another example, a Type II state estimator forecasting the value of sensor P7SF2 using
past observations of P6SL2 is represented as P 7SF 2P 6SL2 .
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Table 7.6: List of state estimators in PLC 10, PLC 7 and PLC 6
State estimator location

PLC 10 (Gasoline Tank Farm)

PLC 7 (Gasoline Pump House)

PLC 6 (TT Gantry)

State estimator type
Type I
Type I
Type I
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type I
Type I
Type I
Type I
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type I
Type I
Type I
Type I
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II

Input
Past SMM + Past observations of P10SL1
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SP1
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SL1
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SL1
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SL1
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SP1
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SP1
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SP1
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SP1
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SP2
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SP1
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SP1
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P6SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P6SP1
Current SMM + Past observations of P6SL1
Current SMM + Past observations of P6SL2
Current SMM + Past observations of P6SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P6SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P6SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P6SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P6SL1
Current SMM + Past observations of P6SL1
Current SMM + Past observations of P6SL2
Current SMM + Past observations of P6SL2
Current SMM + Past observations of P6SL2

Predicting
P10SL1
P10SP1
P10SF1
P7SP1
P6SL1
P6SL2
P7SP1
P7SF2
P6SF1
P7SF1
P7SF2
P6SF1
P7SF1
P7SF2
P7SP1
P7SP2
P10SF1
P6SF1
P6SL1
P6SL2
P10SL1
P10SP1
P10SP1
P10SF1
P6SF1
P6SL1
P6SL2
P6SF1
P6SP1
P6SL1
P6SL2
P10SP1
P10SF1
P7SF1
P7SF2
P10SL1
P7SF1
P10SL1
P7SF1
P7SF2

Figure 7.14 shows the predictions of the state estimators and the confidence
interval. The false reporting starts at the 122nd cycle of the PLC and the hardware
layer replaces the current observations of sensor P6SL1 with older values. The state
estimators forecasting the response of P6SL1 predicts a value different from the hardware layer. Every estimator flags it as an anomalous reading because the value of
the hardware layer is out of the confidence interval. During such scenarios, instead
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Figure 7.14: Prediction of the state estimators and the confidence interval of the
hardware layer values

of using the anomalous readings from the hardware layer, the Type I state estimator
P 6SL1P 6SL1 uses its predictions as input.
Table 7.7 shows the predictions of the state estimator, actual values from
MATLAB simulation, and the false readings from the hardware layer. Some state
estimators flag PLC cycle 125 and 126 as normal because the false readings overlap
with the actual values. The Type I states estimators in PLC 6 and the Type II state
estimators in PLC 7 and 10 detects the false readings of sensor P6SL1.
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Type II

Type I

PLC 7

PLC 6

P 6SL1P10SL1
P 6SL1P 7SF 1
P 6SL1P 7SF 2
P 6SL1P 6SL1

Sensor P6SL1

MATLAB Values
Hardware Layer
Predicted
Predicted
Predicted
Predicted

[2] The red cells are values outside confidence interval

[1] The green cells are values within confidence interval

State Estimator
Type
Type II

State Estimator
Location
PLC 10

Notation

Normal
Cycle
122
-4.25 e-11
-4.25 e-11
-4.25 e-11
-4.25 e-11
-4.25 e-11
-4.25 e-11

Normal
Cycle
121
-5.27 e-11
-5.27 e-11
-5.27 e-11
-5.27 e-11
-5.27 e-11
-5.27 e-11

False reporting
Cycle
123
-2.28
-4.25 e-11
-2.24
-2.31
-2.28
-2.31

False reporting
Cycle
124
-1.5
-4.25 e-11
-1.49
-1.52
-1.46
-1.55

PLC Cycles
False re- False reporting
porting
Cycle
Cycle
125
126
-0.424
0.6
-4.25 e-11 -4.25 e-11
-0.394
0.632
-0.446
0.557
-0.379
0.606
-0.46
0.592

Table 7.7: Behavior of the state estimators during the cyber-attack
False reporting
Cycle
127
0.852
-4.25 e-11
0.898
0.793
0.858
0.799

False reporting
Cycle
128
0.985
-4.25 e-11
1.01
0.939
1.03
0.966

False reporting
Cycle
129
1.07
-4.25 e-11
1.1
1.04
1.08
1.06

False reporting
Cycle
130
1.14
-4.25 e-11
1.18
1.1
1.16
1.13

7.3.2

Pipeline Transfer (PLT) operation - (Attack on multiple sensors)
The PLT operation transfers liquid cargo from a shore-side oil refinery to the

mid-stream oil terminal using a 150 kilometer (km) pipeline. The pipeline transports
the liquid cargo into one tank in the tank farm. Five pressure sensors (P3SP1,
P3SP2, P3SP3, P3SP4 and P3SP5) monitor the state of the pipeline during the PLT
operation. Attk-16 (discussed in section 5.4.2.1 of chapter 5) closes a valve at one
end of the pipeline and spoofs the readings of the pressure sensors. The closing of the
valve increases the pressure inside the pipeline. The operators do not see this change
of state because of the false readings of the pressure sensors. Attk-16 eventually leads
to a pipeline rupture.

Table 7.8: List of sensors involved in a gasoline PLT operation
PLC Name

PLC 3 (Pipeline Transfer)

PLC 10 (Gasoline Tank Farm)

Sensor Name
P3SP1
P3SF1
P3SP2
P3SF2
P3SP3
P3SF3
P3SP4
P3SF4
P3SP5
P3SF5
P10SP2
P10SF2
P10SL1

Purpose
Terminal side pressure
Terminal side flow rate
30 kilometers from terminal pressure
30 kilometers from terminal flow rate
60 kilometers from terminal pressure
60 kilometers from terminal flow rate
90 kilometers from terminal pressure
90 kilometers from terminal flow rate
120 kilometers from terminal pressure
120 kilometers from terminal flow rate
TK11 Receipt line pressure
TK11 Receipt line flow rate
TK11 Tank Level

The cyber-attack Attk-16, compromises a single PLC (PLC3) and spoofs
the readings of five pressure sensors (P3SP1, P3SP2, P3SP3, P3SP4, and
P3SP5) connected to it.
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Table 7.9: Absolute values of Pearson Correlation Coefficient (PCC) of sensors
P3SP1
P3SF1
P3SP2
P3SF2
P3SP3
P3SF3
P3SP4
P3SF4
P3SP5
P3SF5
P10SP2
P10SF2
P10SL1

P3SP1

P3SF1

P3SP2

P3SF2

P3SP3

P3SF3

P3SP4

P3SF4

P3SP5

P3SF5

0.9254
0.9569
0.1940

0.1504
0.9721
0.9679

0.6301
0.8739
0.2005

0.2951
0.9831
0.9437

0.7239
0.7960
0.1540

0.1093
0.9732
0.9475

0.6501
0.6134
0.4600

0.3050
0.9243
0.9180

0.6723
0.5987
0.1793

0.2109
0.9155
0.9172

P10SP2
0.9254
0.1504
0.6301
0.2951
0.7239
0.1093
0.6501
0.3050
0.6723
0.2109

P10SF2
0.9569
0.9721
0.8739
0.9831
0.7960
0.9732
0.6134
0.9243
0.5987
0.9155

P10SL1
0.1940
0.9679
0.2005
0.9437
0.1540
0.9475
0.4600
0.9180
0.1793
0.9172

Table 7.10: List of state estimators in PLC 10 and PLC 3
State estimator location

PLC 3 (Pipeline Transfer)

PLC 10 (Gasoline Tank Farm)

State estimator type
Type I
Type I
Type I
Type I
Type I
Type I
Type I
Type I
Type I
Type I
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type I
Type I
Type I
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II

Input
Current SMM + Past observations of P3SP1
Current SMM + Past observations of P3SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P3SP2
Current SMM + Past observations of P3SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P3SP3
Current SMM + Past observations of P3SF3
Current SMM + Past observations of P3SP4
Current SMM + Past observations of P3SF4
Current SMM + Past observations of P3SP5
Current SMM + Past observations of P3SF5
Current SMM + Past observations of P3SP1
Current SMM + Past observations of P3SP1
Current SMM + Past observations of P3SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P3SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P3SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P3SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P3SF3
Current SMM + Past observations of P3SF3
Current SMM + Past observations of P3SF4
Current SMM + Past observations of P3SF4
Current SMM + Past observations of P3SF5
Current SMM + Past observations of P3SF5
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SP2
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SL1
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SP2
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SL1
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SL1
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SL1
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SL1
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SL1
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Predicting
P3SP1
P3SF1
P3SP2
P3SF2
P3SP3
P3SF3
P3SP4
P3SF4
P3SP5
P3SF5
P10SP2
P10SF2
P10SF2
P10SL1
P10SF2
P10SL1
P10SF2
P10SL1
P10SF2
P10SL1
P10SF2
P10SL1
P10SP2
P10SF2
P10SL1
P3SP1
P3SP1
P3SF1
P3SF2
P3SF3
P3SF4
P3SF5
P3SF1
P3SF2
P3SF3
P3SF4
P3SF5

In PLT operation, PLC 3 manages the 150 km pipeline. The pipeline transports the liquid cargo into a gasoline tank farm. Table 7.8 shows the list of sensors
connected to PLC 3 and PLC 10. For each sensor, the embedded IDS has a Type
I state estimator. Type II state estimators are built for sensors having PCC values
higher than or equal to 0.9. Table 7.9 shows a matrix with the absolute PCC values
of the sensors. Table 7.10 illustrates a complete list of Type I and Type II state
estimators in PLC 10 and PLC 3.

Figure 7.15: Prediction of the state estimators and the confidence interval of the
hardware layer values
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Figure 7.16: Prediction of the state estimators and the confidence interval of the
hardware layer values

Figure 7.17: Prediction of the state estimators and the confidence interval of the
hardware layer values
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Figure 7.18: Prediction of the state estimators and the confidence interval of the
hardware layer values

Figure 7.19: Prediction of the state estimators and the confidence interval of the
hardware layer values
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Type I

Type II

PLC 3

PLC 10

State Estimator Notation
P 3SP 1P 3SP 1
P 3SP 2P 3SP 2
P 3SP 3P 3SP 3
P 3SP 4P 3SP 4
P 3SP 5P 3SP 5
P 3SP 1P 10SP 2
P 3SP 1P 10SF 2

Sensor P3SP5

Sensor P3SP4

Sensor P3SP3

Sensor P3SP2

[2] The red cells are values outside confidence interval

Predicted
Predicted
Predicted
Predicted
Predicted
Predicted
Predicted

MATLAB Values
Hardware Layer
MATLAB Values
Hardware Layer
MATLAB Values
Hardware Layer
MATLAB Values
Hardware Layer
MATLAB Values
Hardware Layer

[1] The green cells are values within confidence interval

State Estimator Type

State Estimator Location

Sensor
Sensor P3SP1

1.3711
0.0997
0.1601
0.43
0.880
1.3705
1.3710

Cycle 2
1.3710
1.3710
0.0983
0.0983
0.1613
0.1613
0.4218
0.4218
0.8893
0.8893

Cycle 1
1.3710
1.3710
0.0983
0.0983
0.1613
0.1613
0.4218
0.4218
0.8893
0.8893
1.3710
0.0991
0.16
0.4301
0.8780
1.37
1.3710

Normal

Normal

4.7320
225.0772
2.4021
1.8991
28.9346
4.6905
4.7237

False reporting
Cycle 3
4.7391
1.3710
225.3551
0.0983
2.6323
0.1613
1.9535
0.4218
29.3407
0.8893
4.7304
226.9749
3.2209
1.9730
29.07947
4.7069
4.7103

False reporting
Cycle 4
4.7354
1.3710
226.9389
0.0983
3.4267
0.1613
2.0838
0.4218
29.3437
0.8893

4.7301
228.9087
4.1906
2.2206
29.5040
4.7149
4.7214

4.73
229.9065
4.9731
2.3900
29.3500
4.7146
4.7279

PLC Cycles
False re- False reporting
porting
Cycle 5
Cycle 6
4.7317
4.7282
1.3710
1.3710
228.5181
230.0972
0.0983
0.0983
4.2086
4.8766
0.1613
0.1613
2.2364
2.4053
0.4218
0.4218
29.3471
29.3511
0.8893
0.8893

Table 7.11: Behavior of the state estimators during the cyber-attack

4.729
231.7052
5.6790
2.4919
29.3500
4.7412
4.72

False reporting
Cycle 7
4.7246
1.3710
231.6909
0.0983
5.7130
0.1613
2.5594
0.4218
29.3555
0.8893

4.723
233.3010
6.7920
2.7092
29.3590
4.7154
4.7194

False reporting
Cycle 8
4.7212
1.3710
233.3256
0.0983
6.9122
0.1613
2.6412
0.4218
29.3602
0.8893

4.7206
234.7206
7.5001
2.6907
29.3750
4.7150
4.7105

False reporting
Cycle 9
4.7177
1.3710
234.9768
0.0983
7.4099
0.1613
2.7074
0.4218
29.3649
0.8893

4.7181
236.0045
7.6061
2.7019
29.2909
4.7161
4.7101

False reporting
Cycle 10
4.7144
1.3710
236.6390
0.0983
7.7066
0.1613
2.7714
0.4218
29.3697
0.8893

Figures 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 show the predictions of the state estimators and
the confidence interval. The false reporting starts after the 2nd cycle of the PLC and
the hardware layer replaces the current observations of pressure sensors with older
values. The state estimators forecasting the response predicts a value different from
the hardware layer. Every estimator flags it as an anomalous reading because the
value of the hardware layer is out of the confidence interval. During such scenarios,
instead of using the anomalous readings from the hardware layer, the Type I state
estimators P 3SP 1P 3SP 1 , P 3SP 2P 3SP 2 , P 3SP 3P 3SP 3 , P 3SP 4P 3SP 4 , and P 3SP 5P 3SP 5
uses its predictions as input.
Table 7.11 shows the response of the state estimators during the cyber-attack.
The false readings are from the pressure sensor of PLC 3. The Type II state estimators P 3SP 1P 10SP 2 and P 3SP 1P 10SF 2 placed inside PLC 10 successfully identifies the
incorrect values. Hence, the embedded IDS is suitable for detecting the cyber-attacks
on the neighboring nodes when they are managing an interdependent process. Moreover, Attk-16 spoofs readings of multiple sensors. The Type I state estimators inside
PLC3 were able to flag the false values from all sensors.

7.3.3

Marine Tanker (MT) loading operation - (Attack on multiple sensors across multiple PLCs)
The MT loading operation involves four subsystems: gasoline tank farm (PLC

10), gasoline pump house (PLC 7), loading marine tanker (PLC 5), and 12.5 kilometers (km) terminal-to-jetty pipeline (PLC1). The centrifugal pumps in the gasoline
pump house transfer liquid cargo from the gasoline tank farm to the internal tanks of
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the Marine Tanker (MT) using the 12.5 km terminal-to-jetty pipeline. Attk-12 (discussed in section 4.21. of chapter 5) compromises three PLC during the MT loading
operation: PLC 1, PLC 5, and PLC 10. The attacker closes a valve at one end of
the jetty-to-terminal pipeline and spoofs the readings of the pressure sensors P1SP1,
P7SP2, and P10SP7. The operator does not see the rise in pressure because of the
closed valve and the pipeline ruptures.

Table 7.12: List of sensors involved in a gasoline PLT operation
State estimator location
PLC 1 (Loading Marine Tanker Pipeline)

PLC 5 (Loading Marine Tanker)

PLC 7 (Gasoline Pump House)

PLC 10 (Gasoline Tank Farm)

Sensor Name
P1SP1
P1SF1
P5SP1
P5SF1
P5SL1
P5SL2
P5SL3
P5SL4
P5SL5
P5SL6
P7SF1
P7SF2
P7SP1
P7SP2
P10SP7
P10SF7
P10SL3

Purpose
Terminal side pressure
Terminal side flow rate
Marine tanker manifold pressure
Marine tanker manifold flow rate
Tank P1 Level
Tank P2 Level
Tank P3 Level
Tank S1 Level
Tank S2 Level
Tank S3 Level
Gasoline pump house inlet flow rate
Gasoline pump house outlet flow rate
Gasoline pump house inlet pressure
Gasoline pump house outlet pressure
TK13 Dispatch line pressure
TK13 Dispatch line flow rate
TK13 Tank Level

The cyber-attack Attk-12 compromises three PLCs (PLC10, PLC7, and
PLC1) and spoofs the readings of three pressure sensors (P1SP1, P7SP2, and
P10SP7) connected to them.
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P1SP1
P1SF1
P5SP1
P5SF1
P5SL1
P5SL2
P5SL3
P5SL4
P5SL5
P5SL6
P7SF1
P7SF2
P7SP1
P7SP2
P10SP7
P10SF7
P10SL3

0.9613
0.6743
0.3703
0.6014
0.1907
0.1864
0.1005
0.145
0.4831
0.9913
0.371
0.9973
0.291
0.1391
0.0027

P1SP1

0.7931
0.9869
0.914
0.9034
0.9347
0.9064
0.954
0.9017
0.8571
0.9993
0.6713
0.6412
0.1789
0.013
0.1006

P1SF1

0.0051
0.6597
0.1343
0.743
0.1456
0.723
0.731

P5SP1
0.9613
0.7931

0.9301
0.9451
0.3219
0.416
0.0129
0.0397
0.364

P5SF1
0.6743
0.9869

0.673
0.9072
0.0947
0.112
0.71
0.1332
0.1131

P5SL1
0.3703
0.9140

0.7649
0.8901
0.3641
0.136
0.354
0.6311
0.1145

P5SL2
0.6014
0.9034

0.8561
0.9313
0.0541
0.213
0.1546
0.546
0.1165

P5SL3
0.1907
0.9347

0.731
0.9064
0.0721
0.7045
0.1655
0.1457
0.1364

P5SL4
0.1864
0.9064

0.8101
0.9431
0.0746
0.7601
0.3649
0.151
0.1516

P5SL5
0.1005
0.9540

0.643
0.8846
0.03
0.1114
0.1664
0.1564
0.616

P5SL6
0.1450
0.9017

0.1092
0.983
0.9136

P7SF1
0.4831
0.8571
0.0051
0.9301
0.6730
0.7649
0.8561
0.7310
0.8101
0.6430

0.306
0.9703
0.8012

P7SF2
0.9913
0.9993
0.6597
0.9451
0.9072
0.8901
0.9313
0.9064
0.9431
0.8846

0.9506
0.034
0.0633

P7SP1
0.3710
0.6713
0.1343
0.3219
0.0947
0.3641
0.0541
0.0721
0.0746
0.0300

0.013
0.1501
0.2643

P7SP2
0.9973
0.6412
0.7430
0.4160
0.1120
0.1360
0.2130
0.7045
0.7601
0.1114

Table 7.13: Absolute values of Pearson Correlation Coefficient (PCC) of sensors
P10SP7
0.2910
0.1789
0.1456
0.0129
0.7100
0.3540
0.1546
0.1655
0.3649
0.1664
0.1092
0.3060
0.9506
0.0130

P10SF7
0.1391
0.0130
0.7230
0.0397
0.1332
0.6311
0.5460
0.1457
0.1510
0.1564
0.9830
0.9703
0.0340
0.1501

P10SL3
0.0027
0.1006
0.7310
0.3640
0.1131
0.1145
0.1165
0.1364
0.1516
0.6160
0.9136
0.8012
0.0633
0.2643

Table 7.12 shows the list of sensors connected to PLC 1, PLC 5, PLC 7, and
PLC 10. The embedded IDS inside each PLCs have a Type I state estimator. Type
II state estimators are built for sensors having PCC values higher than or equal to
0.9. Table 7.13 shows a matrix with the absolute PCC values of the sensors. Table
7.14 illustrates a complete list of Type I and Type II state estimators in PLC 1, PLC
5, PLC 7, and PLC 10.
Table 7.15 shows the response of the state estimators during the cyber-attack.
The false readings are from the pressure sensors connected to PLC 1, 7, and 10.
During the attack, the Type II state estimators in PLC 5 identifies the incorrect values
from the pressure sensor connected to the neighboring node (PLC1). Additionally,
the Type I state estimators inside PLC 1, 7, and 10 detects the incorrect values from
pressure sensors connected. Figure 7.20 and 7.21 shows the predictions of the state
estimators and the confidence intervals.
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Table 7.14: List of state estimators

State estimator location

PLC 1
(Loading
Marine
Tanker
Pipeline)

PLC 5
(Loading
Marine
Tanker)

PLC 7
(Gasoline
Pump House)

PLC 10
(Gasoline
Tank Farm)

State
estimator
type
Type I
Type I
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type I
Type I
Type I
Type I
Type I
Type I
Type I
Type I
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type I
Type I
Type I
Type I
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type I
Type I
Type I
Type II
Type II
Type II
Type II

Input

Predicting

Current SMM + Past observations of P1SP1
Current SMM + Past observations of P1SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P1SP1
Current SMM + Past observations of P1SP1
Current SMM + Past observations of P1SP1
Current SMM + Past observations of P1SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P1SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P1SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P1SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P1SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P1SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P1SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P1SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P5SP1
Current SMM + Past observations of P5SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P5SL1
Current SMM + Past observations of P5SL2
Current SMM + Past observations of P5SL3
Current SMM + Past observations of P5SL4
Current SMM + Past observations of P5SL5
Current SMM + Past observations of P5SL6
Current SMM + Past observations of P5SP1
Current SMM + Past observations of P5SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P5SL1
Current SMM + Past observations of P5SL2
Current SMM + Past observations of P5SL3
Current SMM + Past observations of P5SL4
Current SMM + Past observations of P5SL5
Current SMM + Past observations of P5SL6
Current SMM + Past observations of P5SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P5SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P5SL1
Current SMM + Past observations of P5SL3
Current SMM + Past observations of P5SL4
Current SMM + Past observations of P5SL5
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SP1
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SP2
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF1
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SF2
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SP2
Current SMM + Past observations of P7SP1
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SP7
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SF7
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SL3
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SP7
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SF7
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SF7
Current SMM + Past observations of P10SL3

P1SP1
P1SF1
P5SP1
P7SF2
P7SP2
P5SF1
P5SL1
P5SL2
P5SL3
P5SL4
P5SL5
P5SL6
P7SF2
P5SP1
P5SF1
P5SL1
P5SL2
P5SL3
P5SL4
P5SL5
P5SL6
P1SP1
P1SF1
P1SF1
P1SF1
P1SF1
P1SF1
P1SF1
P1SF1
P7SF1
P7SF2
P7SF2
P7SF2
P7SF2
P7SF2
P7SF1
P7SF2
P7SP1
P7SP2
P5SF1
P10SF7
P10SL3
P1SP1
P1SF1
P5SF1
P5SL1
P5SL3
P5SL4
P5SL5
P10SF7
P1SP1
P10SP7
P10SP7
P10SF7
P10SL3
P7SP1
P7SF1
P7SF2
P7SF1
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Figure 7.20: Prediction of the state estimators and the confidence interval of the
hardware layer values

Figure 7.21: Prediction of the state estimators and the confidence interval of the
hardware layer values
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Type I

Type II

State Estimator Type
Type I
Type II
Type II
Type I

State Estimator Notation
P 1SP 1P 1SP 1
P 7SP 2P 1SP 1
P 1SP 1P 5SP 1
P 7SP 2P 7SP 2
P 1SP 1P 7SF 2
P 1SP 1P 7SP 2
P 10SP 7P 7SP 1
P 10SP 7P 10SP 7
Predicted
Predicted
Predicted
Predicted
Predicted
Predicted
Predicted
Predicted

MATLAB Values
Hardware Layer
MATLAB Values
Hardware Layer
MATLAB Values
Hardware Layer

[2] The red cells are values outside confidence interval

[1] The green cells are values within confidence interval

PLC 10

PLC 7

PLC 5

PLC 1

State Estimator Location

Sensor P10SP7

Sensor P7SP2

Sensor P1SP1

Sensor

-0.0019
-0.0045
-0.0028
-0.0025
-0.00011
-0.00015
-1.8601
-1.863

Normal
Cycle 1
-0.00004
-0.00004
-0.00004
-0.00004
-1.8668
-1.8668
-0.0020
-0.0032
-0.0031
-0.0031
-0.00054
-0.00034
-1.871
-1.864

Normal
Cycle 2
-0.00004
-0.00004
-0.00004
-0.00004
-1.8668
-1.8667
0.0016
42371.2
0.005
42051.09454
0.004
0.0029
-651.7318
-661.4175

False reporting
Cycle 3
2.98 E-08
-0.00004
43022.0814
-0.00004
-643.3943
-1.8667
0.0015
72612.001
0.00514
52789.1061
0.0051
0.0042
-691.0049
-593.4173

False reporting
Cycle 4
4.76 E-08
-0.00004
72232.1791
-0.00004
-677.0040
-1.8667
0.0014
235917.4175
0.00534
228009.3469
0.0059
0.00515
-676.7064
-674.1751

False reporting
Cycle 5
8.15 E-08
-0.00004
247666.5974
-0.00004
-689.0399
-1.8667

0.0007
270310.317
0.00594
269201.4697
0.00679
0.00643
-522.1094
-470.4136

PLC Cycles
False reporting
Cycle 6
8.30 E-08
-0.00004
272423.2571
-0.00004
-496.1942
-1.8667

0.0006
225166.0373
0.00672
223997.4397
0.00796
0.00685
-260.3104
-231.1465

False reporting
Cycle 7
7.99 E-08
-0.00004
225843.6113
-0.00004
-246.4120
-1.8667

Table 7.15: Behavior of the state estimators during the cyber-attack

0.0002
168390.104
0.00691
155533.0133
0.00801
0.00756
-30.7541
-50.1645

False reporting
Cycle 8
7.63 E-08
-0.00004
171334.4222
-0.00004
-0.5124
-1.8667

0.0001
125173.9
0.00731
101542.4763
0.00812
0.00798
180.9431
215.1647

False reporting
Cycle 9
7.28 E-08
-0.00004
123474.0606
-0.00004
199.1277
-1.8667

0.0001
91912.4
0.00781
72451.1124
0.00829
0.00809
315.4521
324.1443

False reporting
Cycle 10
6.98 E-08
-0.00004
85512.7711
-0.00004
330.3051
-1.8667

7.4

Impact on PLC performance

This section performs two experiments: the first experiment measures the
time taken by the embedded IDS to log a false sensor reading, the second experiment
analyzes the effect of the embedded IDS on the real time performance of the PLC.

7.4.1

Response time of the embedded IDS
This analysis measures the time taken by the embedded intrusion detection

system to respond to a false sensor reading. The embedded IDS operates inside the
PLCs of the midstream oil terminal. The experiment repeats Attk-8 (uses hardware
trojan to spoof level sensor reading of loading bay 1; a detailed description is in section 5.4.1.3 of chapter 5) ten times during the TT loading operation. Each instance
of the experiment measures the peer-to-peer network latency, time taken by the ensemble state estimators, and time taken by the incident response system. Figure 7.22
illustrates the average, median, and maximum response time of the embedded IDS.
The embedded IDS takes an average time of 33.922 milliseconds to predict and
log a false sensor reading. The analysis also reveals that the maximum time taken to
respond is 40.3 milliseconds. The disparity in response time is because of the network
latency of the peer-to-peer network.
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Figure 7.22: Response time of the embedded intrusion detection system

7.4.2

Effect On real time performance of the PLC
This analysis repeats the experiment of section 6.2.2.2 of chapter 6 and studies

the effect of embedded IDS with the physical system anomaly detector on the real-time
performance of PLCs. The embedded IDS operates inside PLC 6 of the midstream
oil terminal. The cycle time of the PLC is set to 50 milliseconds and an embedded
logger monitors the cycle time for a period of 24 hours. This experiment is repeated
thrice to study the cycle time data without the IDS, with embedded network IDS,
and with the embedded physical system anomaly detector.
The PLC maintains a mean cycle time of 50.04 milliseconds and a standard
deviation of 0.0142. The experiments show that the embedded IDS has no impact on
the real-time performance of the PLC
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Table 7.16: PLC cycle time in milliseconds
PLC
PLC without IDS
PLC with embedded
network IDS
PLC with embedded
network IDS and
physical system
anomaly detector
7.5

Average
50.04

Standard Deviation
0.0142

50.04

0.0142

50.04

0.0142

Conclusion

This chapter illustrates an implementation of a distributed embedded intrusion
detection system. The embedded IDS operates inside the PLCs and uses a peer-topeer network to share the physical states of the PLC with its neighboring nodes.
Using the states of the PLCs, a neural network-based state estimator predicts the
potential values of the sensors. The embedded IDS categorizes a sensor value as
incorrect if the values from the hardware layer are out of the prediction interval of
the state estimator.
Three case studies show the effectiveness of the embedded IDS for detecting
false sensor readings. In interdependent processes with correlated sensor values, the
embedded IDS can predict the state of the sensors connected to neighboring nodes.
Two experiments show that the IDS has no impact on the real-time performance of
the PLC and the response time of the IDS is less than the cycle time of the PLC.
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CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

8.1

Conclusion

A programmable logic controller (PLC) is a ruggedized digital computer for
controlling the industrial processes in cyber-physical systems. PLCs lack security
modules and rely on network isolation and centralized intrusion detection systems for
their protection from cyber-adversaries. This dissertation adds to the existing centralized security solutions and develops an embedded intrusion detection system (IDS)
inside the PLC. Additionally, this dissertation introduces a virtualization framework
for evaluating the embedded IDS.
The research leading to the development of the embedded IDS puts forth several contributions towards enhancing the current state of SCADA cybersecurity. The
first contribution of this work is the creation of a novel simulation framework capable of replicating industrial control systems. The framework is modular, scalable,
portable, and produces high-fidelity response during normal and cyber-attack conditions. The virtual nature of the framework reduces the implementation cost and lets
researchers assess novel cybersecurity principles.
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The second contribution uses the virtualization framework to model two laboratoryscale physical systems from the SCADA Security Laboratory at the University of
Alabama in Huntsville. This results in the development of two virtual testbeds: a
virtual model of a laboratory-scale gas pipeline and a virtual model of a laboratoryscale water tank. Having virtual replicas of physical systems allows this research to
validate the modeling framework. The validation shows a high fidelity response from
the virtual testbeds during normal and cyber-attack scenarios.
The modularity and the scalability of the virtualization framework allow researchers to build to-scale models of large industrial processes. Hence the third contribution of this dissertation leverages the scalability of the virtualization framework
and develops a to-scale model of a midstream oil terminal adhering to the American
Petroleum Institute (API) Standards. The midstream oil terminal testbed has twelve
PLCs and 217 sensors and actuators. The scale of the virtual midstream oil terminal
testbed enables researchers to model cyber attacks that exploit multiple components
simultaneously or in sequence. This flexibility supports the reproduction of large-scale
and cascading events, as well as analyses of the interdependencies existing between
systems.
The fourth contribution stitches together approaches from literature and creates a systematic workflow for developing meaningful cyber-attacks against the midstream oil terminal. Using the workflow, this research demonstrates the impact of
sixteen cyber-attacks on the midstream oil terminal testbed. The workflow is generic,
and researchers can use this technique for modeling cyber-attacks on any industrial
control system.
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The comprehensive threat model associated with the mid-stream oil terminal
executes the attacks from a compromised trusted node. Compromising a trusted node
allows the attacker to disable the centralized intrusion detection system. Hence, the
fifth contribution of this dissertation introduces a novel embedded network intrusion
detection (IDS) framework inside the PLCs. The framework has an anomaly detector
module. The anomaly detector baselines the normal behavior of the nodes and can
classify abnormal network behavior with high accuracy of 99.94 %. Additionally,
the embedded IDS has an anomaly categorizer that classifies a Man-in-the-middle
(MiTM), repeated command injection, and volumetric denial of service with a high
classification accuracy of 97.027 %. The experiments in this dissertation show that
the embedded IDS slows the network response of the PLC by 2.031 milliseconds and
has no impact on the real time performance of the PLC.
The aforementioned embedded IDS cannot detect anomalies related to the
physical system and has no visibility over the neighboring nodes. The last contribution of this dissertation addresses this issue and adds three modules to the embedded
IDS: a physical system data sensor, a peer-to-peer network for sharing states with
neighboring nodes, and a state estimator for detecting false sensor readings. With
the modifications, the embedded IDS detects falsified readings of sensors connected
to current and peer nodes. Two experiments show that the IDS has no impact on the
real-time performance of the PLC and the response time of the IDS is less than the
cycle time of the PLC.
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8.2

Future Work

The work in this dissertation encourages numerous research projects in the domain of SCADA modeling and embedded intrusion detection systems. For instance,
the SCADA modeling framework can be expanded upon by adding physical components along with the virtual elements. Such a testbed will demonstrate a Hardware-inthe-loop (HIL) scenario which might produce better fidelity than the virtual models.
This area needs further investigation and interested researchers should compare the
characteristics of a complete virtual model to a HIL version.
Another interesting project will be to replace the SCADA network module
with paradigms like software-defined networking (SDN) or network functions virtualization (NFV). These novel technologies provide flexible management for large-scale
networks and can virtualize an entire class of network node functions. Integrating
these technologies in the testbed will allow the model to have a network architecture
more realistic to the industrial control system.
Further investigations can be performed to enhance the embedded IDS technology presented in chapters 6 and 7. The list of possible research path on embedded
intrusion detection systems are:

1. Placement of data sensor: The embedded intrusion detection system uses
data sensors at two locations. The first sensors monitor the incoming network
traffic, while the second monitors the sensors and actuators by taking a snapshot
of the MODBUS memory of the PLC. Researchers can study the effect of adding
more sensors to the embedded IDS. An interesting idea is to add data sensors
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at centralized nodes. This will provide the embedded IDS with the visibility
over the trusted nodes.
2. Comparison of different algorithms in the analysis engine: This research uses several algorithms for detecting cyber-attacks on the midstream
oil terminal. Researchers can analyze different algorithms and compare their
performance.
3. Improving peer-to-peer network response: This research introduces the
idea of using the peer-to-peer network for sharing states of neighboring PLCs.
The experiments in chapter 7 show that the sharing of states takes longer than
all other operations of the IDS. Hence, improving peer-to-peer communication
might improve the response time of the embedded IDS.
4. Incident response in SCADA: The embedded IDS has an incident response
module that is invoked if a cyber-attack is detected. A proper response to the
detected attack can prevent or minimize the impact of the attack. Hence, more
research will help the embedded intrusion detection system to better respond
to cyber-attacks.
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APPENDIX A

APPENDIX

This appendix lists the names and locations of the PLCs, sensors, and actuators in the mid-stream oil terminal testbed. The names of the PLCs starts with
“P” followed by a serial number. The names of the sensors and actuators physically
connected to the PLC starts with the names of the PLC followed by the component
code and a serial number.
Component codes for the sensors and actuators are:
• Pressure sensor - ”SP”
• Flow rate sensor - ”SF”
• Level Sensor - ”SL”
• Valve- ”AV”
• Pump- ”AP”
• Earthing(Ground wire)- ”AE”
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Some examples:
• A pressure sensor connected to PLC1 will be P1SP(component index number )
• A valve connected to PLC12 will be P12AV(component index number )
• A pump connected to PLC7 will be P7AP(component index number )

A.1

List of PLCs, sensors and actuators

Table A.1: List of PLCs

VM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
SIMULINK

IP address
100.100.100.1
100.100.100.2
100.100.100.3
100.100.100.4
100.100.100.5
100.100.100.6
100.100.100.7
100.100.100.8
100.100.100.9
100.100.100.10
100.100.100.11
100.100.100.12
100.100.100.200

PLC Functionality
Loading Oil Tanker Pipeline
Loading Marine Tanker Controls
Pipeline Transfer
Discharging Marine Tanker
Dispatch oil Tanker Pipeline
TT Controls
Gasoline Pumphouse
Diesel Pumphouse
ATF Pumphouse
Gasoline Tankfarm
Diesel Tankfarm
ATF Tankfarm
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Table A.2: Components connected to PLC1
Controllers Involved

Area of operation

P1

Loading Marine Tanker Pipeline

Sensor and Actuators
ID
Location
P1AV1
Gasoline Pipeline
P1AV2
Gasoline Pipeline
P1AV3
Diesel Pipeline
P1AV4
Diesel Pipeline
P1AV5
ATF Pipeline
P1AV6
ATF Pipeline
P1AV7
Loading Arm
P1AV8
Marine tanker manifold
P1SP1 Terminal side pipeline-end
P1SF1 Terminal side pipeline-end

Table A.3: Components connected to PLC2
Controllers Involved

Area of operation

P2

Unloading Marine Tanker Pipeline

Sensor and Actuators
ID
Location
P2AV1
Gasoline Pipeline
P2AV2
Gasoline Pipeline
P2AV3
Diesel Pipeline
P2AV4
Diesel Pipeline
P2AV5
ATF Pipeline
P2AV6
ATF Pipeline
P2AV7
Loading Arm
P2AV8
Marine tanker manifold
P2SP1 Terminal side pipeline-end
P2SF1 Terminal side pipeline-end
P2AP1
Marine tanker Pump

Table A.4: Components connected to PLC3
Controllers Involved

Area of operation

P3

Pipeline Transfer

ID
P3SP1
P3SF1
P3SP2
P3SF2
P3SP3
P3SF3
P3SP4
P3SF4
P3SP5
P3SF5
P3SP1
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Sensor and Actuators
Location
Terminal side pressure
Terminal side flow rate
30 kilometers from terminal pressure
30 kilometers from terminal flow rate
60 kilometers from terminal pressure
60 kilometers from terminal flow rate
90 kilometers from terminal pressure
90 kilometers from terminal flow rate
120 kilometers from terminal pressure
120 kilometers from terminal flow rate
Terminal side pressure

Table A.5: Components connected to PLC4
Controllers Involved

Area of operation

P4

Unloading Marine Tanker

Sensor and Actuators
ID
Location
P4SL1
P1 Level
P4SL2
P2 Level
P4SL3
P3 Level
P4SL4
S1 Level
P4SL5
S2 Level
P4SL6
S3 Level
P4AV1
P1 Valve
P4AV2
P2 Valve
P4AV3
P3 Valve
P4AV4
S1 Valve
P4AV5
S2 Valve
P4AV6
S3 Valve
P4SP1 Marine tanker manifold
P4SF1 Marine tanker manifold

Table A.6: Components connected to PLC5
Controllers Involved

Area of operation

P5

Loading Marine Tanker
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Sensor and Actuators
ID
Location
P5SL1
P1 Level
P5SL2
P2 Level
P5SL3
P3 Level
P5SL4
S1 Level
P5SL5
S2 Level
P5SL6
S3 Level
P5AV1
P1 Valve
P5AV2
P2 Valve
P5AV3
P3 Valve
P5AV4
S1 Valve
P5AV5
S2 Valve
P5AV6
S3 Valve
P5SP1 Marine tanker manifold
P5SF1 Marine tanker manifold

Table A.7: Components connected to PLC6
Controllers Involved

Area of operation

P6

Tanker Truck Gantry
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Sensor and Actuators
ID
Location
P6AV1
Bay 1 Valve 1
P6AV2
Bay 1 Valve 2
P6AV3
Bay 2 Valve 1
P6AV4
Bay 2 Valve 2
P6AV5
Bay 3 Valve 1
P6AV6
Bay 3 Valve 2
P6AE1
Bay 1 Earthing 1
P6AE2
Bay 2 Earthing 2
P6AE3
Bay 3 Earthing 3
P6SP1
Bay 1 Pressure Sensor
P6SP2
Bay 2 Pressure Sensor
P6SP3 Bay 3 Pressure Sensor 1
P6SP4 Bay 3 Pressure Sensor 2
P6SF1
Bay 1 Flowrate Sensor
P6SF2
Bay 2 Flowrate Sensor
P6SF3 Bay 3 Flowrate Sensor 1
P6SF4 Bay 3 Flowrate Sensor 2
P6SL1
Bay 1 Level Sensor 1
P6SL2
Bay 1 Level Sensor 2
P6SL3
Bay 2 Level Sensor 1
P6SL4
Bay 2 Level Sensor 2
P6SL5
Bay 3 Level Sensor 1
P6SL6
Bay 3 Level Sensor 2

Table A.8: Components connected to PLC7
Controllers Involved

Area of operation

P7

Gasoline Pump House

ID
P7AV1
P7AV2
P7AV3
P7AV4
P7AV5
P7AV6
P7AV7
P7AV8
P7AV9
P7AV10
P7AV11
P7AV12
P7AV13
P7AV14
P7AV15
P7AV16
P7AV17
P7AV18
P7SF1
P7SF2
P7SP1
P7SP2
P7AP1
P7AP2
P7AP3
P7AP4
P7AP5
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Sensor and Actuators
Location
Pump House Dispatch Inlet
Pump House Dispatch Inlet
Pump 1 Inlet
Pump 1 Outlet
Pump 2 Inlet
Pump 2 Outlet
Pump 3 Inlet
Pump 3 Outlet
Pump 4 Inlet
Pump 4 Outlet
Pump 5 Inlet
Pump 5 Outlet
Pump House TT Pipeline
Pump House TT Pipeline
Pump House MT Pipeline
Pump House MT Pipeline
Pump House TF Pipeline
Pump House TF Pipeline
Gasoline pump house inlet flowrate
Gasoline pump house outlet flowrate
Gasoline pump house inlet pressure
Gasoline pump house outlet pressure
Pump 1
Pump 2
Pump 3
Pump 4
Pump 5

Table A.9: Components connected to PLC8
Controllers Involved

Area of operation

P8

Diesel Pump House

ID
P8AV1
P8AV2
P8AV3
P8AV4
P8AV5
P8AV6
P8AV7
P8AV8
P8AV9
P8AV10
P8AV11
P8AV12
P8AV13
P8AV14
P8AV15
P8AV16
P8AV17
P8AV18
P8SF1
P8SF2
P8SP1
P8SP2
P8AP1
P8AP2
P8AP3
P8AP4
P8AP5
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Sensor and Actuators
Location
Pump House Dispatch Inlet
Pump House Dispatch Inlet
Pump 1 Inlet
Pump 1 Outlet
Pump 2 Inlet
Pump 2 Outlet
Pump 3 Inlet
Pump 3 Outlet
Pump 4 Inlet
Pump 4 Outlet
Pump 5 Inlet
Pump 5 Outlet
Pump House TT Pipeline
Pump House TT Pipeline
Pump House MT Pipeline
Pump House MT Pipeline
Pump House TF Pipeline
Pump House TF Pipeline
Gasoline pump house inlet flowrate
Gasoline pump house outlet flowrate
Gasoline pump house inlet pressure
Gasoline pump house outlet pressure
Pump 1
Pump 2
Pump 3
Pump 4
Pump 5

Table A.10: Components connected to PLC9
Controllers Involved

Area of operation

P9

ATF Pump House

ID
P9AV1
P9AV2
P9AV3
P9AV4
P9AV5
P9AV6
P9AV7
P9AV8
P9AV9
P9AV10
P9AV11
P9AV12
P9AV13
P9AV14
P9AV15
P9AV16
P9AV17
P9AV18
P9SF1
P9SF2
P9SP1
P9SP2
P9AP1
P9AP2
P9AP3
P9AP4
P9AP5
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Sensor and Actuators
Location
Pump House Dispatch Inlet
Pump House Dispatch Inlet
Pump 1 Inlet
Pump 1 Outlet
Pump 2 Inlet
Pump 2 Outlet
Pump 3 Inlet
Pump 3 Outlet
Pump 4 Inlet
Pump 4 Outlet
Pump 5 Inlet
Pump 5 Outlet
Pump House TT Pipeline
Pump House TT Pipeline
Pump House MT Pipeline
Pump House MT Pipeline
Pump House TF Pipeline
Pump House TF Pipeline
Gasoline pump house inlet flowrate
Gasoline pump house outlet flowrate
Gasoline pump house inlet pressure
Gasoline pump house outlet pressure
Pump 1
Pump 2
Pump 3
Pump 4
Pump 5

Table A.11: Components connected to PLC10
Controllers Involved

Area of operation

Gasoline Tank farm
P10
(TF1)
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Sensor and Actuators
ID
Location
P10SP1
TK11 Dispatch line
P10SF1
TK11 Dispatch line
P10SL1
TK11 Level
P10AV1
TK11 Dispatch line
P10AV2
TK11 Dispatch line
P10AV3
TK11 Receipt line
P10AV4
TK11 Receipt line
P10AV5 TK11 Recirculation line
P10AV6 TK11 Recirculation line
P10SP2
TK11 Receipt line
P10SF2
TK11 Receipt line
P10SP3 TK11 Recirculation line
P10SF3 TK11 Recirculation line
P10SP4
TK12 Dispatch line
P10SF4
TK12 Dispatch line
P10SL2
TK12 Level
P10AV7
TK12 Dispatch line
P10AV8
TK12 Dispatch line
P10AV9
TK12 Receipt line
P10AV10
TK12 Receipt line
P10AV11 TK12 Recirculation line
P10AV12 TK12 Recirculation line
P10SP5
TK12 Receipt line
P10SF5
TK12 Receipt line
P10SP6 TK12 Recirculation line
P10SF6 TK12 Recirculation line
P10SP7
TK13 Dispatch line
P10SF7
TK13 Dispatch line
P10SL3
TK13 Level
P10AV13
TK13 Dispatch line
P10AV14
TK13 Dispatch line
P10AV15
TK13 Receipt line
P10AV16
TK13 Receipt line
P10AV17 TK13 Recirculation line
P10AV18 TK13 Recirculation line
P10SP8
TK13 Receipt line
P10SF8
TK13 Receipt line
P10SP9 TK13 Recirculation line
P10SF9 TK13 Recirculation line
P10SP10
TK14 Dispatch line
P10SF10
TK14 Dispatch line
P10SL4
TK14 Level
P10AV19
TK14 Dispatch line
P10AV20
TK14 Dispatch line
P10AV21
TK14 Receipt line
P10AV22
TK14 Receipt line
P10AV23 TK14 Recirculation line
P10AV24 TK14 Recirculation line
P10SP11
TK14 Receipt line
P10SF11
TK14 Receipt line
P10SP12 TK14 Recirculation line
P10SF12 TK14 Recirculation line

Table A.12: Components connected to PLC11
Controllers Involved

Area of operation

P11

Diesel Tank Farm (TF 2)
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Sensor and Actuators
ID
Location
P11SP1
TK21 Dispatch line
P11SF1
TK21 Dispatch line
P11SL1
TK21 Level
P11AV1
TK21 Dispatch line
P11AV2
TK21 Dispatch line
P11AV3
TK21 Receipt line
P11AV4
TK21 Receipt line
P11AV5 TK21 Recirculation line
P11AV6 TK21 Recirculation line
P11SP2
TK21 Receipt line
P11SF2
TK21 Receipt line
P11SP3 TK21 Recirculation line
P11SF3 TK21 Recirculation line
P11SP4
TK22 Dispatch line
P11SF4
TK22 Dispatch line
P11SL2
TK22 Level
P11AV7
TK22 Dispatch line
P11AV8
TK22 Dispatch line
P11AV9
TK22 Receipt line
P11AV10
TK22 Receipt line
P11AV11 TK22 Recirculation line
P11AV12 TK22 Recirculation line
P11SP5
TK22 Receipt line
P11SF5
TK22 Receipt line
P11SP6 TK22 Recirculation line
P11SF6 TK22 Recirculation line
P11SP7
TK23 Dispatch line
P11SF7
TK23 Dispatch line
P11SL3
TK23 Level
P11AV13
TK23 Dispatch line
P11AV14
TK23 Dispatch line
P11AV15
TK23 Receipt line
P11AV16
TK23 Receipt line
P11AV17 TK23 Recirculation line
P11AV18 TK23 Recirculation line
P11SP8
TK23 Receipt line
P11SF8
TK23 Receipt line
P11SP9 TK23 Recirculation line
P11SF9 TK23 Recirculation line
P11SP10
TK24 Dispatch line
P11SF10
TK24 Dispatch line
P11SL4
TK24 Level
P11AV19
TK24 Dispatch line
P11AV20
TK24 Dispatch line
P11AV21
TK24 Receipt line
P11AV22
TK24 Receipt line
P11AV23 TK24 Recirculation line
P11AV24 TK24 Recirculation line
P11SP11
TK24 Receipt line
P11SF11
TK24 Receipt line
P11SP12 TK24 Recirculation line
P11SF12 TK24 Recirculation line

Table A.13: Components connected to PLC12
Controllers Involved

Area of operation

P12

ATF Tank Farm (TF 3)
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Sensor and Actuators
ID
Location
P12SP1
TK31 Dispatch line
P12SF1
TK31 Dispatch line
P12SL1
TK31 Level
P12AV1
TK31 Dispatch line
P12AV2
TK31 Dispatch line
P12AV3
TK31 Receipt line
P12AV4
TK31 Receipt line
P12AV5 TK31 Recirculation line
P12AV6 TK31 Recirculation line
P12SP2
TK31 Receipt line
P12SF2
TK31 Receipt line
P12SP3 TK31 Recirculation line
P12SF3 TK31 Recirculation line
P12SP4
TK32 Dispatch line
P12SF4
TK32 Dispatch line
P12SL2
TK32 Level
P12AV7
TK32 Dispatch line
P12AV8
TK32 Dispatch line
P12AV9
TK32 Receipt line
P12AV10
TK32 Receipt line
P12AV11 TK32 Recirculation line
P12AV12 TK32 Recirculation line
P12SP5
TK32 Receipt line
P12SF5
TK32 Receipt line
P12SP6 TK32 Recirculation line
P12SF6 TK32 Recirculation line
P12SP7
TK33 Dispatch line
P12SF7
TK33 Dispatch line
P12SL3
TK33 Level
P12AV13
TK33 Dispatch line
P12AV14
TK33 Dispatch line
P12AV15
TK33 Receipt line
P12AV16
TK33 Receipt line
P12AV17 TK33 Recirculation line
P12AV18 TK33 Recirculation line
P12SP8
TK33 Receipt line
P12SF8
TK33 Receipt line
P12SP9 TK33 Recirculation line
P12SF9 TK33 Recirculation line
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